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PREFACE
What follows is not typical of modern American 
sociology*.- References to standard authorities in the field 
of social change will be scarce; primary and secondary data 
will originate in historical, political, popular and 
intuition!stic sources by design. This scheme makes 
m  s s it.' x *3 a t synthesis of the disparate contributions to 
l^ocial change- .and "futurologyt? of, inter alia, Richard T« 
4j£aF±ere, Marion Yanfossen, Alvin Toffler and myself. 
..Departing from the accepted thesis format is necessary to 
the task, that is, to predict where post-modern culture is 
--j^eaded by using common and, whenever useful, uncommon 
Sociological indicators and theorists.
- •' Probably a shocking and discomforting aspect of
the enterprise., for readers of "journal sociology”, is the 
lack of attention paid to many discipline champions. For 
example, Michael Harrington1s newest book, Socialism, is 
genuinely fascinating to read and study, particularly his 
15reinterpretation5V of the "real" Marx. It is written with 
the appropriate liberating sentiment and- intellectual 
sophistication one would expect from a professional 
American revolutionary” and social scientist. However, 
the book is involved in an academic game for which there
is no time in the course of this thesis: it is in the lay
sense "scholarly”, i.e. totally, inexorably out of touch 
with social reality. Harrington is carrying on in the 
noble radical tradition, trying to effect social change by 
writing a normatively powerful tract. That there is little 
empirical evidence to support his main contention - a 
revolutionary potential about to erupt within the American 
labor organization - does not actually impune the quality 
of the book. Reading it is like reading The City of God: 
it has to do with relatively little in the real world, but 
as, literature, human thought and normative suggestion, it 
■, is quite good.
f . This distinction, then, between scholarly game-
playing and accurate, empirically "sensible51 analysis will 
u. remain central throughout the following. While several 
^-especially useful books will be given intensive treatment, 
point of the thesis will not be to display scholastic 
■fireworks, although writing in that style is great fun and 
sometimes even of sociological use. Put in simplest terms, 
although it would be personally satisfying to write some­
thing along the lines of "The Epistemological Roots of 
Wissenssoyiologie" or "The Revolutionary Content of Marx", 
the following work is a. more pedestrian, Yeblen-Mills style 
scholarship, aimed at speaking simply and directly about 
the readily perceivable, the sociologically accurate, about 
the "real worldM and of nothing extraneous to it*
However., there is inherent in this a central paradox 
which may seem to contradict the above* What the following 
does not promise is simplistic solutions to the question of 
social change*.. In each part of the world, a different type 
of change will 'probably obtain, and at different rates, with 
different actors. Even within the limits of any given 
sector, there will exist easily perceived diversity,, This 
thesis will study and prognosticate about change of major 
and thoroughgoing proportions within, essentially, the 
United .States and 3.ike areas of the modem world* What 
-will, be described is the genesis of a new definition, of 
phs-elf", of the social actor, along with concomitant, 
^.o-gically necessary adjustments of the socio-political 
'world both, as.cause and effect of these revised self-views. 
>:?;To step,’-slightly ahead, a theory which hopes to avoid 
inadequate linear projection must concern itself with an. 
appropriate range and diversity of personality types,- 
especially those most likely to instigate or adopt alter­
ations in social processes, structures, and/or values,. 
Therefore, economic and political realities will be to 
some degree deemphasized (as opposed to their usual 
primary position in studies of change) in favor of 
social-psychological, valuational factors. This is not 
however a fabricated, academic position of preference so 
much as a reflection of necessities in the study of change 
as I think it will occur in the future*
ABSTRACT
This study was undertaken in the belief that current 
theories of social change, -especially those espoused and 
utilized by sociologists, are inadequate as explanatory tools
regarding certain types of social change in the. future.
One unorthodox theory of change, that of Richard T. 
LaPiere 7 was found to be of in ore use than others. This theory 
was radically -modified to .better- • facilitate- the analysis of 
the latest manifest at ions of'.social change.
A survey of social change in Western history from the 
middle ages to the present day was performed in order to
stzrat e the efficacy of haPieref s theory plus the attendant 
Modifications proposed by the author«
*:i ' Finally, the societal problems which may well evolve
i&lorg with the new form of change were examined* Some minor 
■suggestions for mitigating the impact of these problems were 
made•
A THEORY OF FUTURE SOCIAL CHANGE
INTRODUCTION
The following is an attempt at what has come to be 
termed "grand theory". Although Mills years ago attacked 
entrenched theorists by using the term pejoratively, some 
of his admirers have recently hqen theorizing on the 
macroscopic level, it might seem, in spite of his admon­
ishment • However, the motive behind their writing has not 
sen,. as in the case of the writers Mills examined, to aid
|.rr.hhe legitimation of a- social order under the slogan
Rvalue-free" social, science. Rather, men like I. !•« 
Horowitz,- N.« Bimbaum, the quasi-Marxists of Britain, and 
an,?;amorphous Continental contingent who combine critical 
philosophy with sociology (including the Frankfurt 
school), work at producing large-scale critiques of the 
traditional systems In which they operate. Gonldner• s 
Coming Cxdsis,in'Western Sociology, although demonstrably 
- shoddy in other respects, puts succinctly the problem of 
a social science enamored more of a safe, antiseptic 
"predictive" role than that of partisan. It should be 
obvious then that this thesis has been crafted In the 
increasingly accepted belief that sociology, diluted In 
its normative character, becomes dangerously neutral 
academic chatter. The sociology of knowledge has
p
3
conclusively demonstrated that social scientists* perhaps 
more than other, scholars, are by definition* from the first 
moment of their research, inextricably embroiled in 
evaluat i ve concerns.
As a prelude to this project, and in the hope of 
resolving major methodological questions* I made a study of 
the relatively new "sociology of sociology*1. The small but 
potent literature in this blossoming subfield has become 
radical in both methodological - and substantive suggestion. 
s('l) ("Radical7* in. this sense connotes an attitude of 
^•persistant critical intensity, aimed at investigating, and, 
'ftt warranted, debunking standard ideologies offered by 
- who seek to maintain unnecessarily inegalitarian
..social organization and structure.) It was felt that a 
study of social change ought first to be informed of 
valent sociological "domain assumptions" (2) and 
£Oit sequent blind spots common to the discipl.ine itself.
While this may seem of excessively peripheral interest, the 
brief,; study nevertheless pi*ovided a general!25ed legitimation 
fox’ the historically maligned radical position, and thus 
served in supporting and corroborating the suspicion, 
harbored by younger practitioners, that sociology has been 
hiding from the more flammable* less funded areas of 
research* The reasons for this avoidance behavior on the 
part of most researchers is easily documented by common- 
sense evaluations (professional aspirations, fund procure­
ment, etc.), and by more sophisticated ideological analyses*
estrange itself from the ignominious near-homonym * 
socialism)*- but that given the current sentiment and 
interest in social policy* such 'behavior still persists 
(especially in the most statistically oriented universities 
and research settings)*
In subscribing to this radical position* the 
younger researchers concern themselves less with quanti­
fiable precision than with the overall legitimacy and 
rmeaning of any given project* and moreover* with content 
ijftprjocess and. values) and not so much with the historical 
pubberfuge of conservatives * form (structure )• It has been 
pointed out. since antiquity that dichotomous descriptions 
.of reality* these included* are usually highly interdepen- 
lt#3at in the "real" world* so that in fact we cannot deal 
:^th,only process* only values or only content* no more 
than exclusively with structure, form or "patterned 
variables"* Among the many reasons for this* the most 
cogent -‘ is. that these terms are not mutually exclusive : 
they are complementary analytic/descriptive tools*
However, as the post-Mills generation is quick to point 
out, in the past those sociologists concerned for the most 
part with structure and form have arrived (and/or begun) 
at.conservative theoretical positions and promulgated upon 
their sociological audience a great many suggestions for 
research to support their reactionary contentions* By
eschewing "abstracted empiricism11, the modern theorist risks 
being labeled npolemicist”, "pamphleteer” and "popularize!*" 
by his computerized colleagues. However, he may well 
produce, with sufficient attention to qualitative and 
historical methodology, hard-hitting, sociologically 
sensible work, as evidenced' by many of Mills* followers 
end others of his ilk who wrote before him®
The present work is not a "review of the literature”, 
a "replication study”, or a. test of the validity c-f a former 
theory: it is an attempt at an -’original" theory of future
social change* Obviously, however, there has been incurred 
heavy intellectual debt to earlier thinkers who pointed 
;in the direction taken here® Shis is- certainly not ab 
nihilo theorizing* These precursors are considered by 
many to be extremely gifted sociologists, and to extend 
their insights somewhat is an "advocate1s" role rather than 
of the "innovator" * This thesis will utilise pre­
dominantly sociological, and historical sources in describ­
ing and analyzing with broad strokes the history of social 
change {of a certain specifiable type) in the modem world® 
Building on that analysis, I will propose a theory of 
rationalized, consciously perpetrated change which claims 
fox- itself strong predictive power regarding the future of 
particular areas of the world* (This is done with high 
regard, for the critical legacy of Mills, and the spirit; he 
proposed for-the social sciences, as clearly explained by 
Horowitz in his introduction to The New Sociology (1) ).
At/the same time and by way of qualification, much of this 
presentation, especially those sections dealing with social 
movements, political revolutions and the general theory of 
social change as borrowed fi*om noted thinkers, is nothing 
but "journeyman sociology”. As is typical of research at 
this level" of the academic hierarchy, most of the useable 
input... is .derivative, not original, for example, in the use 
..of such standards as Arnold W. Green’s introductory text.
The first lesson in the study of social change of whatever 
type is that real, purposive, singularly- conceived innovation 
Vis, for a variety of sociological reasons (beyond personal 
^S'iHitstions), a most difficult enterprise® That this axiom 
■’laja^ plies to academic theorising should be emphasized, for 
*fehe education8.l-schol.arly milieu very often demands near- 
• |conformity, thereby excluding and denigrating innovational 
v^pproao'hes to the subject matter.
Horowitz has given us a poignant reminder, that this 
was'so, even as recently as the mid~1950f s:
'.•.we are all too ready to pay homage to the dead.
Mills received no awards which sociologists make 
annually for books deserving and otherwise - while 
mow an ‘annual award is to be made in his name.
After Power Elite he was turned, down for every 
request for"a grant from the great institutions of 
the 1philanthropoids1 with but a single honorable 
exception - while now sponsorship fox'* work on Mills 
is available.(5)
The "newness”, the contestable part of the thesis, 
begins very late in the work. Modern sociologists and 
political scientists might readily reach consensus regarding 
the nature of political revolutions and the etiology of
social movements* These standard analyses serve adequately 
when examining social change (of one important type) between, 
roughly/ the French Revolution and the Second World Wax', but 
as aids in considering change within the last quarter 
century or so, the traditional concepts (and prejudices) 
become increasingly less useful. The reason for this is 
really quite simple. Like everything else in a changing 
‘;world5 the nature of change has been rapidly changing* 
Integral to the theory attempted here is the 
inclusion of a revised understanding of personality* Terms 
“/such as "movement” and "revolution" denote of the partial- 
collective interpretation and action regarding 
•iji'diLiticsl reality. Such terms were formulated and accepted 
vfby --the social science community with the implication that 
Jan.'**appropriate" personality cynosure of modem man was 
■as&lf-evident. The usefulness of. collective terms it seems *~ 
iiir,.the jargon of Mannheim - has seen its finest hist ordeal 
•*;momdnt. ’The post-democratic revolutionary era has until 
recently been dominated by easily perceived group 
(collective) performances* 'The present theory suggests that 
not only do these larger descriptions of change now falter, 
but likewise^that the traditionally unquestioned cynosure 
can be faulted, even in its loosest understanding, as 
"ideal type",. This insertion is left somewhat vague 
intentionally, but with the assurance of elaboration 
towards clarity in the closing sections of the thesis*
(The ramifications of a revised personality theory, from
the perspectives of socialization processes, the signifi­
cance of ! individual ism" and "private property", etc., are 
complex and of considerable import, and represent the most 
speculative element of what follows*)
It becomes -then the point of the thesis to show 
why time-honored conceptual definitions of social change no 
longer prove satisfactory, and further, to advance a theory 
. which is better capable of "explaining a larger proportion 
of..the variance” concerning change in recent history, and 
more importantly, in the future®*
it/The exposition of (1) theories of social change and (2) 
fehe'history of social change may of course be criticized 
the standard academic posture: accuracy of fact,
tnrmdness'' of logic, interpretation, clarity of prose, etc.
^  it the final prognostications included herein fall more 
c-mthin the realm of "educated hunches" and the new theory, 
vjdue to .its mildly innovations! character, must stand without 
•Ithe usual protection afforded by the "literature" of past 
ye arch, and other familiar tools of defensive scholarship. 
■|0iki:he many hazards unique to this non-normal mode of 
$3^uiry, perhaps the most; precarious is the near certainty 
*^ £iat theorists of the "old style" will suddenly become very 
.•precise in their conceptions of the boundaries of "scienti­
fic" work: they move with haste from the spirit of science
to that of scientism. One of the "greats" in this field, 
Karl Popper, has been providing ammunition for conservatives 
since 194-3 (6), apparently in the naive belief that he is 
.defending the pristine Scientific Method, against those who 
care more for theoretical accuracy and awareness.of change, 
than methodological tradition*- Against this type mind there 
is no unequivocal defense, for his premises are finally 
psychologistic and ad homlnem, though carefully camouflaged 
with belabored "logic". It £s hoped that this presentation 
may be received in the same spirit with which it has been 
constructed:- with sociological sophistication, theoretical, 
rigor and a belief in the necessity for innovation in this 
crucial area of the discipline, thereby avoiding tedious and 
unproductive quasi-arguments, so typical of Popper and his 
admirers *
CHAPTER I 
LAFIERE'S THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE
In the broadest and perhaps only somewhat useful
sense5 it is possible to equate sociology with social 
•change* The most adamant systems-analysts have in the 
recent past included provisions within their theories to 
deal with change, though usually at the interpersonal, 
;§gCiaI.-psychological level in lieu of macro-analyses* At 
iyb© mther- extreme, grand, theorists ever since. Vico have 
^ftracted -from reality one or two "independent” variables, 
s.*and hung the weight of all social change on those slim 
'pjpmjbers,* whether they be geography, race, weather.
&£ jfchese larger theories is offered by Richard Appelbaum 
in a recent text (?)* Without claiming originality he 
suggests. "Evolutionary", "Equilibrium", "Conflict".. and 
"Rise and Fall" groupings for the many theories within the 
tradition* Far more interesting and polemical is Sorokin*s 
Mode m  Historical and Social Philosophies (8) in which he 
character!stically dismembers about a dozen theorists of 
change with acerbic grace and insight. However, his own 
theory somehow emerges unscathed, therefore limiting some­
what the book * s usefulness.
on, economics or whatever. A convenient breakdown
We have learned from these critics and the many 
others who have zeroed in on nonocausal or cyclical thinkers, 
that whether it be Spengler, Toynbee, Kroeber, Marx or even 
Sorokin, social change is altogether too -complex a 
phenomenon - cx* more precisely, a. grouping of phenomena «*• 
to be explained even in small part by one or two overloaded 
causatives* A more fruitful approach, and one which avoids
internecine, "schools” debate, is that offered by Richard T.
LaPiere in his latest text production, Social Change (9)®
*“■ ’ a p i <iii 'w a» » .!u a
Of the mysteries which have developed in league with 
x&aieriean sociology, one of the mors bisarre and unexplain- 
isbl© is the discipline’s ignoring and maligning of LaPiere* 
Wfe has been producing important texts since 1938 when he 
’■‘ifeote one of the first of the second generation treatments, 
..pnllective' Behavior* In the early 19.904 s he produced 
£k" * i >ry of • Social Control, then somewhat later The Freudian 
hltSLd . The book used here is his capstone achievement, 
i-ncorporating elements of the others. LaPiere' s concern 
with innovation and change was intimately related to his 
private and professional life: he was a creative and
penetrating thinker who cared little about aligning himself 
with "schools”* Therefore he came to understand through 
formalized learning as well as life experience the coercive, 
perverse powers of (in this, case, professional) social 
control mechanisms* OneTleoks in vain through any of the 
ma*jor overviews of the discipline written in the last 20 
years for adequate or laudatory mention of LaPiere. Two
reasons come to.mind* First,-his areas of interest do not 
neatly coincide with the "mainstream” of the discipline, 
since the mao or spokesmen have cai'efully- avoided, the more 
explosive and difficult areas, such as social control.
Second, his style of scholarship is anathema to the Main- 
streamers. He simply reads and thinks, usually without the 
ai&vof computers, fables and other gimmickry unessential to 
his tasfce For this he has 'won permanent unpopularity with 
many practitioners, although it becomes obvious upon 
studying his work that his suggestions for research and 
,fprther .investigation are eminently operational, were anyone 
t'D.: take the trouble *
j$p Laid ere, in terms of modem American sociology, is
a^p. innovator* A thinker with whom he shares many traits is 
Wright Mills. Their writing is always an informed hair 
>=|pay..from polemics; their synthesizing minds tear through 
hunks of literature with precision and an unbending 
"need” to exorcise inaccurate pretentiousness, if in the 
■form of overly grand., theory, computerized triviality, or 
otherwise* Mills gave the discipline its most popularly 
influential power study, and one of its finest theoretical/ 
methodological statements. LaPiere, similarly working alone, 
provided. the most exhaustive study of social control, which 
latex* grew into a study of how- men overcome societal 
restraints in the interests of change. Both writers eschew 
mythmaking or intellectual .gamesmanship, sticking as closely 
as possible to -readily perceivable empirical reality, and
from it drawing refreshing insights.
For reasons of accuracy and clarity, LaPiere will 
be, at least temporarily, the centerpiece of what follows 
concerning sociological theory. His writing is authorita­
tive;, lucid, comprehensive and candid. Also, unlike others, 
LaPiere knows and uses history to his advantage, a technique 
to be emulated here. It is necessary to emphasize that 
when-a part of his theory (or a minor extension) is offered, 
it is with the knowledge that such a "transcribing" 
inevitably mutilates and undoes, in terms of concision and 
style,, what the original writer- worked so hard to avoid: 
sipfpy expression thereby linked with inept reasoning.
To ^.y that LaPiex*e * s theory, at whatever level, is a 
"tight conceptual package” is to understate. It is hoped 
tha%?& measure of his style can be retained in this 
presentation „
v $?o emphasize by repetition, LaPiere * s work is a 
complex-and detailed accretion of data from many fields 
and 'sources, much of which escape the standard theorists 
of change. Included in this broad range are anthropological 
findings, especially the work of Homer G. Barnett (10), to 
whom LaPiere acknowledges an. immense debt (11), detailed 
histories of inventions in all types of crafts, industries 
and disciplines, social history at its best (e.g. Marc'
Bloch and Preserved Smith), and other, more "offbeat"
literatures. The theory is a subtle blend of macro and 
micro-sociology, for example, the Industrial Revolution
(if such an "event” actually occurred) is balanced against 
social-psychological requisites and conditions which 
produce individuals capable of creating change. LaPiere 
ist amazingly perhaps* as comfortable in one area as in 
another• As mentioned before* the vast subject of social 
change is a logical culminating point for one whose prior 
books handled collective behavior and social control (12).
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to 
explication of LaPiere1s theory with occasional elabora­
tions/ and detours in the interests of my thesis* If is 
■vboped- that; this project will not become tedious* although 
times the analysis and recounting of LaPiere * s 550-page. 
into less than a tenth the space will require uncom- 
portable compression. l'he most unfortunate aspect of this 
einpt at. ,s yn op s is is tli e tmavo id at-1 e omi s s i on o f LaPi e r e * s 
. fPilumnous documentation. -Only his conclusions will be 
$||&Qnicled‘* therefore creating the erroneous impression 
that ’they are pure armchair speculation. His d&ta- 
•gathering Is scrupulously comprehensive.
I do this so that the position of the innovator as 
a motor of change will.be appreciated completely* without 
my -having to create an original explanation. At the outset 
I should make clear several things. First * LaPiere* s 
exposition is not to be confused with my thesis: they are
not absolutely synonymous* although I willingly acknowledge 
his indispensable contribution* Second* I differ with L 
LaPiere regarding the role of culture and its cumulative
quality* since it is obvious that the social actor of 
whatever talent cannot successfully operate without 
knowledge and access to a nourishing cultural milieu. 
Moreover* the tools of innovation are the reservoir of 
cultural traits and.their infinitely reccmbinable nature.
In his polemical and outspoken style* LaPiere makes a 
superb case-for the innovator,, but only winks at the problem 
of culture and its role in change»
* .On the positive side however* I go through this 
-.rather‘ onerous operation in order to provide a well-made 
plabfoiin from which to extend his theory, reshape-it and 
px*€pent my own* I allow LaPiere to speak for himself at 
length so as to avoid unfairness in the presentation of 
what?- must be considered an excellent sociological tract.
Whafe'follows then is a.blow by blow account of Social Change, 
selectively edited of course, and mildly bastardized, in 
orifefevbo 'better serve my intellectual intentions.
"Every innovation* whether it be a new mechanical 
device* a ..new form, of human relationship, an addition to 
tire stock of knowledge, or a theory* such as that which 
will be presented here, is at once a utilization of estab­
lished cultural elements and a violation of some aspect of 
the status quo” is the first sentence of Social Change.
-** w  ii" » i i w i ■m w w j . - i w  r « i ^ » n  .1—
With, writing as sound and appealing as that, it will be an 
effort not to over-quote the source. Furthermore:
> V& 
O'
«* *Through most of-recorded social history men have 
apparently considered that change per se is undesirable 
and that the ideal social, condition is stability* •. 
Folklore, myth, legend, theology, social philosophy, 
ethical and aesthetic standards, and other symbolic 
constructs have, for the most part, reflected the 
traditional modes of social conduct and have operated 
as social controls, subtly or overtly coercing the 
v individual members of society to conform to the tradi­
tional ways of life. Even the philosophers of change*
. such as Plato and .Marx, have usually granted the- 
desirability of change only as auneans to the achieve­
ment. of the good and stable - social order; men have 
in fact through most of social history maintained a 
considerable degree of social stability* Wars, 
invasions, and other disasters, natural or social, 
have been a commonplace in most times and places; but 
periods of pronounced social change have been few and 
of short duration, and during these periods only 
^limited areas of the social system have been affected, 
fdiile the. vast bulk of. the social -.heritage has persisted, 
generation after generation, more or less intact* (13)
■y. Social change, then, is atypical, asocial, historic-
alp,.y rare -and something of a "regularity" only in the last
three ■' hundred years in the West*
r ’ Even now, in the midst of the most rapid, social change 
.^y. that man has ever experienced, the - social ideal would 
seem to lean toward the glorification of stability and 
:the depreciation of change, as witness -the fact that 
i|? most contemporary sociological! writing is concerned 
-i’« with structure rather than process, with the state of
things ~as they are rather than how they came to be that
way and in what directions they are going, (emphasis 
added) (14-)
LaPieref-s dislike for Marx and other traditional heroes of 
those who claim to own the inside track vis a vis the study 
and ideological,support of change, is a potentially aggra­
vating note for many modern students. Yet in the final 
analysis, LaPiere. comes off as better sociologically informed 
and .currently more useful than, the more revered 1 9 th century
radical heroes. His attention is to individual innovation,
advocacy and adoption of technological* organisational and 
ideological changes, and not to large-scale, collective 
change* as evidenced in the few successful social move** 
ments and revolutions of the last two centuries*
His theory was constructed upon many others’ work, 
yet is noticeably removed from standard sociological 
presentations in many instances. I have added emendations 
to the overarching schema, as suggested principally by 
Marion G. Vanfossen and like theorists, who concern them­
selves with the necessity of developing adequate conceptual 
tools toward successfully understanding the future. (Were
yffbxh&astiveness my aim, a final section on the details of
1*’;
.fi'lsocial pi arming, in the tradition of Mannheim, .Dahl/
liindblom, etc. would be included.) A crucial issue which 
| tkill be given unfortunately short shrift is the idea now 
•^ ffcaihing some currency, that we should begin socialising 
!'h^ our* citizens from their youth to live in a segmented world 
rather than pretending we still operate in the never-never 
land of Gemeinschaft. (This is for my purposes accepted as 
axiomatic, but slightly beyond the central issues, there­
fore mentioned rather briefly, as is the case with other 
significant extensions of thought*.
LaPiere * s analysis and description of social change 
in human history, especially the recent past, is the most 
precise, inclusive and sociologically sensible this 
researcher has been able to find® What will be shown is 
that the mechanisms of change-themselves have undergone and
currently undergo transformations in form and content, and 
that therefore * many current writers have been misled into 
• considering only collective action as the motor of signifi­
cant change,. Hot only is this not the case in post-modern 
culture, there is much.evidence suggesting that this set'of 
ideas .never has been the most accurate portrayal of the 
purposive restructuring of society.
Bodin and Vico -outdistanced -their contemporaries by 
.introducing- cyclical theories of change, and Locke first 
'.posited nor/natively the possibility of human-designed 
^Iterations of society* Coxidorcet* however* was the .first 
.;.,jp$itivist for whom social engineering through scientific 
.wtudy of behavior seemed possible. (15)* -On his heels, in 
cnlightenment, the idea of progress (16) as not only 
j^ssiblebut a positive good vied with the remnants of 
'gHgp$$rvat±ve late medieval thought and institutions, in 
which change of any type was anathema. (While modern 
scholars of the medieval have worked valiantly at dispel­
ling the misnomer, Dark Ages - born in 19th century 
scholarship ~ we still must accept the widely held, opinion 
that in terms of human freedom, the Middle Ages were too 
immersed in tradition to allow very much. This attitude 
may-..;become tempered through efforts of more -scholars like ; 
Sylvia Thrupp (17)*- .Examination, of some modem studies 
portrays the people of the Middle .Ages as often having- been 
aware...that trade procedures,, military customs, and other
.feudal realities (especially the Papacy) were obstructing 
possible betterment of life. Yet, sadly, the social 
structure and its overwhelmingly powerful legitimations 
deterred most would-be innovators and coopted those few 
whom it could not pacify in other ways* Changes which did 
occur'were very slow in coming and usually of a-modifying 
nature rather than the gross restructuring and rethinking 
•which has become the hallmark, of modern society and its 
theorists*)
I" • i•..for it required great courage and profound contempt 
for the traditional to assert that not God but man 
y h himself had created society and that what man had
wrought ..man could change to suit his needs and his 
conveniences* It is difficult now to appreciate haw 
radical, how subversive in the eyes of authority, 
how strikingly adventurous,rthis idea must have 
I?:. seemed to most men of 18th century Europe* It reject-
ed and ran counter to a vast collection of myths,
. •> legends* superstitions, laws and theological prescrip­
ts tions* (18)
llStvshould be pointed oxit that while social scientists have 
. since- -adopted the enlightenment appreciation of man’s 
^-control'of social reality, the. vast majority of souls, even 
within the political borders of “advanced” nations, still 
feel "extremely timorous when the question of their social 
system’s legitimacy is raised*. Perhaps Maine was premature 
xn announcing the move from status to contract in the West, 
when there still remain among us many powerful and demanding 
“feudal” constraints under which people must carefully 
operate, lest' their ”contracts” be revoked for noncontractual 
reasons. Throughout any discussion of social change, the 
basic-and perennial distinction between intellectual
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theorists, and pronelytizers and the masses with their - 
leaders,, sacred and secular,- requires emphasis* To forget 
that the mental productions of a Vico, Locke or Condorcet 
were literally worlds removed from those of their contem­
poraries is to ignore one of the basic laws of innovation: 
its utterly atypical and asocial quality* To innovate is 
to deviate from established cultural values in the most 
heretical way.
' Darwin became a great' friend to social scientists 
rrmterested in change, eventhough his Origin of Species often 
differed in.their writings. The evolution of species 
•<pfeikly became the “natural* evolution of society toward a 
^necessarily” imincoved state« In this way, a potentially 
radical' theory of change lost much of its punch, being 
.jc^vertedinto a legitimation of the status quo* Capital-
,exploitation of the worker, imperialist wars and other 
ilitb ^ century conditions seemed in some half-informed minds 
' suddenly to be affirmed by ontological forces larger than 
man. Amazingly, the public still remains at least slightly 
• mystified and pleased by the “survival of the fittest” 
theoryespecially when their particular- group turns out to 
be the fittest.
The mid-nineteenth to early. 20th century was rich in- 
theories of change: (1) social -Darwinism; (2) To entiles’
famous dichotomy (more symptom than cause of change); (3)-* 
the socialist conceptions (anarchism./ Marxism,. Eabian 
'socialism, and the most effective in many ways in the
non-Marxist countries,-moralistic reformism; (4) cyclical 
theories of history; (3) particularistic theories (diffusion- 
ism, geographic determinism, biological determinism); and
finally (6) the sociological theories (assimilation, social 
ecology/, social lag, cultural acceleration, to name the 
more famous) - each brandishing its practitioners, theorists 
and schools.
Of the socialistic doctrines, Fabian socialism holds 
the distinction of being the.most accurate prognosticator of 
& 20th -century reality (19)- Its playing down of "necessary 
^and immanent revolution" in lieu of compromise and moderately 
iftlMljeral “gradualism” more accurately reflects the changes 
idi&ieh even-now are being incorporated into modern society, 
than the apocalyptic visions of the Marxists® However, in 
d rt&xms of effectiveness of political action, the many short- 
fc/feSved, single-issue (segmented) (20) reform movements win
down. Two beliefs characterised these movements, the 
* power of organised minorities, and the power of religious' 
righteousness in destroying the social evils of the world 
(prostitution, drinking, disenfranch!sement of women, 
heathenism-in foreign, countries, etc.) (21). Although 
clothed in obfuscating State Department ideology, this 
basic- “show the natives how to live’5 sentiment is today 
obvious in this countx'y*s aid to “underdeveloped, nations”.
Cyclical theories, whether of historical (Sorokin, 
Toynbee, Spangler, etc.-) or anthropological persuasion 
(Kroeber, Leslie White, Gordon Chil.de, etc*), .when-tested
scrupulously against historical reality (as best we can know 
it) became merely useful and interesting prods to. more 
sophisticated research*..- (Sorokin’s monument to groups study 
probably better withstands attack than -other cyclical 
theories, and his popularized versions hold great appeal for 
those who.- .wish;'to -return to-!iideational” culture * The deep- 
seated Puritan*motives behind his chosen trichotomy are too 
apparent to attack® That complex society should become less 
•v sensute”. -runs counter to the very nature of. modernization 
,r and increased rationalization of culture throughout the 
r^orld* )•" Specialists of brief historical periods have 
^peatedly stated that, cycles make sense only to the 
sSesearcher -’whose period of interest extends beyond the 
possibility of detailed knowledge: the pyramid at two
;tp±Xes becomes hewn stones at two .yards, molecules at two 
;tecromi'crohs.* The sociologist must exercise care that 
^Keimtively unlinked, “unique historical events”, do not 
become magically glued in order to fit a desired conceptual 
arrangement*
Diffusion!sm and „the famous determinisms suffer 
from saxr * error of thinking regarding causality, in assuming 
that a-given phenomenon is in direct causal chain with a 
proposed .independent variable, without considering the 
(usual).condition.of intervening variables. Under modern 
scrutiny,, the deterministic route has been laid to rest, 
and the concept of “weighted variables” and multivariate 
causation has -arisen to •"fill- the void* The many "Only”
causes have been, .properly downgraded, to. the rank "One of. 
many”• As LaPiere notes, “Thefse) systems of interpretation 
...were grandiose social philosophies rather than .scientific 
hypotheses - testaments of faith neither derived from nor 
testable against the evidences of social history or the 
observable facte of social life”* (22)
Without going to unnecessary lengths in refuting the 
major sociological theorists of change, it can be said that 
.,-eaeh one seized haphazardly upon an interesting and time- 
.^locale' specific feature of social reality, and announced that 
“jail1*:- change was - therewith produced. While Thomas, Park and 
hirers offered intriguing and somewhat useful models of
(in -terms for instance of assimilation of immigrant 
groups, cycles of race relations phenomena.,, and other 
/ll^pplogical15 .occurrences)., Ogburn in 1922 'brought forth a 
.;^mpwhat more useful Idea®. He built on Tarde1 s law of 
d|^#rition - invention by the -individual - but added to that 
*• a..little Marx, giving us the still popular conception of 
social lag, in which material productions necessarily out—
• strip in: their sophistication attendant Intel!actual/emotive 
responses. To use LaPierer& trichotomy, technology confronts 
social .organisation and ideology with-conflicting and 
challenging elements, thus--.creating the possibility of highly 
"inconsistent51 behavior patterns and beliefs..
Even when, these luminaries are considered, along with 
lesser figures - Hart, W. Moore.* Mart indale, etc. - their 
predominant fascination, with stasis and structure blocks an
adequate appraisal of change* It is as if change will 
“take care of itself” while social scientists must concern 
themselves far more with the “problem” of societal ongoing- 
ness* This: obvious fallacy lias been attacked by more x'ecent 
theorists ~ Mills* Barrington Moore* Barnes* to name the 
earliest. Out of this revolt* a most important suggestion 
emerges* as pointed.out by LaPiere* in the words of Bendix 
and Berger?
'And to do this* to include in sociological concern the 
changes that may occur within the social system 
1. ^attention'nrust he focused on the boundary-extending
*r .as well as upon the boundary-maintaining activities of 
-v‘- individuals * in the permissive aspects of culture and
Igr. society which enable individuals tq experiment with
~what is possible as well as upon the social controls 
•yy. which’ Smit^the range of tolerated behavior without
■ '-fe.h* /defining that range clearly* (23)
-That sentence • better than any other of its period - 1 9 3 9 - 
•‘^igghsts- -precisely where this thesis is going. What remains 
-*i§0r%e filled in are the outgrowths and reasons which are 
d$fte©lvr@&- in- that particular view of social possibilities*
■ . v .Perhaps more amazing than, old-style reduction!sm is
< the often attacked (by Europeans) ahistorical quality of
American theory* especially that purported to explain change* 
It has** been* pointed, out frequently that current American 
training in sociology does not stress history due to the 1 9 th 
and early 20th century fascination and enslavement to histori­
cal^'matters among its founders, which, diluted the burgeoning 
sociological perspective. LaPiere suggests that a “funda­
mental misconception regarding social change has closed the 
door to sociological exploration of the field" (2A)* speci-
?A
fieally, the belief, inherited from this hi story-1 aden
legacy, that change is a constant, ever-present element of
society, an "inherent social process”* LaPiere continues
with the interesting aside that economists, not shackled by
this belief, have developed more useful theories of change
through their involvement with modernization programs:
The search for an explanation of this resistance 
(to change introduced from the outside) has not yet 
produced a general theory of social change that is 
.sociologically acceptable, but it has led to a 
• . consensus among economists who are interested in
.economic stability and growth that it is the character 
and activities of individual members ^ of ^ the society*
.not the social system itself^ that nSTstingufsh.es the 
stable from the dynamic society, a view that is in 
*$$1. * .-'general accord with that -which will be developed in 
the present work. (2 5 ) (emphasis added)
' In one of the most revolutionary and memorable
sections of the book, LaPiere powerfully introduces key
S#eas under the heading ”The Asocial Nature of Social
'gfeaaee". This section follows his critique of older theorists
W K p ;sets the tone for the remaining pages. An extended quote
(a: practice not to be repeated) is in order at this point:
...It is the thesis of this book that the changes that 
occur within a society are asocial; that they are not 
in any sense a product of the society per se or a 
consequence of some universal and unvarying law of 
social life. Social change is not comparable to the 
changes that invariably occur through time in a living 
organism, to the normal changes that are involved in 
growth, maturity and decline,* The changes that may 
occur in a society are, on the contrary, far more 
comparable to those violations of the normal organic 
processes that follow when, for reasons yet unknown, 
a cell goes wild - when it breaks from the ”laws” that 
control its growth and reproduction and, multiplying, 
disturbs the functioning of the entire organism. The 
forces that make for social change are, if the organic 
analogy be pursued, abnormal - a violation of the 
normal process by which the social system is transmitted
from generation to generation of members* 'A change in 
society .comes, even as does a tumor in an organism, as 
a foreign and unwanted agent, not necessarily of des­
truction, but always of disturbance to the established 
and organizationally preferred structures and processes 
of life*«» The idea that social change emerges direct! 
out of the society that it thereby changes has long 
delayed recognition .of the fact that society in all its 
various•aspects operates constantly and consistently 
toward self-maintenance; that all social organization, 
formal and informal, is as organization inherently 
resistant to change; and that social change is the 
work of socially deviant individuals acting in asocial 
ways* That social change is not directly produced by 
, the society so changed was implicit in a theory of 
collective, behavior that. was. advanced in 1921 by .'Robert 
'JB. Park (with Burgess, Introduction to the Science of 
Sociology, hi of Chicago Press* pp«863~93^)T Change” 
j • comes^about, in this theory, as an incidental conse- 
■- ?>, . quence of the fortuitous interaction of numbers of
^ *' * people .who have become desocialized - that is, stripped
• of their normal social characteristics through parti-
ife:- cipation in mass milling* In the milling process, new
modes of social conduct are sometimes created and, he 
If . thought., sometimes established in the social, system as
the end product of a social movement* Had Park turned 
his attention' to deviant individuals rather than to 
deviant masses of individuals, he might have broken the 
v ■ conceptual barrier that has retarded sociological study
.. of social change .and thereby inaugurated a fruitful
change In American sociology* (26}
$T . ,Jr For _many theorists, including in some measure the
■ present.author, this position' is 'extreme* It underestimates 
the importance of institutionalized innovation (as in scien­
tific. or technological research settings and "think tanks”) 
and it makes by implication the unorthodox suggestion that 
a major component of change (if not all change) in the tech­
nological, ideological and organizational realms is not 
subject to iron sociological laws, but actually random and 
unpredictable in origin and frequency* These complaints 
were offered in reviews of Social Change* However, even if 
they were entirely-valid and fatally so vis a vis the useful*
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ness- of LaPiere1 s' approach (which is not the case, as will 
be shown), his insight in this matter is nevertheless 
valuable enough to explore and amend in various ways with 
• complementary and extending ideas# While far from perfect 
in formulation,. this theory is more capable of "handling 
the data” of human history, especially in the post-modern 
period, than any other - although in a few instances LaPiere*s. 
conclusions and predictions arrived at by way of the theory 
are demonstrably 'weak*
-* .A common- assumption .among theorists of change is 
asskdrnsistance upon the supposed cohesiveness of society; 
ttoy imply much more interdependence with "social system1 
terminology than actually operates, especially concerning the 
pfet^modern situation# One need not embrace an extreme form 
.df^aocial atomism in order to appreciate the unalterable and 
unmitigated individual quality of life* a function of the 
physiological and mental situation of the human, animal, 
along with societal constraints such as ones "place" in the 
system and the coincidences of personal history (Mills)* 
.."Social r System" reasoning carries in terms of personal 
security a rich psychological pay-off assuredly* and as an 
analytical, heuristic device it may have been useful vis a vis 
premodem societies* Recently Gouldner and many others have 
pointed to- the false, "Pollyanna" sentiment implicit in this 
approach-as a- product: of 1 9 3 0 * s theorists trying desperately 
to put back together a world in fragmentation* Marxism was
beating on the American door and more and more academic ears 
were attuned to.the "new” tones, so Parsons and his followers 
fictionalized the system perspective, and to their delightf 
over the years^since Its inception,.it has begun- in some 
minor ways to correlate with reality.
Change is as diverse and pervasive a reality as 
stability in both the social and physical worlds, yet in 
many minds, the dynamic tendency is conceptualized as a 
single', -constantly uniform quality* It -would make as much 
sense sociologically to allow’change its due in terms of 
various -tones, textures and rates., as to lavish upon stasis, 
^g&ilibrium and stability the distorted, unhealthy attention 
.•sM&cli. has become the hallmark of .right-wing sociology. 
(However, vin keeping with the. nature of dialectics, it must 
.be admitted that of very late, those younger, "hip" 
^Petitioners - especially text writers and editors - have 
to the opposite pole with unwarranted ease, perhaps 
more in .an effort to catch the liberated student market than 
to alter the direction of the discipline*)*
Change cannot be conceived and explained in anything 
like the terminology suitable to stability. The nature and 
structure of the language itself deal a poor hand to those 
wishing, to compose an adequate portrait of this perplexing 
element. It has been suggested by some anthropologists that 
our physiological tensions, our readiness to explode into 
action has historically been geared towards'conservatism.
•written in 1972* The "liberated" stands, as qualified
Alterations in the environment of major dimensions were' to- 
be. avoided and quite- literally fought off. This truism has 
been entirely overdone in the interest of political conser­
vatism, hut it is nevertheless foolish to ignore what seems 
to be a rather basic human preference - for the predictable, 
usual and'nnthreatening. Yet, alas, we simultaneously seek 
after entertainment and new stimuli with nearly the same 
zeal with which we protect our fragile status quo.
Keeping these "dialectical forces” In mind, LaPiere 
divides (somewhat arbitrarily) the phenomena of change into 
several types; (1) normal cycles, of activity and the usual 
aspi-constant changes of personality, which represent the 
paginal, non-innovative aspects of change; (2) the other, 
unpredictable elements of human history - great men and 
.eightss change over historical time labeled as epoch or era, 
more generic "quality vs. quantity", the most 
.di^icult to .measure in some aspects and the most inclusive 
of; all such terms (27). In addition there are other, less 
important- types? fads, fashions, cults, movements (28).
•Again turning to LaPiere, we find that:
Although a social system or particular aspects of a 
social system may be fairly stable through many’ 
generations, social, life is nevertheless life.. It 
exists only through the actions of the members of the 
society, and those actions are not in any real sense 
static or* stable. Actions are motion; motion is 
fleeting; and the Instant the members of a society cease 
acting, that society ceases to exist. (29)
His pronounced positivist, "action-theory" bias does not 
vitiate the statement’s value. LaPiere seeks to undo the
constraining theoretical knot of the functionali st s, but 
perhaps his view of the social fabric is a bit too loosely 
woven, his vision somewhat distorted due to his over­
reacting to the stasis-champions* -• Great emphasis is put 
throughout his study on the need for scholarly awareness 
of the apparent static quality of systems* on the apparent
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success of social control mechanisms in inhibiting innova­
tive behavior, yet, on the actually unpredictable, almost 
anarchic potential for change evidenced in some semi- 
-t socialised participants in*any given society. The genesis 
■Jsand-.impact of these deviants will concern us further at a 
Hater point.
*Betho&ological Interlude
‘i&r- History is very often the analysis and chronology
Jsgf crises and unique, unplanned situations and events*
.-'The day to dayness, the normal and unperpetrated changes 
- -that occupy most of society most of the time also gain the 
attention of those who keep records: "Daily life in..."
is not. an unusual title. But "Social Change in the time of 
Henry I"-would shock most medievalists, and certainly the 
People who occupied that historical moment. Therefore the 
uses of history for the scholar, intrigued by change are 
different from those of the standard academic historians. 
There is enough recorded trivia to be sure, but incisive 
and accurate analysis of change is something which until 
very recently in the history of historical writing was
practically absent** The- few well-known exceptions (e.g«,
Ibn Khaldun) prove the rule that historical writing meant
a less than perfect recording of the "noteworthy” - and in 
less eclectic historical epochs the definition of that 
criterion fell largely to those, few despots who could afford 
and were willing to support a court note-taker. Froissart, 
with his sly frankness- concerning the social structure of 
late .medieval Europe,- or Maehiavelli, whose Discourses 
:.-•■smack of much less respect for the autocracy than does
Prince  ^ were atypical enough to accentuate the usual 
-legitimating, pandering words of court historians*
•fir:.. .The time is taken here to .point out the highly 
llf&bat eable"uses of that most ambiguously handled art:
.■pro-modem historiography* For a date, we might agree with 
•Sixties and select Rankin as the founder of modern historical 
.4Kgfcudy (JO). But for in&ance even so late as 1969, a new 
Jjf&dk, The Political Economy of Slavery (31), according to 
\ ''authorities, totally revised the accepted view of that 
ante-bellum practice, so that previous explanations were 
largely obsolete* And this is not the product of a new 
"discovery"., in terms of primary materials, but more a 
substitution of a revised approach to the data (Marxist in 
this case) In lieu of the traditional one*
The problem of causality occupied this writer longer 
than was profitable* Some of the better studies (32) 
stressed more than anything else the hellish complexify of 
social life, particularly/ when viewed, as in this instance,
tram a-macro^orientation* Still, useful is Ma.clver’.s 
of causation, although his diatribes against quantitative 
analysis are somewhat dated* What this researcher did 
learn from .his study, among other things, was the utterly 
"assailable position taken■throughout this thesis* A sharp 
quantitative inquisitor could with little effort probe into 
any number of large-scale general.isations in search of 
experimental, or other proof. As in the sociology of 
Sociology, one learns that a defensible position requires 
such a watering down of content, especially when of an 
innovative nature, that worry over problems of questioned 
cau&ality are fruitless. Here, it seems, positivism has 
Xo^ferany sense of larger reality or meaning. When LaPiere 
states without apology "Social, .change .comes for the most 
part:: inconspicuously,, and for the most part it- is worked 
byMMximpxessive. little men whose names and achievements 
axttg&arely entered in the records of social history” (:33)s 
it ^ either .strikes one as a useful, creditable, assessment of 
the past by an. expert - and is - thereby included in one1 s 
stock of knowledge as valuable and contradictory to the 
overriding greatr-man. bias - or it ds junked out .of hand as 
unsupportable intuition which at best is somewhat.interest­
ing,. at worst incorrect.
3This section began, with a few reservations and 
announcements regarding the nature of change® We then 
arrived at some' equally, hasty remarks about history and
•causality* so that henceforth- there will be. no more energy
spent in attempts at defending any of the many "unquanti-
"the direction of the society%  he does not sweat blood 
trying to fit every contingency into his analysis* (Myrdal* s 
methodological statements, both from American Dilemma and 
his more.recent Asian Drama, support this view*)
LaPiere§
.-«•«»there is a complex* uncertain and. variable relation- 
'ship between the qualitative and the quantitative 
changes that occur in society*••there is some evidence. 
*that some hinds of quantitative changes do more than 
Just reflect qualitative changes.* that they actually 
iy: implement qualitative changes* When this is the case*
jfe,. . the quantitative change. wou3~d appear to operate as an
' intervening variable, a link between two orders of
-y -qualxtative changesT* although' not in any sense the
■p cause.of the changes that are second in time***
... *
• .v* there is still another way in which the uncertain
relationship between quantitative and qualitative social 
t:* changes makes for difficulty in analysis* Every quali- 
fative change, be it a new tool or technique, a new idea 
•w' or belief, a new form of human relationship or method 
of; organization* begins in the • mind and action of one 
man* At that point it is most certainly not a signi­
ficant change; indeed, as will be seen, it is often 
socially defined as the product of mental aberration*
If, however* others adopt the new, if it gains more 
and snore adherents, a kind of quantitative change is 
then occurring; in simple' terms, the new tool, -idea, or 
method of organization is being diffused through the 
membership of the society* But the question then 
arises; at what point in this quantitative change is 
the.qualitative change accomplished? when 10 per cent 
~ ~ " 1 new? when over 50
tatements which follow When one wishes to discus
LaPiere is here (controversially)- laying- the ground­
work for brief analyses of "transitory social change" -
fads* fashions, cults and .movements - all of which he 
•concluded are not of much value in effectively restructuring 
the social order* (I see such activities as more propitious 
regarding change than does LaPiere*) Opposed to this, are 
"socially significant changes”, brought about by accumulation 
and synthesis*. Quite simply,- change is "significant" when 
enough people have partaken of it to give the particular 
phenomenon the look of the normal*
What LaPiere calls accumulation is simply that: the
appearance of a "startling" discovery in innovation (e*g* ,
; modem, medecine) which ini fact has been in the cultural.
•■••works for many decades* Synthesis is the logical partner of 
,accumulation, the putting together of cultural artifacts 
(meant broadly) into a fresh pattern to form an hitherto 
unknown product or relationship * Ihese terms are immediately 
recognisable as powerful antidotes to the common be3.ief that 
^social change Is effected predominantly by abrupt, dramatic 
social events or equally meteoric ideas. Furthermore 
LaPiere, with usual laconic sentiment, points up the modern 
equivalent of "prayers and incantations": social planning.
A note vis a vis planning and its relation to 
LaPiere: since Comte, sociologists have dreamed of con­
structing the rational social order, bereft of repressive, 
myths, ideologies and other.constraining devices of exploita­
tion and inequality* Karl Mannheim (35) redirected his 
gargantuan talents near the close of his life towards the 
multifaceted problems facing those who wished to- "reconstruct"
postwar Britain.- In his- tracks Bahl and Lindblom (JG)
- fallowed* with better data and a generally more positivistie 
‘•orientation toward social engineering. As of- late John 
Friedmann. .,(37) has made his contribution to the growing list 
of authors' who wish "to he of aid in constructing a superior 
environment in these cataclysmic -times.
. Each of these authors.* as well as others, -finally 
succumbs to the bete noire of conservatives t. the ,ffloating 
, unattached intellectual elite" with whom the hopes fox* a 
.liberalised world must ride. Without entering this merry- 
or go-round of polemics and frustrations,' it', should "be noted' 
the. forthcoming theory of change will, thankfully, not 
to- concern itself with the ancient quls custodiet 
dilemma*- , Instead of facing the problem "squarely" and
into the same wall which has- .greeted every liberal 
^planner from Voltaire to -Etsioni • - fhe: elements of this 
^thepry take a.less direct and therefore more effective• route.
It is therefore to be expected that the significant
social changes of the future will come about, as they 
have in the past,-, in a random and 'segmental fashion 
and that most of the legislated and other grandiose 
attempts to shape the social future will in the 
perspective of time turn out to be no more than 
social events.
.At this point, however, it may suffice to say that one 
of the underlying assumptions of the present analysis 
is that man has not yet discovered a unique and effect­
ive means by which to determine his social future and 
that- thus the same- processes that have shaped the social 
present from the social past are working and will con­
tinue *to work to make the social.future from the social 
present*, (36)
When 'using the concepts related to functional 
relativity, most theorists point hastily'to the arbitrary, 
culturally-defined nature of "good" and "bad" elements 
within a system, without considering eufunctional change. 
-Although dysfunction makes the dichotomy - normal versus 
abnormal complete, a trichotomy makes more sense if 
adequate analyses be desired. Eufunctional changes are 
those which- over time generate more positive than negative 
consequences, although at their inception they- may have 
seemed catastrophic as viewed from the status quo. It is 
#,In the realm of the eufunctional that innovators must 
Invariably operate„
In addition, LaPiere offers a -complementary 
trichotomy,>-each of whose members provides differing 
flamates for change* "Stable congruence1 is best typified' 
utopian vision - a highly unlikely social order in 
any element5 s alteration is absorbed quickly and 
without -.excessive distortion by related elements. China 
between 500 and 1700 is the best modern historical example, ( 
"Static.■ incongruence" is- quickly understandable by referring 
to Franco * s Spain, a. condition which fails, to provide- the 
society with individuals inspired or permitted to work for 
alterations. The monogamous family system,, the "American 
dilemma" and numerous other elements of social organization 
operate within this frustrating framework. Perhaps the 
extreme example of this condition is Sicily.
"2.C.
It Is the usual state of affairs with statically 
incongruent societies that "entrepreneurs" of shady creden­
tials arise in order to provide services and. goods which 
the archaic legitimate machinery of state cannot. These 
exploitative individuals may in fact insure the continued 
operation of the society, even beyond the point of its 
"deserved" collapse| but this activity, of a parasitic 
nature* threatens to destroy whatever Is left of the societal 
^carcass. Black .markets are the. best examples, along with 
late email corrupt I. on on the administrative level. However, 
usually before social chaos develops, an intruder or a 
:f|^VDluiion (lead, by those who refuse to exploit in this 
jgapmer) end the "widespread venality.. The Reformation, and 
the -French Revolution are examples, yet the former began a
period of eufunctional change for the Church, whereas 
t^e.^latter only increased the misery of its intended bene- 
,i||ic-iaries by creating havce which produced a century of 
,c ounter™revolution *
Finally, there exists the post-modern culture and 
..the. area of primary concern here, "dynamic incongruence"•
When the characteristics of the social system are such 
that the psychological tensions generated by incon­
gruence between functionally interdependent social 
elements tend to be directed toward a modification of 
those elements, rather than an exploitation of themr...(40)
this condition is in. evidence. American society is renowned
for its disorganization, and since it allows for some degree
of ideological and organizational modification, Its more
Innovative members have room to ‘work. (In an absolutistic
-situation, these same individuals might well resort to 
artistic extravagance or insanity as expressions of -innova­
tive zeal, although one would expect the number of experi­
menters to ;be inversely related to the degree of absolutism 
evident in the culture® There are those of course who would 
maintain that just this type of "creative deviance" obtains 
especially In the U.S.)
The most Important aspect of this discussion 
’ concerns the range of possible behavior and thought In any 
..given society. Historically there have been a great many 
r 'cultures which demanded and rewarded behavior (in the ideo- 
JE^gical* .technological and organizational) which maintained 
H^kt by our standards is the unthinkable predictability of 
•stable congruence*. Societal members could deviate only 
.Slightly from normal patterns* for two reasons: social 
:Ja8titrois maintained their obedience with narrow definitions 
••^ fe'what constituted "human" behavior and* secondly* the 
•- mental- or logical processes necessary to rational' evaluation 
of existence -• the precursor to innovation along organiza­
tional lines - were absent.
Static incongruence generated manipulators of the 
inefficiency and inadequacy connected with "legitimate" 
social order. The roots of.western trade and commerce, lie 
in the late medieval when sly* courageous merchants braved 
negative -sanctions of the church and in some instances the 
secular authorities as ’well* in hope of gain. Their tactics 
were by modern standards barbarous* yet considering the
opposition all aroxtnd to their "unholy" behavior* it is 
surprising that, some of the more persistent entrepreneurs 
were financing; royalty during the 14-th and 15tb centuries (4-1) 
But for there to he culture-wide 'approval, and 
awareness of the possibility of social • change * dynamic incon­
gruence must prevail. This is why within the sociohistorical 
framework,' Innovation can almost become routine - but only in 
its prevalence* not in its "method"* which to date has 
escaped codification.or.even precise analysis. .With -these 
•^general remarks* it is time to review the role of the innova-
t fwbi. <
lirtv • LaPiere feels that it is relatively easy to show 
historically'that .collective,action has contributed far less 
-important rchange than has the behavior of what are being 
termed "innovators"* (Again* for me this is somewhat hyper- 
.ttelc.)' What is practically impossible to illustrate* 
however* ‘are any hard and fast sociological or psychological 
"laws"* regarding either the genesis ox* -operation - of these 
"asocial" individuals. Whether It be In technology* social 
•organ!zation- or ideology* the whys and wherefores of innova­
tion have not been resolved through comprehensive appraisal. 
•While it is comforting, to lean heavily on the. old "social 
forces" idea • - that the correct social conditions "produce1 
(in an unspecified manner) certain types of mental and 
physical behavior - this is hardly sufficient. On first 
reading The German Ideology, the sociologist is gratified■
*y o
to leam that the ideological w superstructure" of a given 
. socio-physical " sub structure n is c. altogether appropriate,
• until the bald fact dawns that Marx and Engels* realization 
is an interesting description of reality: for an analysis
one must go elsewhere. In. this instance, even the encyclo­
pedic LaPiere throws up his hands. Any attempt at systema­
tizing the history of innovation is doomed to failure.4 
innovators have produced their gems under any and all condi- 
*tions ‘ of recorded history, sometimes in the great flurry of 
^creative civilization (Renaissance), but nearly as often in 
;splitude, moreover in social structures more characterized 
b^ystatic - incongruence than by the preferable dynamic incon- 
•lj$$ience. It must be admitted that the unquestioned* unexamin- 
abSLe a priori which under 1 ies al 1 tliat fol 1 cws is the prob 1 em 
how innovators "get that way’h Though much documentation 
caricature, perhaps even an "ideal-type" - although that 
of contradiction - can he offered, a theory of the 
development of the innovator will only be sketched in roughly. 
If this be allowed* then much can be offered in terms of the 
• promised theory of future social change, but if this lacuna 
becomes a theoretical stumbling block, the rest of the work 
loses its credibility®
Certainly the most aggravating feature of the 
innovator has to do.-with the incessant paradoxes which 
surround him. It is almost -asilf some mephistophelian were 
behind the scenes* pulling the strings of contradiction, first 
this way then that,, in many instances tearing the subject, or
his social environment* • or both into pieces. On one hand
he must be enough of his historical period to perceive a 
need (again*, technological, organizational or ideological), 
yet he- must utilize uncommon effort and ability in radically
 transcending'the thought- and behavior patterns”of his epoch,
in order to arrange the data of experience differently. He 
must be peculiar enough in Goffman’s terms to maintain that 
necessary distance which allows him critical time to produce, 
,-yet he must also maintain sufficient contact with his- peers 
vthatyie- is not classified insane or foolish, and consequently 
^discounted out. of hand® Even more mysterious,-he must feel 
gQmefrow. that his particular social setting deserves his 
^teniioxi; (which typically is of an extreme ardor) and labor, 
but lie must not., be enamored of the status quo or i?he opinions 
f^nthe -many who are to the point that he worries over Its 
oration. -In ail instances he must conclude, albeit with 
reservations, that the rewards of productive conformity 
do not outweigh the less structured, less assured rewards of 
^innovative thinking and acting, a -belief which runs• counter 
to the very.nature of socialization processes.
The list of paradoxes could (and will) be extended 
at greater length* each succeeding sentence more illuminating 
the character of the enigmatic performer in a world of the 
new. Generally- it can be said that a more perfect example of 
the severe failure of socialisation and Indoctrination cannot 
be conjured up than the vision .of the ■ -"typical" innovator 
(a necessary contradiction in terms)® In• approaching these
peculiar sorts, the'.study of Sen koans, full of - paradoxical 
"wisdom”, is perhaps of more use as an introduct ory exercise 
to the researcher than positivistic investigation in hopes 
of finding fabricated regularities*.
Nov/e. again allowing the dialectic its dues
innovators are not in any sense the supermen, of human.
•history. -They do not fall neatly into Hollywood caricatures
a.la Einstein. They are as varied and difficult to catalog
pas are their productions, and each of them has usually - made
-a ^ relatively minor rearranging of the data in order to come
: wgp with (in a very short time) what comes to be regarded as
cultural "of-cour seism1*. Although II. G.« Barnett in his
■ monumental, statement on. the stibj ect • exaggerates somewhat,
vhis contention supports this view:
It is commonly supposed that inventions are extra- 
ordinary achievements of rare and brilliant, individuals,
; and consequently that at any•one period in history few 
feu of them appear. A contrary view is taken in this ’book.., 
.innovations - even important ones - are everyday common- 
places,... Everyone is an innovator, whether popular 
.•? definitions allow him that recognition or not.’ (k2)
.Before offering any qualification of that statement, perhaps
it is -advisable to allow Barnett to mitigate to some extent
his. own hyperbole:
There are incentives for innovation, just as there 
are motivations for any other action. They may be 
treated within more than one conceptual ’framework, but 
it is essential that some position concerning them be 
taken. The "why” of innovation is an inescapable 
question. It is also one of the most difficult aspects 
of the problem and one of the two~’that have H5 e'en treated
only very superficially. The analysis is admittedly a
formidable task, the more baffling and confusing the
deeper the probing goes, (emphasis added) (43)
At this point, to the disgust of the sociologist, Barnett 
takes off on a- complex Kurt - -Le win-like., entirely too 
.psychologist!c interpretation of the innovator, which takes 
slight and insufficient account of social, factors as they 
operate in the phenomenon. That is a major reason for 
LaPiere*s superior position vis a vis useful theory, although 
Barnettf s ground-breaking work preceded LaPieres's by 12 years, 
Moreover., Barnett1 s entire book is based on data selected 
from five cultures and a sect: American,• European, three
vindian tribes on the west coast and an Indian Shaker cult.
He. admits (along with every other researcher) that these 
souses were, as much chosen for convenience as for their 
;int el 1 e c tu al vatlu e *
However9 Barnett * s divergent views notwithstanding, 
the flipst; impenetrable -problem is not determining who and 
wh.atpjfche innovator is, but how he gets that way, and why 
r&X^iye to. the population, there seem to be either few 
innovators (LaPiere) or many whose suggestions for cultural 
rearrangement are not advocated and utilised by the culture 
(B.amett)*- (It would seem that LaPiere is talking after 
the fact, Barnett before*)
What has been established is the fact that the 
innovator must be convinced to an, abnormal degree that 
consensual validation of his.Weltanschauung - or at least 
a particular section of it - is not only unnecessary, but 
undesirable. Perhaps this explains in part Marx * s dis­
pleasure towards the end of his life regarding his
apotheosis, and'the concomitant gibberish which many 
"Marxists" had already begun offering to the proletariat 
at The Word. Marx* s view- of social reality in 1844 was to 
say the least a radical.perception when compared to the 
reigning bourgeoisie of Manchester and 'London, who were to 
a large extent the arbiters of what' was- and was not "Truth”• 
But by the 1880s s, his many innovations and historical 
insights in tens of economic and social thought had been 
to a large extent incorporated into civilised, bourgeois- 
 ^centered operations, such as the Bahians» If Marx is 
r4furt4er utilized as a "typical” innovator, then his life is 
!pit>st instructive: he was a miserable father, husband and
by all cultural definitions of the time; he had 
absolutely no status, no role, no "position” in the social 
•structure except that to which he appointed himself,
$0Jheorist of the Oppressed; he was slipshod and unkind in his 
^financial dealings with close friends, earning the distinc­
tion of being totally unreliable and cantankerous whenever 
the issue of finances arose; he was in short, not a positively 
sanctioned representative of what 19th century Europe offered 
as its personality cynosure. And yet through terrible 
harrassments by bill collectors, wife and friends, through 
unending physical ailments and emotional dilemmas typical of 
an innovator1s consciousness, Marx persisted until death in 
loudly defying the dominant culture, in rejecting wholesale 
any apparent need for validation of his private, asocial 
definition of what was and what was not Good, True and
b h
Beautiful. Put colloquially, Marx for his culture was a 
bastard c More important, in our age of pseudo “-individual ism 
(do your own thing so -long as your thing is an approved 
commodity or behavior pattern), it would be pi^esumptuous and 
inaccurate to minimise Marx * s achievement, that is of defying 
•by intention the, status quo* He should be accorded, along 
with most pre-modem innovators, limitless respect and awe 
in' pursuing "undaunted” his personally approved course of 
.-.action and. thought* While nowadays Paul Sweezy and like- 
mindedr writers can with no great difficulty publish neo~ 
Marxist., ..critical tracts, this is all a. function of the 
marvelous diversity of tastes, and persuasions that typify 
postmodern-.‘Society. To continue with Marx colloquially, 
he was also a lonely bastard.
.*. But lest the image of the innovator be inaccurately 
cast^t-it-should also be mentioned that the romantic innovator 
(sucfitras the current example) is only one type or style and 
certainly not the predominant form. He who braves the storm 
of social control- and relentless -socialization to come out 
.blatantly ',fa .man. ahead of his time" is no more the typical 
innovator than Marx could be characterised as the typical.
19th century -economist* Adam Smith’s quiet and conservative 
life in Glasgow-.or even more, Kant Vs comically, sequestered 
. and pedestrian existence in Konigsberg make the case for 
- unobtrusive innovators.
LaPiere:
* #..raan has rarely, and then only in limited ways* 
exercised his capacity'to devise new and functionally 
more effective forms of social life; (44)
an innovation is an idea for accomplishing some recognised 
social end in a new way or for a means of accomplishing 
some new social end*.*the innovating consists of the 
creation of a unique and to a significant degree unpre­
cedented mental construct, the idea that makes possible 
the thing". (4-5)
LaPiere here points to the distinctive differences in types
of innovations: technological, organizational, ideological*
He notes that'the process of innovation has been studied
basically through the history of "mechanics, and fine arts,
>:medicine, world exploration and the physical -and biological
Ijchc-iences" (4-6) but from this it is not to be assumed that as
r: ff
^process, innovation along organizational and ideological
..■L
if lines is radically different. He does note that organiza­
tional innovation usually takes a great deal of time, and t 
ytbat the number of people involved in technical advance is 
^lasually smaller than those trying to change a form of social 
organi z ati on ( 4*7 )«
The distinction between innovation and development 
is new made:
Innovation...does not occur in a piecemeal fashion: it 
cannot he facilitated by organization and a division of 
labor; and it cannot be forced by financial or other 
.extraneous incentives (as .can developments)• (4-8)
It is in considerable measure the failure to distinguish 
conceptually between the process of innovation and that 
of development that has led many writers, including 
some sociologists, to advance the view that innovation 
is a- normative social process, .In this view innovation 
is thoiight of either very abstractly as the emergence 
of new.cultural items put of antecedent ones or as the 
result of organized social endeavor to produce something 
new; as in research institutes. -There is no doubt that
the development of innovations is currently facilitated 
<by organized support; but there is good reason to 
believe that innovations themselves are for the most 
part, today as in time past the product of individual, 
endeavor that is more ilively to be hampered than 
facilitated by membership in a business, industrial 
or scientific organization® (4-9)
LaPiere continues the discussion by pointing to the difference
between discovery (a mental construct that gives recognition
to *the existence of something previously unknown) and invent.
fion (the creation of something by the synthesizing of pre~
existing cultural elements into a new pattern) (.50)* He
y-sLso points to the fallacy of believing that the mother of
. invention is necessity, when of course, necessity is cultur-
4^ 1 1 y defined and. redefined by the innovator.
It is not some inherent necessity that mothers invention, 
but, rather, an asocial perception of the existence of a 
problem that is susceptible of solution** That percep­
tion may be either a specific redefinition of a socially 
recognized inadequacy or, as is much more common, the 
definition as a problem of what has not previously been 
defined as such*.. 'From time to time in any society, 
vague discontent with things as they are on the part.cf 
some individuals or class of individuals may lead to 
political or some other form of rebellion; but a general 
and vague discontent does not result in the kind of 
"asocial perception that fosters innovative efforts to 
change the system. It is, rather, discontent of a 
specific and individual nature that leads to perception 
of this sort, the discontent of some individual with 
some specific condition of life - chronic hunger, too 
many babies,.«.or -some other circumstance that is 
accepted as normal bv the other members of the society®
( ernphas:l s added ) ( 5^  ;
It is wellfdocumented among historians that the plague of the
late medieval and the ensuing lack of labor, along* with the
*0ne objection- to this statement lies in recent history* Ihe
Second World.War produced innumerable innovations through dire 
necessity. However, over the centuries it would seem that 
LaPiere®s attitude is supportable.
sentiment of' the ‘.Reformation, created the markedly new 
conception of the dignity of the individual* This was the 
beginning, however • tenuous-, of the .generation of 'a climate
•suit a .e to innovation which has persisted until today*
However, transcending historical epochs* there is this
consideration*
Although they (innovations) reflect the trend of the 
times in which they are made* they are made by some 
individual who because of popularities of personal 
experience and character is hypersensitive to" some 
•specific circumstance of his time and place* (5 2 )
In a most informative subsection ,=*; J!Tiie Innovative
process” ~ LaPiere continues pointing to the inherently
'isfoblematie aspects of studying the innovator* due of course
the • complexity and ambiguity of the process itself*
An asocial perception of a problem does not* of course, 
ensure that an innovation will in due course be forth- 
coming* Borne of the problems that men pose themselves 
. may conceivably be unsolv&ble.*. For the most part 
however* failure of innovative endeavor to solve a 
•problem seems to have stemmed from one or both of two 
circumstances: the fact that innovation is inherently 
difficult and the fact that social preconceptions of 
one sort or another inhibit the innovative process. 
Little is actually known about the innovative endeavor* 
aside from the fact that it is not standardized, that 
it is difficult, and that it is a random trial-and- 
error procedure that involves for the most part the use 
of symbols rather than things. (53)
Creative thinking, the kind that is necessary if a 
unique solution to a problem or any solution to a 
unique problem is to be achieved, involves a more or 
less random synthesis of symbols that are themselves 
.'Often of vague and uncertain meaning. Each such put­
ting together constitutes a trial that, upon evaluation, 
by the creative thinker, usual].y proves to be an error. 
Essential to this process is the ability to ascertain 
all the possible permutations in the. arrangement of the 
symbols that are being manipulated and the capacity to 
evaluate each permutation in turn in terms of its 
relevance to the problem. Equally essential is the
Vft
'ability to continue -the- ende avor tx dal after trial 
and error after error until a workable solution has 
been found, even though the solution may not be 
reached for weeks, months or years. (540
Following these seminal remarks* LaPiere gives at 
length data to support his contention that the talented 
amateur, the marginal nonprofessional has historically 
contributed (more often than the institutionalised members 
,of. any professional organisation or discipline) significant 
isnd radical innovations which have had tremendous impact 
lipon the professionals as well as the larger 'world. Needless 
totsay, the reaction of those who have undergone the appro­
priate training and apprenticeship is one of scoffing 
v: d. Uvtle, until- the value of the new idea becomes undeniable.
tv*-* *it is. just because American- universities are in this 
'.‘■respect (Russian-styled indoctrination) somewhat ineffect' 
 ^ive" that, they occasionally produce a scholar, scientist 
f-* or technician - who is qualified to do innovative work in 
v his field and yet not so fully indoctrinated in the 
r" established beliefs, preconceptions* and ways of think-, 
ing of that field to preclude his engaging in fairly 
random trial,-and-error experimentation* (55)
Following very closely LaPiere *s explanation, we now arrive
at myths having to do.with innovation, which for convenience
are "here listed and compressed?
1) That innovation is a single^ stunning ”creative 
synthesis” while in fact it is a synthesis of a 
long series of specific innovations, each pre­
requisite to those that followed,
2) That there exist in science “breakthroughs” which 
will at one blow shatter any number of extremely 
difficult problems, when in fact the idea of the 
great and wise scientist - to•whom charisma is often 
imputed as to political heroes - and the spectacular 
act are more in keeping with Jules Feme- than the 
actual, history of scientific development.
3) That innovation is a group or collective phenomenon 
which while* in keeping with the prevalent democratic 
bias of the West is completely out of keeping with 
actuality.* The V!research team'1 is effective not 
because of its collective skills but because of the 
talent of each of its .members and the rationalizac­
tion of behavior and research possible through 
financial backing, etc* As advocate (to be discus­
sed) the committee may do wonders for the,innovation- 
produced individually*
4-) That innovations are ?ssocial imperatives” - somehow 
immanent within the culture - and will “out" as 
perhaps justice is alleged to do, with the natural­
ness of the coming of spring.* This is a conserva­
tive and inaccurate bias which attempts to depreciate 
the deviant who innovates., (36)
Yery closely connected with these myths are broader 
^Stereotypic conceptions about the innovator himself. Origin-
sidling in Confucian China, the idea has also been embraced by
p- >
$$$fetern cultures that the innovator is,of such refined and 
:«nusual sensibilities that his behavioral excesses,? his 
llaia oral isms”, must be allowed so as not to smother his
4
innovating furnaces® Prom this it is an easy -jump into the
of the artist, supposedly so much of another, “higher”,• 
world that peculiar or outlandish behavior, particularly in 
the case of recognised artists, is now considered merely par 
f or the -course9 - What is evident immediately to those 
familiar with the history of new ..ideas- and cultural apparatus, 
is that a peculiarity of outward behavior does not typify 
the innovator so often as an oddity or unconventionality of 
mind, the ability and/or need to reshape reality through
*My reservation about this statement is rooted in the late 
We s t e m . •development of complex ..organizations, an extremely 
important innovation,,for which there is no ascertainable 
single innovator. Organizations seem to have grown out of 
a larger cultural heritage, and very slowly*
symbol manipulation. Although it has often been noted that 
some of the more-famous inventors and artists behaved 
“strangely”, or that they utilized slight infirmities to 
their advantage in avoiding the time-consuming duties of 
normal existence, these are but the partial manifestations 
of, innovation, and not its essence.
There are many things which need to be said 
regarding the innovator and. his indecipherable craft* These 
few pages have been a whirlwind statement of necessary con­
ceptions before the remainder of the theory may be discussed* 
The ultimate' goal, the wedding of several, key theories, is 
possible without .a clear understanding of what the 
;|gnovator is and to the degree possible, some appreciation 
of. how he*- operates. It has been established that he holds 
4gjL$&$Qcial* perception of social reality, and through unflag- 
g§||g • effort and a brand of hyper-motivation typically lacking 
-orthodox societal members, he may - but usually is not 
able - .bring to the consciousness of the social environment 
his suggestion for change* That change is most, often of 
small dimension, yet quite distinct, and even in its minor, 
unmonumental form it excites opposition® In order to foil 
the -.dictates of: the :• society, in-'order "to sidestep and person­
ally. sabotage. the unceasing demands of roles, social controls, 
and sentiments of his culture, he must be possessed of enor­
mous egocentricity which corroborates his belief that the 
thingC-s) .which concerns him is ultimately of more value than 
the conventional activities and thought he eschews® It does
not surprise the sociologist that only a miniscule- proportion 
of any cultural population displays these personality requi- 
sires, plus of course sufficient intelligence and creativity 
to pursue innovative careers*
. It,LaPiere?s trichotomy is recalled, it makes some 
sense to note' that the innovator - as failure in socializa­
tion.-* is (theoretically) more likely to be found in American 
.culture,• known.:for its' .dynamic incongruence, than in Franco*s 
Spain* LaPiere points to three possible responses tc dynamic 
■incongruence by-, those members of the culture who do not for 
the most part imbibe its patterns and values; there are
parasites” (predatory criminals, social incompetents
ii
a®d''jsexual and other antisocial deviants); the similarly
\.
learned behavior of “neurotics and psychopaths51; and finally 
iS8g5.op.ther -group who occupy us here, the innovators (37)®
Jteir c ui be imagined, this -line of reasoning has serious impli- 
agtions for many current ideologies regarding the "sad lack" 
of -continuity, integration or predictability in post-modern 
-culture* Would it not he gravely/ "dysfunctional” to any 
culture to produce a dearth of innovators due to the society 
arriving, at ,*the social nirvana of static congruence?
Utopians in this-instance, even those with the dialectical 
skills of Marcuse, may be at -a loss to respond except in 
the- most abstract and imprecise maimer®
Central to the theory of Barnett and LaPiere is 
the subsidiary :eole of the "advocate" (58)* Briefly,• he is 
the man or -group who has the pull to have the innovation
examined seriously 'by members of the -culture to whom it is 
directed® Very often the innovator- is not in a position of 
influence or does not have the personality best suited to 
the propagandizing of his ■ invention or idea® Although both 
theorists allow this necessary adjunctive role considerable 
treatment within their works, I icLXl not-* This is where my 
theory begins to overtake LaPierefs and consequently where 
1 will- diverge from S ocial Change * Along with the advocate 
however - who finally is a. more 'rough and. tumble PR-type.' 
fthan the innovator ~ is the adopter (59), the final actor 
Oih LaPiere * s theory* LaPiere is quick to point out that 
norther of the three roles -.pushing for institutionalisation 
of-::the innovation, that of innovator, advocate or adopter, 
is 'any • more or less easy than the others* Each is fraught 
-with a multitude of complex difficulties, but' naturally of 
different types* Innovation is problematic mostly concern-
a
$SiSg*ian 'alteration of consciousness; the advocate must be 
sufficiently persuasive and in time with the culture that 
others will listen to him and not disparage his defence of 
a-;, suspect addition to the culture §, and the adopter is 
.instantly ridiculed by his contemporaries, or worse, forced 
to fail in his use of the innovation by way of a 'self- 
fulfilling prophecy•
But"again, for my purposes, the innovator takes 
center stage in what follows, due for the most part to the 
specific type of innovation central to this thesis* The 
role of* advocate and adopter is implied, but a discussion 
of them is not of key significance*
CHAPTER ll 
A REVISED THEORY
Ever since the great democratic revolutions of the 
18th and 19th centuries, social scientists have made the 
- ..mistake of assuming that political revolution, with its 
self-righteous, humanistic splendor, would he the "going 
.thing” .as far as. rapid, social change was concerned, fox' some 
time/at .least* Even those who saw the limitations, histori­
cal^;* . of this mistaken perception allowed themselves to 
faUfainto anothex* equally fallacious theoretical rut by 
viewing social movements as the most important motor of 
change* * Luckily, there have been of late some theorists and 
historians who recognize the inconsistency between these 
viopeMfend the empirical * data emanating from the most advanced 
cul/bures.* Building, on the sound understanding of revolution 
and social-movements offered by writers like Barrington 
Moore, Crane Brinton, Hadley Cantril, among many - theorists 
who avoid-* the above pitfalls - I have constructed a theory 
of future change in post-modern culture, which owes much to 
the suggestion of Marion Vatrfossen.
Basically, this Is a theory which considers the 
effects of the sophisticated, relativistie attitude or 
“enlightenment” on a populace, plus an appreciation for 
historical context such as the ,disso3.ution of feudalism,
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and at the other end of the spectrum, the advent of "post- 
ascetic” culture* Very briefly; the breakdown of feudal 
social structure in terms of obligations and duties between 
classes brought with it the popular' revolutions of ‘France, 
America,' Russia "and China •— to name only the most successful 
when the aristocracy and royalty refused to revise its 
position in the society in favor of the ”enlightened” bour­
geoisie and an infuriated populace*- After the particular 
cultures- each evolved into an industrial setting, the need 
, for political revolution was in large measure over, as was 
the ...easy possibility of it. Put bluntly, the forces of 
coercion - in most instances an. uneasy reactionary coalition 
; .between the remnants of the aristocracy, lingering; ruling 
houses, and the more affluent bourgeoisie - had taken their 
.lesson of. 1r/B9. seriously-, and were growing ever--more skilled 
|<:in the arts of oppression* However, as there were still 
^tremendous forces extant in the interest of ma;5©r • social 
change, the social movement developed in the late 19th 
century - as -a suitable -tool,- It combined the large-scale 
impressiveness of political revolution with wisely conceived 
gradual!stic tactics (e*g® the Fabians and reform groups), 
thereby avoiding holocaust and. annihilation, at the hands of 
counter-revolutionary forces* Thus far- in the description, 
few historians and political- analysts would quibble, except' 
over details, or the sticky question of causality.
However, this is where, a revised .perception begins 
to come to the aid of scholars who, for example, look sadly
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•upon the memory of the liberalizing 1960* s and proclaim 
(with the approval of their Xike-thinking peers), "Alas, 
there was no revolution, only mild changes of fashion in 
some elite groups; no redistribution- of income, no altera­
tion of power, no change in relations of production"* X 
would respond; "Quite wrong - the cultural revolution ox 
the 60Vs was just that* It had and will continue to have 
far-reaching effects in a liberating direction, not only 
in .elite, collegiate - groups, but -across - a wide range and 
diversity of personalities throughout post-modern culture”• 
^At this point LaPiere Vs thoughts might be phrased in this 
xtamier; "Yes, I see that my innovator theory has been 
latched onto and that the user of it recognizes that 
especially now-in an era of mounting* menacing social 
control agencies and mechanisms, surely the only practicable 
ui^ans of social- change is through the innovator out-thirik~
out-maneuveringf out-innovating the repressive features 
of the status quo”** Offered here in dramatic form, and 
greatly simplified, is the outline of what will follow.
Individual innovators in the persons of traders, 
merchants and bankers, sowed the early seeds in the. late 
medieval which erupted into revolutionary action late in the 
18th century* In that four or five century span many changes
*Very "recently a financial analyst, Harry Browne, produced a 
popular manual, How 1 .Found Freedom in an UnFree World (N.Y.: 
Avon Books, 1974-T^'Ech in'crass and“atEeore"ELcal terms sets 
■out one possible course of action for potential innovators, 
at least regarding certain aspects of modern social life. While 
his views are not completely coincident with mine, it is the 
best (only?) of its kind, and has been warmly' received.
enveloped European society* ‘The plagues decimated the 
feudal ‘workforce; the Renaissance and Reformation substituted 
for unthinking servility necessary to the operation of the 
feudal social arrangement* a youthful* naive -rationalism and 
individualism* technological deve3.opments were rifes of 
extreme importance for modernization and. my theory was 
Gutenberg*s contribution* She rux*al, homogeneous* incestu­
ous -country folk escaped with but little reluctance.to the 
city* • where social mobility was possible and where the eon- 
,cOmitant ideas of personal freedom and endeavor were the 
lliouse ideology* liie absolutistic ”thought1 (or lack thereof) 
. m  ''-necessary to lord-vassal allegiances and a social, structure 
viewed. as- God-given* began early to. fall to the "modem*** 
more relatxvisti'c* understanding of social relations as man- 
#rdbated and therefore man-dissoluble* As mentioned much
the perception of the possibility of change was and 
of 'central importance to the success of all those who seek 
an. alteration of social reality* whether it be the innovator 
or- the mass movement leader, or for that matter he who seeks 
to develop fa better mousetrap"* With the discovery of the 
American continents, the mandate for geographical and mental 
exploration was accentuated, and men like Luther and Calvin, 
Columbus and Cromwell straight through Voltaire and Rousseau - 
among the peculiar, outlandish and unappealingly innovational 
of their times •- pursued the light of reason into the darkest 
contradictions of medieval- life®
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But the Age of Reason brought nearly as many 
problems as it solved, fox' with the displacement of God, 
Country or King as supreme being, Europe and the colonies 
in America fell under the merciless rule of Progress* It 
can fairly-be said that only in the last generation or two 
have the,millions of genuinely exploited laborers of the 
18th, 19th and 20th centuries been vindicated in some small 
way for- their mutilated lives* They left their rural 
* hamlets - in which Christopher Hill tells us they labored 
perhaps 15 weeks per year (60) - and migrated often by 
'.necessity to the mills, mines and factories, where around 
ight clock til death was the schedule* But with their 
Spoken backs they produced what now is termed post-industrial, 
post-modern or post-ascetic culture• Certainly they are not 
|^;pne responsible, but "were it not" for their slavish 
•^.forts, affluence as we know it could not have been created•
■ But being human animals, the urban proletariat 
could not tolerate indefinitely the abuses to which they were 
constantly subjected® Some of the liberated bourgeoisie 
(LaSalle, Marx, Proudhon, Blanqui, Kropotkin, etc*) came to 
their .aid, and those strong workers who .could not be intimi­
dated. by•their employers and whose, strength was not utterly 
exhausted at the factory* slowly, but loudly began the labor 
agitations of the early 19th century® And as in almost any 
historical period, those who revolt even mildly feel the 
immediate blow of reaction® Even the famous Paris Commune 
of 1871 ended with the terrible deaths, of 1 7 ? 0 0 0  "revolu­
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tionaries", many of whom, were infant s.*. 'Thus it 'began to 
dawn upon social, theorists of change that violence brought 
the same^ and more of it; the famous British gradualist 
tactic,- although less dramatic and requiring more patience,
t
"proved" finally td"be the-* most feasible "approach. As' 'already- 
noted, reform movements met with amazing success, much more 
so than the violent expressions tor change which preceded 
them.
What type of person joins a movement, gives:his 
“•■all, irelates to its activities thoroughly and allows himself 
ofep. be caught in a "religious” dedication to the cause? As 
be detailed latex*, these participants are distinctly 
•modern" or "industrial" citizens: not well educated,
~ not yet estranged sufficiently .from former, rural -absol-u- 
Ul^stic thoughts about goods and evils, not mobile, not well 
Raveled; not, then, affluent participants of post-modern
Even if social movements could operate efficiently 
issu.the current historical matrix, organizers would be hard- 
pressed to fill their rosters,, to organize viable cells, to 
impress upon their members the ultimate goodness of their 
: goal and the ultimate evil of their opponents, to have their 
participants carry cards and swallow whole a moralistic, 
hyperoptimistic ideology*
• Put- idiomatically, the world has grown too wise, 
the people have grown too sophisticated —• that is, in the 
most advanced sectors of the most advanced- nations* Bore-; 
over, it ml,I not do, in criticising this position, to note
that there have always been folic who would not accept 
absoluteSo That Nietzsche v/ould have been a poor follower 
does not impune the' theory; for today there are millions of 
Nietzsches9 but more worldly even than he® Certainly one 
of the shining triumphs of the modern cultures is the number 
of minds whose orientation is becoming more and more cosmo­
politan,- non-nationalistlc but international, nonlocal, 
nonsectarian, nonabsolutistic• These millions of minds 
seek - to steal from Mills - as much, freedom as their reason 
?catr handle® And to date it seems that very few innovators 
Bn the realm of cultural change have exhausted either them- 
'iteftves .or the possibilities in their search and experimenta- 
for the rational life® Habermas * recent book, Towards 
at Rational. Society (although from -the Rrahfcfurt. metaphysical 
1?r lit ion), -eapsulizes- the aspirations -of those with minds, 
tou^ey-and time® There has never before been in human history 
"iftch•an opportunity for individual growth through experimen­
tation .across a wide range and diversity of lifestyles and 
'cultures as now exists for some people in our culture*
Ogburn' s useful concept of social lag immediately 
comes to mind'-as we witness those who in every way are capable 
of relatively limitless experimentation, yet are entirely 
unwilling to forego their acquired cultural baggage, in the 
form of outdated beliefs and properties, which prevent them 
from making the most of the culture® I stress the historical 
■element of the argument- (i®e® the possibilities- affluence 
brings to the social innovator) for there is throughout the
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culture a peculiar combination of sentiments: first, an
awareness of dizzying flux and change (adequately documented 
by Toffler) and second, the competing, contradictory idea 
that things never really change much finally, and that what 
was good enough for father®•• The resolution of this contra­
diction is something beyond the capabilities of many societal 
■ members*
The statement of Bendix and Berger (referred to 
;ahove, p. 23')- comes now into clearer focus as to its relevance 
*$to ray theory® Very obviously, if one is to inhabit what can 
be,;termed a ’'multiplicity of selves”, thereby maximizing the 
c^portnnity for involvement with others in a cross-section 
•-s^hsituations, the whole concept of ”bound&ry-maintenance " 
becomes relatively useless as compared to its opposite, 
*%pundary-expansioii” * Closely connected with the first 
m flnhlorLed concept is one of the most potentially reactionary 
filers -*ev.3r to have been propounded by psychologists: the
'Gestalt* The idea that the social, actor could ever be, or 
.rather,• ought to be,, a consistent, monolithic, thereby 
morally-, predictable Oneness .throughout situational variation 
is straight from the Bible: the soul®. It is easy to picture,
the utility of defining people in this way, when the locus 
of one's entire life is a small, homogeneous, sherds-driving 
tribe in the Midd3.e -.East two millenia ago* It was functional 
to some- degree- for* a man to be known as ’’good” or ’-’bad” to 
his .kinsmen and to occasional intruders into the culture•
The idiocy of trying to employ such standards in the post-
-ssp&ern situation is immediately -obvious* The media do their 
best to make high tragedy out of modern life by using these 
anachronistic conceptions of behavior and the protagonists 
involved in that behavior. The favoid.te example' in the' late 
60* s was to show "dispassionately” the photograph of the 
phi beta kappa, good, down-home community boy sitting in a 
federal, prison for resisting the draft or selling marijuana. 
Somehow that was to suggest the "inevitable” irony and 
"■confusion, the ’alienation” ..if you will, "necessarily” 
inherent- in the modern situation* This is a mistake in 
perception and understanding® Clearly, the "violator” was 
iimovating,"but he ran afoul of social control agencies - 
'Something proficient innovators learn not to do - and the 
powers that were, in very clear-eyed fashion, incarcez'at ed 
his for his "bad” actions. There is no ambiguity here: 
the innovator knew just what he was about, and the impressive 
agencies*knew as well. There is no high tragedy: there is
only the historically usual condition of the innovator being 
penalized through the normatively coercive power weilded by 
the state. The innovator threatened - altogether too loudly 
of course - to overthrow in some relatively minor way the 
status quo, in favor of a more rational, personally meaning­
ful world. Hi S' reward' is the usual fare for people of such 
aspirations.
Hand in hand with the necessity for situational
ethics (an unfortunate term), a resilient definition of 
"selves”, and the desire to expand" boundaries through multi-
faceted interpersonal- experiences, is the relinquishing of 
• many other key values of the acquisitive culture* The 
innovator in this sense does not care for property except 
that property which immediately promotes his capability for 
innovating* interpersonally and otherwise. He does not care 
for nor is he .fascinated by power- over people or things5 
his interest is perennially focused on the "using up" of 
himself and his resources in the direction of people,, whom 
he defines as able to properly "use him". This is. not 
.philanthropic, or centrally so; what must operate however in 
• /the arena of multiplicative selves is a high level of 
^reciprocity9 inasmuch as people are capable of responding
r\ ' \ - *. ' *
airly for "goods" (used very ‘broadly) they receive. This 
is not to be construed as "game theory" or a rehash of the 
popular economic models used in small groups theory. Even 
|xa^ioueh of mechanistic thinking in an area so • sensitive as 
l^fcLs.ie a touch overdone.- If there is. a -theory which
approximately conveys the untended meaning here* it would be 
'• one of the 18th century models of human behavior* understood 
to be constituted of .well-thought out* calculated and rational 
action* but now. based on the desire to experience things and 
people under mutually satisfying conditions.* Parenthetically*
*There resides in the use of rationalist, psychologies (known 
also as "naive positivism" or "Pollyanna" interpretation of 
behavior) a paradox which I would do well to dispose of 
immediately. Because there are evidenced in human behavior 
any number of irrational or nonlogical acts (exhaustively 
analyzed by Pareto among others)* the theorist who therefore 
avoids the enlightenment understanding penalizes himself on 
poor grounds. . Voltaire* Kant and similar thinkers .were aware*
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the age old debate (e.g., Hobbes vs* Rousseau; Marx vs®
• smith) about whether man is "basically” good, cooperative and 
well-meaning or bad, aggressively antagonistic and an evil­
doer, if it has any relevance here, probably finds me on the 
side-of those who support, the kinder appraisal of man* But 
instead of man being this way or that !,by nature1 of his man- 
ness, I would insist (in the standard sociological posture) 
that given an appropriate social structure, post-modern men 
•' would for the most part treat each other well, well enough 
f-at any rate to facilitate end encourage innovations! behavior 
jsiaong one another, as opposed to the treatment historically
Stem sure, that wide-eyed rationalism, .most memorably repre­
sented in "the social contract theory, did not offer a compre­
hensive. definition or analysis of human behavior*. What it 
did do with fabulous success was posit a normative vision of 
“‘m&u, as agreeable and reasonable, in pseudo-scientific terms 
.feich typified 18th century polemics® This argumentative, 
J^rperbplic. style should not obscure the usefulness for 
■fecoxdsts of change of the positivist legacy® 
jplUu." There is no debate that men manifest socially both.
*rdtional and nonrational actions. In addition it is agx'eed 
.that life is continuously ambiguous and difficult to exhaust­
ively investigate® The marginal success of small groups 
research better than other sociojogical subfield testifies 
- to the problematic nature of wmixid-watching". But after that 
is said, what remains is the unsavory options either we adroit 
to the -.lure of apotheosizing the irrational as the central 
feature' of life (Jung), or we largely ignore it and its unpre­
dictable quality, and focus instead on ‘rational activities, 
ail(i Jflpst important, the possibilities for rational improve­
ment*’of life when and if individuals care to attempt same.
The question for sociologists should be, IP a person chooses 
to- be as rational as he sometimes can be, THEN how does the 
social structure appear to handle his attempt, warmly, coolly, 
or indifferently? That a person may continuously live a life 
of thoroughly nonlogical action is admitted; that many people 
actually do is unlikely. Therefore the entire theory present­
ed here is suitable for application only to those who make 
the effort at rational existence®
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given the -unorthodox. They would behave amicably simply 
because of the benefits derived from interaction and the 
concomitant lessening of social, controls surrounding it*.
Also:-essential in understanding the post-modern 
innovator is the realization that his definition of "self” 
differs radically from the psychiatrically approved recipes 
for "healthy” self-conception often promulgated in advanced 
societies. Along with'the pleas•. for self-scrutiny, self- 
.^acceptance, self-forgiveness, self-expansion through medita— 
.^tion*. etc. is the implication that one's unbalanced self- 
yiewyi.s more a function of .alterable, internal tensions and 
•i|§ux-oses than of an ill-constructed social order® Being 
stars' that,this line of argument is, among other things, 
one of'.the oldest of conservative ideologies, the innovator 
. .sjipives .continuously to expand "self" by ignoring it? self 
static, predictable, plugged into a status quo of an 
•eifisent tally unchanging collection of closely inter-related 
situations and personalities. The "multiplicity of selves" 
"the innovator prefers, indeed finds necessary to his .actions, 
is a construct of situations, not of continuity (habit) or 
property (home)* The innovator* s self is the product of his 
accumulated knowledges and experiences, his aim being to 
increase incrementally both components to the betterment of 
his ability to handle various, nonintegrated behaviors*
The unending demand among popular psychiatry, that people 
ought to-become neatly, wholesomely contained entities, free 
'of tension and distress, holds no more appeal for the innova­
tor than the multiplicity of selves idea would hold for a 
Southern plantation owner of the previous century* The old 
Southern gentleman is precluded from making personal enlight­
enment and- experience a goal., for his position as patriarch 
demands that he display for the land s.n,d his chattels (which 
includes the family) an unreasonably, inhumanly narrow, 
righteous and unbending "self” which strives only to "preserve 
and protect"* There is no more antithetical a position 
conceivable to this feudal mind than that of the innovator, 
whose 'being is not in having and making, but strictly in 
knowing and doing* The~latter is in no need of "roots", 
family, home, "place in society", not to mention religion, 
ccmiitmity and for the most part, government, as it would 
have been understood by the -planter. Inasmuch as there still 
reififeih, in advanced cultures persons with a feudal orientation, 
th^gSosaibility of large-scale -innovation as described here' 
is-:-d:e"ssened* But with the advent of post-industrialization 
and dts* continued growth, the provincial is forced into a 
quasi-schizophrenic condition of watching the world about him, 
emphasized through the media and popular culture, speeding 
towards the dissolution of almost everything he holds sacred - 
literally - while he*sits on the veranda fighting with all 
his resources merely to hold ground. That his position is 
finally untenable- is obvious to no-one more than to himself•
If the above plantation P at n  ax c h is thought of as 
'an ideal-type (on the "right11), then other members of the 
post-modern culture may be compared with his .arch-conservatism
on a continuum. For instance, the 'businessman who lives and 
works in the urban sprawl may have dispensed with religion 
and a love tor community. He may in the interests of 
furthering his career, engage in random, minor innovations 
in circumventing distasteful restrictions imposed upon him 
by'■the government* Also he may rationalize (in Weber’s 
sense) other types of behavior to more comfortably fit his 
personality and various needs, such as the exploitation, of 
:a competitor’s, secretary more for intelligence than sexual 
•reasons. But, more towards the right end of the continuum, 
ha- demand from his suburban wife and children and- his 
professional subordinates, behavior suitable to the obse­
quies '‘Chattel* So, while for him life may make a great 
deal of-sense and be in comfortable accord with the dictates 
mdrlimi tat ions of -the culture, for those subject to his 
possible oppression, his "will to power” may constitute the 
single greatest.irrationality of their existence. For the 
innovator, the possibility of being put in such a situation - 
that. Is, in- the hands of a person(s) who can demand of him 
irrational «-and unnecessary acts of fealty, or put differently, 
one who would .seek to restrain his ongoing search for new 
stimuli - is the ultimately detestable condition.
This has tremendous and far-reaching ramifications 
for our current societal arrangements. The military, social 
movements, clubs, religious .affiliations and the more rigid 
complex.organizations are but the most obvious targets- for 
criticism and avoidance on the part of the innovator. In
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order to maximize his benefits .while, minimizing costs, he 
must stay clear of, any social arrangement which begins to 
operate in noncontractual fashion at least in his business 
and professional concerns* But even in less formal relation­
ships and settings, he becomes the artist in the realm of 
!?traveling light”*, Property means involvement with and time 
spent in the upkeep.of® Noncontractual relations .mean time 
and energy having to be expended which under contractual 
-arrangements could be avoided, if that be desired® Along 
the same lines, it is necessary to point out the sad lack of 
"helpful” structures in current society designed to benefit 
,|ghose who wish to enrich their lives through interpersonal 
^innovation® The lacuna - now present (evei’ywhere except 
perhaps in the most liberated sectors of metropolitan 
;ppltiire) insures fox' the innovator a degree of probable. 
fiftioffectiveness and loneliness which prevents most societal 
participants from even considering innovatioriel roles.
Costs, are thought to outweigh benefits to an extreme degree®
In its most- precise expression, the innovator• s- 
position ..may be. summarized in this way? there are a regret- -, 
ably few. and finite number of moments in life; - expenditures 
of time,, energy and attention are not to be sloppily allo­
cated, but whenever possible activities are to be rationalized 
with the intention of utilizing one’s life-space to the 
fullest; this is done in the hope of realizing maximum satis­
faction of those few but precisely formulated personally- 
defined "goods”* The cumulative- -effect of this Weltanschuung
across the culture is wide-scale social change® Whereas 
Weber was made apprehensive. by this position, the post- 
ascetic innovator feels less 'anxiety over it* Those histori­
cally evolved relationships and behaviors which do not prove 
viable in the post-modern setting, he sets aside, often with 
severe regrets - and no ready alternatives® His job - the 
subject of the thesis >■ is to refashion social arrangements 
to suit his overarching schema* Thai; of course is when the 
innovation, peonies in, and when negative social sanctions 
•■•become the most pronounced* In reconstructing one * s culture 
to’^ sait -oneself, the loss at the outset in terms of comfort- 
ing^abstract sentiments, literature and similar cultural 
productions*1 may seem unbearably heavy* B\xt the promised 
rewards of final emancipation from' historically spent 
components of social organization and the beliefs which 
Invfaiably accompany them.* is in the opinion of the innova­
tor" Worth the. effort and sacrifice®
'While I risk.stating the obvious, it seems advis­
able "at, this point, in -concluding an introductory statement 
of the" theory, to remark about its historical position*
In the development of some new mental constructs, it is 
possible "to assess them as peculiar to only a specific time 
in history, evg., that air power was.something that ought to 
be exploited militarily, a realization only possible circa 
1910 and in no other time*. This theory is.not of that nature- 
It is .likely that those-who-were entirely disenchanted with 
their particular sacio-historical matrix, at whatever time in
history, happened upon this theory, appr.oxinia.tely, but 
threw up their hands when the possibility of implementing 
alternatives .arose® LaPiere overstates slightly the case 
for the innovator, in semipoXemic style, with the intention 
of offsetting the drift in social theory towards the collec­
tivity® But his even bigger error is to understate the 
importance to change of the cumulative nature of culture, not 
precisely or in every case the result of single innovators’ 
works®; The point X wish to make here is. that my theory 
makes some sense of the modem situation and is capable of 
predicting significant change in all major institutions of 
mthe post-modern cultures* But the fact that it does is a 
^.function .not only of its attempted comprehensiveness, but 
more * importantly, because it responds to the possibilities 
t&dfcor. change at all levels inherent in current society which 
&s,S?ere distinctly .lacking in all previous societies* This is 
•^'ixot -so much the case of the epoch being ready for the idea 
■ ""(ideas of personal freedom being very old), but the idea, 
having found the suitable epoch* This also explains why 
the -theory, is useful in pred.ict5.ng change only in those 
relatively small but extremely important areas, of the world 
being termed "post-modern”* The other areas are in varying 
states of inter-epochal flux,- some frozen in- extreme static 
congruence at the primitive level (Sicily), others in pain­
ful static incongruence (much of Africa) and still others in 
the beginning of -dynamic incongruence necessary to the pro­
duction of post-modern.' culture (the more advanced Latin
• American countries)* One tragic aspect of this is the fact 
that in some of these areas, there are•foreign-educated 
nationals who have experienced resocialization while studying 
abroad and therefore seek the same kinds of freedom through 
change that I have been discussing* Theirf s is a sad lot 
unless they wish to migrate to more advanced areas (which 
they often do of course)* One can imagine the pain of a 
sociologist taking his Hi*!)® at Berkeley, then having to 
return to Japan, or Thailand or any of the Latin American 
oligopolies, areas where the feudal-religious orientation 
still,.holds sway* Hox^ever, the same kind of personal dilemma 
mi gilt--ensue when the .American student from Iowa studies with 
the Critic,ai school at .Frankfurt or with left-wing intellec­
tuals in Italy, only to return to his unliberated home* This 
kin^'Of difficulty, personal emancipation in the midst of 
str^baral. repression, will -become in the hon-adv&nced 
sectors •••(as it is currently here) more and more of a problem, 
to add to their* already excessive list®
CHAPTER III 
SOCIAL CHANGE IN HISTORY
Prefatory note
The writing of this section was done with the 
awareness that certain unanticipated difficulties of scho­
larship-: seriously handicapped me in presenting an .adequate 
selection of data to support my thesis* This is not an 
apolp@ia, but a methodological explanation regarding the 
problems of working both the historical and sociological 
fields- in “pursuit of demonstrable Truth*
As'every scholar, I had in• mind the "ideal method' 
of 'handling the phenomenon in question: to secure f rom
histijfchans the finest bibliography of works dealing with 
socidQy change; to sift patiently through them seeking data 
to support (or refute) my thesis about the history and 
future•of change; and to present the findings in a grand 
synthesis similar in spirit* if not in method, to Sorokin’s 
masterpiece* (Aging scholars smile at such youthful plans 
of grandiose dimension*) Nevertheless, I compiled, an 
enormous list of suitable studies, began.in earnest the 
sifting, and to ray dismay these months later, have con­
cluded. that the task overwhelms and depresses me® For 
several reasons*
First, the she ex' magnitude*
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Second, social history, ever since the 19th 
century shift from-political to sociological emphasis, has 
been written in very general terms, practically by definition. 
The move away from hypexp articularism, in the description of 
military and dynastic changes ad nauseum, has given way to 
a similarly exaggerated extolling of the "flavor of the 
period”5 etc*, in homage to Kulturge schicte* Therefore the 
j^ost useful, modern historical sources, those that conscious­
ly include sociological, reflections, are invariably a mixed 
. -blessing., on one hand taking cognizance, of social forces and 
rcultural styles, but on the other, often Hegelian!zing their 
'Igreas of interest with overly diffuse, sometimes mystical 
>Cqaracterization of Zeitgeist* If Thucydides is at times a 
sboxe because of inordinate, enumeration of disconnected 
•Retail, then Alfred Weber (inter alia) for my purposes is 
aerually useless because of his distaste for stating the 
:gppnsociological in favor of more suitably specific and. 
psychological statements, which of course typify earlier 
historians* The fact remains that "social change” is a very 
short term for a most luxuriously rich and complex gathering 
, of phenomena* . And a reading of history with any but chron­
ically over-sociological eyes presents disparate data, many 
of which cannot adequately be dealt with through sociology 
alone. Although this thesis is written by a sociologist, 
since its aim is to predict (after considering the past in 
broad terms), I have had to consider information from his­
torians which often chafed and-forced me to recognize
■realities which fall outside the familiar terrain of my 
discipline*
Connected•with this is the key problems how to 
utilize heavily sociologized descriptions of the past in the 
interests of the individually-rooted theory I am defending* 
LaPiere chose the most obvious route in pursuing the data 
of technological advance, easily attributable to particular 
people, but what of the organizational and ideological com­
ponents? My solution to the important quandry is only mar- 
finally, satisfying, but necessary in order to facilitate 
him.completion of the task* Simply this: I immersed myself
iilifaistorical treatises and after a good deal more reading 
tksfo&rX could present, I decided with some- qualifications,
. that-the history of Western development over the past 
miiyhenium is largely the.record of the activities of thousands 
of^innovative souls who operated in the ore major culture
times promoted and stimulated their work.* (At least 
in ‘comparison with the repressions typical of Eastern, social, 
structure.) k complete documentation of this insight would 
require not 60 .pages hut .several, thousand* What- is offered 
here-instead.are the rudiments to .that documentation, an 
.outline with some specifics interspersed, the assumption 
being made that Mthere•s a lot more where that came from”*
The contours of• innovation axe therefore being detailed 
rather than, the more perfect but less workable project, to 
specify point by point this critical input to social change* 
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This section will constitute a necessarily 
abbreviated statement; regarding, that grouping of phenomena 
•known under the rubric ”social change%  as it has appeared 
in (principally) Western history sinee the Middle Age s * 
Obviously, because I make no pretense of being an historian, 
all.'of what follows depends upon the general consensus of 
professionals in that discipline, the varying opinions of 
which,, I have synthesized into sociologically relevant 
statements*
ty As is well known among students-of historio­
graphy, there are inherent in all histordeal study countless 
potential .difficulties and. confusions, depending upon how the 
-dat&tere comprehended and -presented-. For example, in this 
ps^ieular case extreme care must be taken not to mistake 
them5’great-man theory” of history, of late held in deserved­
ly low esteem, with the B&mett-LaBiere theory of the. inno­
vator in the processes of change« When in the 19th century, 
historians of romantic sentiments began the apotheosis of 
historical notables, there had just been on the European scene 
a number of extremely impressive and effective political 
leaders, the names of whom are the first the young student 
understands to be "History”. The fact that men make times 
and times make men is no longer an astonishing, controversial 
issue. New, however, is the fact that complex society is
much less supportive of the great-man idea, due to plethoras 
of critical variables, most of which elude the control of any 
single figure. Although the media persist in elevating the 
actions of individuals into the limelight, this has more- to 
do with the nature of mass entertainment than with empirical 
reality. *
However, it is immediately obvious from an examina­
tion of Western culture that particular men at particular 
times with outlandish ideas have affected pervasively the 
technological, ideological and organizational systems.
This has been true from the beginnings of civilisation, yet 
.is seldom mentioned that many of the "great men65 have 
no -‘Harness the innovators of the wheel, a multitude of 1 5th 
century trade practices, and so on® "History" for centuries 
whs . the-work, of court-paid scribes -who under severe censor- 
ship.'3.ionized their employers and friends while disparaging 
teemles and ignoring the other 99$ of civilization. Whether 
those important souls whose innovations genuinely aided in 
the debarbarizati.cn of the West should be considered "great" 
is more a moral-aesthetic than, historical, judgement. My 
point.is that those men usually considered members of the 
pantheon are in many cases no more significant than the 
unnamed vis a vis the totality of social change over the 
past mil1enium«
X did not happen upon this view of social history 
merely to conform to Laldere and Barnett, or solely through 
their work. One of the more esteemed "generalist" historians
r~t(“ f O
of the current era, Herbert Muller, has made the point 
most clearly, although his reflections relate specifically 
to technological development. (However, it should not be 
understood that his remarks are irrelevant; to ideological or 
organizational innovation* The" reason that technology has 
been stressed whenever independent creativity is the point 
of discussion as mentioned above rests in the fact that 
other elements of social change are far more difficult to 
■attribute in their origin. While we know-that in 1300 Fra 
Xuca Paciolo invented double-entry bookkeeping, revolution­
ising business life, we can not so precisely assign respon­
sibility, for instance, to those who made England the 
"mother of parli amentary government", or America the -"birth­
place of jazz". This has less to do with the nature of 
change than with the problems of post-facto analysis 
regarding innovational approaches to reality, whether tech­
nological, ideological or organizational.)
Muller:
In thus anticipating the European genius for tech­
nology, these craftsmen also foreshadowed another 
.'-major theme «• the importance of the creative individual* 
In prehistory such individuals are perforce anonymous, 
at best being commemorated in some, later myth like that 
of the master craftsman Daedalus, .and. their inventive­
ness is obscured by the slow pace of change, the gradual 
diffusion of new skills, and the conspicuous uniformity 
of .artifacts* Today their importance is commonly 
minimised because of our awareness of their dependence 
on culture, and of the deep, unconscious, involuntary 
processes of historic change. Yet nothing would seem 
plainer than that every new invention must have been 
the work of some individual - not the automatic outcome 
of an impersonal process, nor the product of a committee 
of embryonic organization men. Even the very gradual 
improvements in skills or changes in styles were due to
minor innovations that could only have been the work of 
individuals* The diffusion of new arts end skills 
itself required exceptional men bold enough to break 
the cake of tribal custom, perhaps defy the patriarchs 
or head magician* Hence the faster pace of innovation 
in prehistoric Europe meant among other things that 
there was now .an increasing number of enterprising, 
imaginative, more or less unconventional men® He may 
doubt that their works were always welcomed or that 
their tribal societies were eager.for change; but at 
least these societies were growing more disposed to 
accept change, encourage the innovator, and thereby 
were anticipating a civilisation- that would provide 
more opportunity and incentive for the creative indivi­
dual than had any of the great Eastern societies®
(Note to the same page): In Change and History Margaret
Hodgen has made a pioneering'study in this, field: a
detailed history of" technological innovation in England, 
shire by shire, parish by parish, over its entire hist­
ory. Three major periods of innovation - . „ . - reflect 
the larger "movements” made familiar by historians and 
illustrate the ... impersonal processes of historic 
change that the innovators may be quite unconsciou s of * 
But a close study of these periods, as of the -whole span, 
gives much more, prominence -to the work of individuals 
other than the few famous inventors. Thus it was not 
.strictly "England” that produced or underwent these 
innovations: they occurred primarily in certain
regions, more specifically in certain towns or parishes, 
and always were the work of particular men, who in the 
16th century begin to be identified by name in the local 
records.- Of the more than 12,000 parishes-in England, 
down to 1900, fewer than 20% ever took up anew craft 
or industry, and most of these ventured upon an innova­
tion but once® Most of England, in other words, remain­
ed a traditional, agricultural society, sit most adopting 
improved tools-made by-more enterprising men elsewhere® (f
This has been quoted at length because of its implications 
for sociological investigation of past eras, the specifics 
for-which more often than not are dispensed with in favor of 
"periods”, "trends”, and the like. There is no sense in .mini­
mizing the interdependence of creator and culture, but because 
of our current historical proclivities, with the, boom of demo­
cratic, sociologized sentiment, to suggest•that an individual 
mind shares little responsibility for a particular develop--
Bient,- is to verge on the heretical, gaining profe-ssi;onal 
responses of "great^manism" or simply "psychologism". (The 
cold reception of LaPiere's Social Change sustains my suspi­
cion that sociologists1 rancor- is most stimulated by those in 
the fold who honor*the specifically individual and/or unique - 
as opposed- to the patterned, consensual or integrated - for 
some- analytical purposes in preference to the more comfort­
ably diffuse and general developments of Man.) The following 
vpages will attempt to walk the narrow line between blindly 
*• sociological vs. romantically individualistic accounts of 
innovations said change in history.
Along with' recognizing the innovator’s role, one 
fraust also realize that particular types or "styles” of 
purposive social change have been possible and effective 
doniy.under certain historical conditions. It is intuitively 
fblear that modes of change under the Pharcahs, within the
polis, and in Charlemagne’s Europe were all -decidedly 
.different. Somewhat less obvious are the enormous differences' 
between successful innovating behavior in the epoch before 
1 7 8 9 , In the 1 9 th century.and during the sixties in this 
country. Styles of change which made great sense within 
certain social structures made none in others, and the mark 
of the innovator—leader (if they were one and the same person) 
was the 'ability to determine when a social change device had 
become antiquated, and institute a more effective one.
Furthermoresocial change is often characterized 
as having- to do with those elements of a culture which are
conspicuously alterable: political-leadership, changes in
attire, distribution of goods and services, and so on. I 
propose that a fresh look offers different data, that social 
change in fact will begin to escape the notice of those 
analysts who are prepared and/or capable only of understand- 
.. ing change in anachronistic terms® It was announced during 
the sixties that no "real" change obtained because the "move­
ment" was ill ““Organized, the goals diffuse and the "revolu­
tion” -merely .emotional® For 30f s radicals it was -a disheart­
ening-" affair with.,.no- party ideology, cells, secret codes of 
. ft bought and behavior and the rest of the package*
. A corrective to this view is easily provided,
/ilo'cia! change in the past two hundred years has been pre­
dominantly structural® Marx was not the only thinker who 
doggedly tied men5 s thought and actions to a particular 
status and role* The fallacy involved here- has been pointed 
fgsmtz too often to require repetition. Today the Weitan- 
sschauungen of millions have become, for sociological purposes, 
Indistingui shable•from ■ one another although the compared 
individuals operate within entirely separate strata of the
r*
power/privilege- hierarchy®- It is not as easy to predict the 
values and related activities of the. laborer today as it was 
in 1848 or 18/1* The swollen middle class has taken over 
the traditional role of the elites as trend and fashion setter 
(something• • which bothered the old-school, e.g., Karl Mann­
heim’s "The Democratization of.Culture"). And because of 
regularized affluence for increasing numbers of the citizenry,
demands, for structural and distributional modification 
reminiscent -of the early 2 0 th century have subsided a great 
deal. Put succinctly, the social analyst of change must 
begin looking, not so .much for dramatic rearrangements of- 
social 'institutions, but "Tor equally important, more 
difficultly detected., shifts in values and processes*
I have dispensed for the most part with Eastern 
history since it followed such radically different contours 
until Westernization began in. -the 18th and 19th centuries. 
Thereafter it has - been subject to similar situations and 
-outcomes with those of Europe, given that certain idiosyn- 
■ssg&hic- features, very often of religious nature, have left 
:thelr mark-.
v*r Now that the -basic premises are clear, I may offer,
h^iway of recapitulation, a heuristic breakdown of the last 
m^Henium, which has been employed by many current historians, 
although they characteristically stop .short of purely socio­
logical analysis® Before -the -high- middle ages of the 12th. 
century, in those centuries somewhat mislabeled "Dark"' by 
1 9 th century scholars, whet change took place (especially 
organizational) seems to have been the handiwork of individual 
strongmen whose hegemony was extremely local and whose inheres' 
were consequently particularistic. With the creeping growth 
of secularism and-the merchant mentality which surfaced aftex* 
the 1 2 th century renaissance, social change took the form of 
conflict between liberalizing mercantile interests and the­
re actionary sentiments of the Papacy-and -some of the ruling
elites* those who failed to utilize the "soiled” capital of 
the traders. With the advent of proto-rational.,ism through 
Kepler* Copernicus* Galileo* Luther, Erasmus, Descartes and 
•later Locke, the stage was set for a new mode of change,* 
although again of a largely 'individual nature* This mode of 
change has been popularized .as the extremely atomistic 
behavior of "renaissance men” and reformation zealots«
As economies and concomitant political arrangements finalized 
in the 1 7 th and 18th centuries, completing the shift from 
^feudalism to early- industrialism, the reactionary and liberat­
ing forces met head on and popular revolution became the
This proved successful beyond .• the wildest hopes of 
'CT^lylibertarians, but with Metternich and the return of the 
pendulum (cf* Henry Kissinger1s The World Restored), revolu- 
tidfi began to produce diminishing returns for those who sought 
employ it within rapidly industrialising areas* The forces 
#^dotinter-revolut.io:a mushroomed; the .Bolshevik, enterprise of 
the 20th century was in many ways 100 years too late in any 
country but Russia*
What must be kept ‘in mind is the fact that these 
dialectical' processes of progress and xve action. were carried 
on at varying rates throughout Europe* Since Britain was the 
first to have a"modern -political revolution (164-0), the first 
to industrialize thoroughly and the first to become essentially 
a culture of nongovernmental complex organizations (early 1 9 th 
century), it may be compared with late-blooming Russia or 
'Germany only to emphasize differences at given times, riot
similarities® But each country went through roughly similar 
changes (which is not to say there is anything ,!inevitable” 
or "necessary” about such regularities), given that some 
advantages, accrued to, for example* Bismarck, through the 
fatal lesson of Louis XVI. If the masses were seemed in 
1 7 7 0 s, by 1 8 7 0  rulers began employing both stick and carrot* 
and the birth of cooptation was. at hand. Socialism could not 
be repressed to death in any country, and the masses were 
quick to learn that the social movement was their only reliable 
weapon against poverty and frozen social position*
We now move abruptly from conventional historic- 
gmphy to the' realm of hypothesis, the point of this thesis* 
The:., social movement in all post-modern..cultures (which elimin­
ates from comment the Third World) is no longer appropriate 
ifgenuine, penetrating and durable social change is sought* 
Ifchas repeatedly been shown, in 184-8, the Paris Communef
@rable peasant revolutions in Russia and other European 
countries, in American labor-management warfare from the Molly 
AleQuire.s on, etc* that the forces of oppression and cooptation, 
the social control facilities accessible to.the ruling inter­
ests, have made not only political revolution, but also the 
social movement impractical* Whereas revolution is precluded 
by the sheer strength of. state coercion, the social movement 
has- been vitiated rather by the growth of- knowledge on the 
part of the masses* A definition of self which permits 
”whole~liogn" movement support is not terribly sophisticated, 
and certainly not relativistic regarding values* Absolutist!©
thinking and social movements (historically) are inextricable 
and necessary to each other® Thus we see that the likelihood 
of mass support for ideologies and cell participation is 
inversely related to the .general level of education (used in 
a specific sense net related to indoctrination or citizen­
ship training) and the inevitably ensuing critical conscious­
ness , which has 'played havoc with political leaders since 
the French. Revolution». In short, the -world's worst follower 
•is. the man who thinks independently of ideologically proffered 
thought-patterns and values®
-yx 8 0  in whirlwind fashion I have outlined the growth 
of various forms of change in modern history. Moving further 
.intoy*hhe hypothetical, we arrive at present-day Europe and the 
TJ* S  ©,: the relatively uninhibited areas of post-modern - develop­
ment «
•.'.t* It is an irony of history' that the. innovator again 
comaiV to the fore as the most efficient and probable exponent 
of, change, after sharing the limelight with collective action 
for the last three centuries® Given the relativism of the 
age and the intense, irrevocable coercive powers of the state 
(largely due to telecommunications and similar technology), 
the 1 one-wolf innovator stands a much better chance of alter­
ing the .status quo than easily recognisable and repressible 
mass demonstrations of intent®
There are connected with this thought both happy 
and unfortunate correlates. A necessary if not sufficient 
reason for the existence in large numbers- of highly rational,
independent, relativistic: social actors, is both' affluence 
and the availability of higher education for other than the 
traditional elites. With, the diminution of supernatural 
systems, ideologies of various sources and related oppressive 
features of older cultures, the modern situation has provided 
the potential innovator with- means, ability and willingness, 
three key components which in earlier epochs were often 
absent, either singly or altogether® However, the current 
period of history is anomalous because of virulent, absolutism 
'living in uncanny proximity with Weimar-like relativism
a vis personal lives and commitments, or lack of same, 
historically an analogous situation obtained in i4*th century 
‘Jtoae when merchants and other radicals carried on their lives 
within sight of the Vatican. And, as in that time, there are 
frepuent clashes- between those whose allegiances vary with 
calculation and those whose are invariably stable because of 
Emotional, nonicgical ties. lUhe innovator, for whom feudal 
•behavior is anathema, has learned (because of inquisitors up 
through McCarthy)' to protect himself from zealous, feudal 
minds-seeking consistency and predictability in those about 
them, b y  carefully clothing questionable acts and thoughts in 
a veneer of compliance. Ibis runs counter of course to all 
conservative morality regarding the supposedly Goodness of 
the’monolithic self, but it has proven itself the single 
reliable road to survival for those increasing numbers who 
practice change.
With some repetition coupled with the addition of
new remarks, we have .gained the required position from which 
to make a swift review of history, and in so doing pointing 
up two related facts: (1) social change has been largely
due to independent innovators\ (2) collective., action under­
taken in the interests'of altering social reality will sub­
sequently meet with- marginal success.* (N.B.: In supporting
•the view of social history which casts the innovator as 
numero uno, I am, • again, not denying the cumulative nature 
of - culture and. the disparate abilities, of different societies 
to aid. or hinder the aspiring, inevitably present innovator.)
The Middle Ages
ipt: Binc-e .-most sociologists get their knowledge of the
medieval/-, second-hand - (a few of the more fortunate ..read 
BXfmhls Feudal Society) - the "stagnant feudal social struc- 
ttrfei of "Europe from GOG to .1200 has become a .professionally 
ritualized conception® Revisionist historians like Sylvia 
Thrupp have been proving our static interpretation to be 
fallacious,- and. they cite numerous, newly discovered instances 
of purposive, violent and/or innovative behavior on the part 
of medieval people® It has been pointed out, for example., 
that legalism prevailed as one of the spirits of the age, and 
even the otherwise ignorant serfs committed to.memory their 
privileges and responsibilities along with the many nonlogical
*The following will rely heavily upon the 18-volume "Rise of 
Modern Europe" series, edited by Langer, which has been repeat' 
edly mentioned to me by professional historians as the finest 
and. most succinct generalist study of modern social history. 
Also of value was Herbert Muller1s trilogy, Freedom in the 
Ancient World, Freedom in the Western World,~Freedom/in the 
Modern World® ’ ’
components of mental life* . This fascination with the. legal 
realm provided constant conflicts “between lords and peasants, 
and it is heartening to encounter the tenacity with which the 
undex*dogs often fought the improprieties of their masters 
through the court system (62)-.
I knew enough about the medieval to avoid complete 
acceptance of the discipline shorthand: feudal Europe equals
unmitigated repression and changelessness® But aftex’ con- 
culting some of the more reliable interpreters of the period (6y), 
ft or my purposes here , it is more safe than., not to characterise 
the era as relatively undynamic, in LaPiere1 s terms, ?lstatic*- 
aply congruent"* 1. allow myself this somewhat begrudgingly, 
fis©? if one performs too many "heuristics” 9 the data become so 
compromised as to mean nothing at all. Reading reputable 
.studies in medieval social history (of which there are an 
aipa.sir.2g■ number) leaves the reader with the wry -impression, that 
tfefess. people, although unlearned and ridden with superstition, 
.nevertheless exhibited an .enormous.capacity for resilience and 
rebellion - perhaps in the search- for new. stimuli - in careful 
disregard for constraining social structure. Modem social 
theorists use the manorial system as a foil to complex society 
and with ..good reason. When compared to the variety we take 
for granted, the manor was indeed a limited scenario in which, 
to carry out all of life * s functions. But to write the entire 
epoch off as Bark, changeless and sterile, "waiting13 for the 
Renaissance, is foolishness.
Traditionally, the year 4-76 ushered in the "dark
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ages" by way of a cataclysmic defeat of the Homans at the 
hands of northern Barbarians.. This is not quite accurate•
Less dramatic, but more in keeping with the facts, we find 
that the invasion from the. north had taken several'centuries' 
and was not a rapacious onslaught, but a quiet usurpation of 
power and status by upwardly mobile foreigners® Roman culture 
was recognized by the outsiders as superior to their own, and 
its lack', of* vitality - allowed their primitive robustness to 
"conquer”; .but, as in. so many other meetings of peoples, the 
more •■simple were readily assimilated into the older, more 
richly ..endowed culture (64-)®
W  However, by the time of Pope Gregory•the Great 
(54-04604-) there were indeed regularized. and ferocious attacks 
on the •remnants, of Roman grandeur, along with famine and 
diseasfa. throughout -Italy. Rome was preserved- from utter 
destruction only by the. diplomatic skill of'Gregory, for he 
placated the Lombards and more by accident than design, • initia­
ted "'the - hegemony of the Church over Europe for the next 
millenium. The 8th century showed little improvement in the 
lives of the "Europeans”, with the•Arab invasions as far as 
Spain; .and the miniscule Caroling!an renaissance died with 
Charlemagne leaving Europe in a 10th century of appalling 
despair..arid pessimism throughout. The year 1000 approached 
to no* chorus of joy,, for as many prophets of the age proclaim­
ed, it. seemed that Western man would not survive his first 
millenium*
Strangely perhaps, technological advance did not
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seem to be inordinately affected by such organizational and 
ideological chaos* Lynn White describes the birth of the 
stirrup, three-field crop rotation and similarly explosive 
inventions all of which, preceded the 11th century by several, 
hundred years (65)# This anomaly, the continuing progress 
of material innovation within a-social structure either 
static or declining, from this point forward begins to 
typify the West/much more than the East* The static congru- 
■ence. of later Rome and the early Medieval gave way gradually 
to -.-incongruence, and then, much later, to the dynamic• incon­
gruence of today (of course varying in quality and speed over 
difi&rent regions)* While the divine monarchs of Eastern 
civilizations assured that technology was restrained and 
applied -principally to art, the Western .leaders with their 
pugnacious acquisitiveness never tired of employing" novel 
device^;,to. further their power. However, to continue in the 
realm# ©f sociocultural paradox, the East developed quite 
early, amidst less material poverty than is often thought, 
conceptions of human spirituality and sensitivities which 
were utterly and forever foreign to the West, yet at the same 
time failing- to rival Europe in mechanical achievements. Thus 
the ideological element grew into degenerate complexity and 
subtlety in the East, the technological component flowered 
without remission or conscience throughout the modern epoch
in the-West, and organizational developments lagged in both 
areas (but to different degrees), even now creating the most 
problems for both worlds,. We- may assume from this that
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Individual creativity may readily find an outlet in either 
the Eastern or Western directions, but that those who would 
radically alter social organization (e.g., Cromwell, the 
philosopher, Lenin, etc.),chose for themselves by far the 
most'difficult arena in which to innovate. As students of 
complex organisations we find this unsurprising, but in seek­
ing a characterisation of social change through history as 
relying heavily upon individuals, the trichotoinous distinc­
tion must constantly be kept in mind. It will not do to 
dismiss the LaPiere-Barnett theory on grounds that large- 
scale organizational changes have in the past century been 
ijjihhe result of many small increments rather than "great man,r 
^•achievements. Complex organization is new in world history 
and-unless we wish- to become completely temperocentric, it 
|§is essential to recognise that as early as. Gregory the Great,, 
ifibe individual (leader, adviser, soldier, or inventor)-had. 
felfar more difficulty in rearranging.social relations than in 
coming up with novel, mechanical, devices or mental- concepts.
This is the nature of social change. Luther rather- easily 
concocted a radicalized theology; he had- tremendous difficulty, 
in establishing a viable non-C.atholic church which, could 
successfully compete with Rome. Within less than a century 
after his 95 theses were proclaimed, over d80 Protestant 
sects had. blossomed, the vast majority of which would have
met with no^approval from their "founder". Examples of this 
sort are rife through Western history. The fact then is 
clear: we have been very proficient at thinking up both new
A a
apparatuses and intellectual explanations, but, as in other 
civilizations, our ability to sensibly organize social 
relations is nearly always out of step, either, somewhat 
ahead ("open 'marriage11) -or behind (feudal demands within 
contract relations). This seems to hold constant even with­
out regarding/-the problems• of power and privilege, the "who 
gets what, when, how" dimension of change.
Between Charlemagne and 1100, "history", as 
chronicled by contemporary observers, remained tied to small 
■.iandtfrequent baronial battles* More important for my analysis, 
tte actual distances' between levels of the stratification 
were .usually slight. As Europe climbed its way out 
the :.socic-pQlitieal chaos left by the complete inf 11 tra- 
. tiorr of the Roman system by northern-peoples and the con- 
' €tPBitsnt dissolution of classical order, there existed 
':ifeo.f fie lent - opulence for anyone to exploit very much* How~ 
^fer^ out of the destruction two positive consequences were 
ih evidence, the conversion of Norsemen into Christian Normans 
• .(responsible for major creative input later in history) -and 
the tenuous understanding among the populations that -a 
"Europe" was in the making. (The 9th century historian 
Nithard first used the-term when assessing Charlemagne1s 
impact (66).) 'From my reading of the period, it seems that 
key figures working in decidedly innovational roles propelled 
the West away from Roman decadence and the onslaughts of 
both Islamic and barbarian invaders. One can say with more 
eettainty about this epoch than of any subsequent one, that
early Europe was the handiwork of specifiable innovators* 
hardheaded and foolishly courageous types who could look 
forward to brief and bitter existences* whether or not they 
sought to inject change into a dismal era®
Among these relatively few but essential figures 
are the leader's of the Church, generally considered the singl 
•force which made any concerted effort to maintain the social, 
fabric, of the civilization* This is not the corrupt and 
heavily entrenched Church of the pre-reformation* hut a 
young and still supple social force* hardly yet deserving of 
the name ‘-organization’5. Among these early purists was of 
St*. Benedict. St* Odo* Abbot of Oluny in the 10th 
ceptpry*„.while preserving the shredded remnants of Western 
tradition* also began a . mil i t anti y altruistic monastic move- 
vmept on the basis of the Benedictine Rule*, formulated 400 
yc|^ rs earlier. It has been noted that this essentially proto* 
s^^eluwork. role of the early monks found no counterpart in 
the East* end before degeneration set in* monasteries served 
.as centers for learning - purely intellectual and secular — 
and security throughout the troubled times. Moreover* the 
■stigma attached to manual labor so typical of previous 
civilizations* was almost completely eradicated under the 
influence of this order* which* as Sombart pointed out, -was 
very likely the root of bourgeois values: hard work* punctu­
ality and..thrift. If any organization ever worked in direct 
contradiction to the sentiment of the culture, it was this 
one* for it was said that if 99% of the monks were destroyed,
the survivors could reconstitute the entire -order piecemeal 
and we are left with the implies si on that precisely this was 
done on more than one occasion (67).
On the other hand, after paying homage to the 
positive aspects of. medieval ingenuity* it must likewise he 
remembered that the era seethed with incessant paradoxes 
and contradictions* Although they retained their older 
technical skills and added to them* although some of the 
writers of the period (Boethius* John Scotus* Cassiodorus* 
etc?*)'"produced laudable tracts on rational governmental 
theory and semi-modern morality* the strange fact persists: 
medieval -men took some perverse pride in binding themselves 
tsih’tbawork&bXe schemes* “preposterous practices*- Godlike oaths 
and ceremonies* only to break loose out!andishly* making a 
MC-tkery of their self-imposed restraints* Youths fornicated 
i#*ekthedr&ls* while ”whores prowled for customers* students 
inhkoly orders played dice on the altars” (68). It was- a. 
time of •”fantastic licence and irreverence" compensating for 
the threat of horrifying sanctions.* "At-no time in the 
world’s history has theory* professing all the while to 
control practice* been so utterly divorced from it" (69)« 
These contradictions exploded. in -'the' 15th and 14th centuries
*But these paradoxes and conflicts had their brighter side: 
"Medieval worldliness led' to a growing naturalism* humanism* 
and individualism that anticipated the Italian Renaissance, 
and characteristic passion of Western*man to savor*-know* fe 
and express all the manifold possibilities of life in the 
-natural world. In short, it promoted a spirit of freedom". 
Muller* Opus cited.* p. 51*
but before the period of Dante#s discontent* Europe took 
asylum from morbid introspection* during the famous 12th 
century.
As Charles Haskins''proved.-long ago in. a famous-- 
work (?0), whatever was dark about Western (predominantly 
British and French) (?1) civilization dissipated in the 
blinding light and conviviality of the 12th century,, This 
proto-renalssance was possessed of everything good: a lack
of firm national boundaries and the related promotion of 
>cosmopolitanism? intellectual commerce with Islamic and 
.Eastern sources* especially in regaining lost knowledge of 
Assistctie ...and Greek culture; an undogmatic clergy linked to 
anrats yet. unossified, noncoercive church — concerning, that 
is, those who were not potential enemies of the Crusaders*
But. as quickly and. wondrously as the clear light of tolera­
tion had dawned over the continent, it faded, with the 
•^hrivai of the bloody and treacherous 13th and 14th centuries. 
These were years in which seeds of discord were sown that 
flowered into problems of unmanageable magnitude we still 
face in our own time* The -familiar divisions - church-state, 
nation-nation, Islamic-Ghristian, church-intellectual - and 
ether confl.ictual dichotomies all find their roots in this 
unforgiving period.
However, both the highspots of glory and the lowest 
points of cultural and personal despair were basically the 
province of elites® For the common people, it is reasonable 
to suppose that life was brief, predictably strenuous and
•boring* Thus, when viewing the past with, sociological 
emphasis, those great leaps forward, heralded by professional, 
historians very often amount to ideological or organization­
al changes perpetrated by the upper crust, having only -second­
ary effect upon the masses* As mentioned above* technologi­
cal change is more democratically represented in history*
As White conclusively illustrated (72), from the 7th century 
onward, innovation in nutrition, warfare, and unrelated 
manorial technology made possible the production of a delicate 
surplus economy, paving the way for the urban explosion of 
the early renaissance. While an intense discussion of tech- 
Urological change during this early period is beyond my scope*
O: it is important to note that■ Ogburn was at least partially 
correct in his comparison of mental vs* material constructs* 
t: Jt ’seems there was no end. to technological improvements* both
of European minds and borrowed-from, distant cultures (73)* 
^fbut the rate of change in social structure and value processes 
significantly lagged. Apparently there existed an almost 
humorous' cat and mouse relationship between lord and serfs 
•uthe-'lord made a feudal demand upon the vassal?s energy, the 
innovative vassal promptly devised a tool or method with 
which to shorten or ease his labor so that he might return 
to his own affairs, the lord "reevaluating the serf’s perfor­
mance”, and upping the take, etc, Modern parallels are obvious
♦In emphasizing the appreciable gap between technological and 
ideological development, I reefer the reader to. monographs on. 
warring techniques, e.-g. A* Z. Freeman’s n WaXX-Breakers and 
River-Bridgerst Military Engineers of the.Scottish Wars of 
Edward I” (74), which emphasize the consummate skill of men 
engaged in mutual annihilation, but still thoroughly within 
an intellectually feudal framework, as late as 15-0 7 ®
G•The heritage and - significance of the middle -ages' 
for the modern world comes through most clearly in several 
familial* terms: Christianity, the classical tradition, the
feudal system, and. the urban bourgeoisie (75)® While the 
roles of the last three in the slow growth of freedom and 
innovation do not require comment, perhaps several remarks 
about the Church and its doctrine are necessary in view of 
the usually negative response given "supernatural systems” 
by sociologists.,
t- ■The first medieval treatise on government, John 
of -0alisbury?s Policrattcus  ^ was inspired by the behavior 
of 'tcfe prophets of 'the Old Testament who rejected their 
sovtffeigns, in stipulating that subjects need not obey 
monarchs who disregarded the law (76). The author of this 
woriktwas -• certainly a mil-lenium or so ahead of his time (1 1 5 9 ) 
i n ‘filing for legal responsibility on the part of ruling 
individual s', who within several centuries had assumed the 
mantle:• of deity. (Even today it seems behavior in the 
upper reaches of political life operates for the most part 
either in pro forma legality or cloaked extralegal maneuvers,,) 
It is important of course to distinguish between the often 
repressive Church bureaucracy and Christian beliefs, the 
latter of which animated such radicals as Aquinas,.- who 
managed to gain official backing for his rational conceptions 
of men as possessing free will® On the collective scale, the 
peasant rebellions which came somewhat later also found 
intellectual and emotional sustenance in the basic Christian
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•premises of equality in brotherhood and its logical 
extension, the value of the individual. Probably most 
important of the many "liberalizing" sentiments built 
into Christian dogma was this issue of the individual, his 
uniqueness and inherent right to certain "natural" preroga­
tives, although of course most -people lived without them,
East and West® Bub as Muller states, "The barbarities of 
our own time seem worse because of the still-live •. Christian 
sentiment that you simply can't do certain things to 
people” (77)** (The most poignant reminder- that this spirit 
.does ’not infect the entire world resides in the Bataan
March and related ordeals through which the Japanese 
:giih. their- "less than human” captives in the last war. While 
^atrocities- in-the West often occur, they are inevitably 
'3$fesnded as abhorrent aberrations. Such feelings were not 
iaiSfcm&Xly associated with beast-like aggression in other 
cultures®)
I made this digression bn the spiritual sources 
of innovation'because of the distinctly Western, quality of 
•existence -which during the medieval emerged in full bloom 
and was to remain relatively continuous thereafter; and to 
emphasize the interdependence ox innovation and freedom,
.which thus.far has been assumed rather, than stated® •With­
out actually doing so, it could easily he demonstrated that 
the other three factors (classical philosophy - especially 
Aristotelian the feudal, system with its incessant; conflicts 
end eruptive nature, and the determined bourgeoisie) all
•contributed to the general awareness of the. strength of 
investigation on empirical grounds, which more than any­
thing else determined the prospects and dilemmas of Western 
life* Such investigations and primitive research were 
naturally the bailiwick of innovators of one sort or -another, 
and with each passing decade their mental productions multi­
plied (almost comically), far outdistancing- demand*
All the major developments which dominated later 
history began as inauspicious rumblings during the middle 
ages,.' and only recently, very recently indeed., have the most 
advanced sectors of the West begun operatixg in a universe of 
steucture, process and values for which the medieval gives 
W' clues- as to future trends*
1350 - 1700
, * -Although a cruel and suspicious time, the 13th and
centuries excite and stimulate the student of change, 
even, moreso than .the preceding epoch* The death throes of 
medieval social organization .-were practically complete, .and 
.the beginnings of vernacular literature, nationalistic feel­
ings, on. the parts of many societal members, and growing 
general intolerance for- -anything unconventional (particular­
ly within the formalized supernatural system), brought an 
avalanche of change to Europe*
But more startling than the bloody exchanges 
between national armies was the unforeseen expansion of 
.minds and-purses resulting from trade and consciousness-
expansion imported by the Crusaders, from Byzantine and 
Islamic sources* -The ' entrepreneur of the -18th and 19th 
centuries:has been.immortalized in social history, song 
and scholarship, but their 14th century precursors, bent on 
individual accumulation through daring and invention are 
' equally important’, simultaneously shocking and delighting 
differexit segments of their society* The innovators held 
.center-stage, if not with the clergy, then with the common 
people as well as with many lords, who began leaning heavily 
.uponItalian, French, Hanseatie and English merchant capital 
finance their wars and public works® Men like Tiedemann 
Limburg, Nicholas Bartholomew of Lucca, 'Sir Richard 
fftitbington, and - the best known of all, Jacques Goeur, began 
,:to give the clergy and the royalty - alike reason to fear and 
Sctaire the quickly entrenched Third Estate (78). These men 
Ad- their -peers began to exercise- such power that by the 
mid^14th century, they clamored for representation in govern­
mental operations, and with the failure of the Hundred Years 
War to resolve itself, they succeeded in establishing institu 
tionalized statuses for themselves in every.major country (79 
It is to be emphasized that these men worked with feverish 
self-imposed regimen. The ideological support of the time 
they did not have; in fact, like all innovators, they had to 
operate sub rosa much of the time, being not only the origin­
ators of various techniques in trading, navigation, banking,
'coinage and so on, but also their own advocates in the face 
of suspicious and counterinsurgent mentalities in both the
First and Second. Estates. They had the opportunity, the 
courage,, and after some wrangling, the means for opening up 
trade between East and West, the Baltic and the Adriatic, 
and for the most part had to rely for moral and intellectual 
reward upon themselves. . Althoxigh this kind of independent 
alteration, of social reality-is.not .unique, there had probably 
not been an instance of such great import for succeeding 
generations.as in the case of the merchants and bankers of 
■the early modern period* Their capital!., created urban centers,
, said*. as is well-known, everything Western. good end bad, was 
born in the ever-growing metropolis.
igKi.-. On the other end of the change continuum, - collective
in. its most rudimentary form also flourished. In 
Sici3.y, France, England, the Netherlands and elsewhere,
.popular, revolts wrought murderous havoc upon recalcitrant
arbitrary lords-. The Sicilian Vespers (from which we have 
word:-"mafia") was the most spontaneous and brutal, with 
the-massacre of the occupying French, but other- attempts by 
the 'lower class to .rectify and soften their wretched condition 
were longer in coming, and more difficult to subdue. The 
invaluable distinction between revolution and revolt was at 
this time unknown, for the first of the great democratic 
revolutions, with armies, fully developed ideologies, recognis­
ed leaders and so on, were far off. The peasant revolts were 
tragic lunges by the dispossessed, - futily trying to construct 
the social world more equitably, but certain to fail because 
of the-.-technology and social organisation - of the. time.
Repression or. the simple dwindling of energy and supplies 
invariably ended the libertarian- activities (80). The 
notion that purposive change as possible and worthy .finally 
reached the masses, in the 18th century is only partially 
correct® The great revolutionists from Cromwell to Lenin 
shared with the .early peasants 'and their spur-of-the-moment 
leaders' the conviction that reality as given required 
rearrangement .(.very often in a regressive direction). 'What 
the peasants did not have was the ability to construct-or 
reconstruct a new-social fabric, only to destroy the noxious 
elements wholly, like children confronted with an unsolvable 
pfezle. But as Engels noted (81), the sheer-fanatical seal 
<3$#later■plebian revolutionaries was fore shadowed clearly in 
-the suicidal battering - of social structure performed in this 
era-by the untutored masses®*
■ By the middle of the 15th century, the world was
.dfenging at a rate which must have seemed to many as absolute­
ly "unGodly”, which it was. The Papacy was a power, bankers 
ruled the' fortunes of more noblemen than vice versa, the 
working, class grew and developed appropriate sentiments (in 
some instances capable of being termed a distinct "class 
consciousness”), and the first- series of large-scale, monar^ 
chic'ally inspired national wars began in efforts to enlarge
*As is often noted, the Black Death beginning in 1348, killed 
one-third.of Europe’s population, and this put a premium-on 
the value of individuals, if for no more enlightened reason 
than the need of laborers-; thus, the further growth of indivi­
dualism and its inevitable correlate, rationality.
treasuries and gain general esteem* And of course, the 
renaissance was on, the ref citation around the bend. However, 
in keeping with my focus thus far, I will skirt the well-trod 
ground of theological-intellectual history in favor of econo­
mic and social, change, 'disregarding the. endless arguments- of 
causation: do ideas cause behavior, or reflect behavioral
definition? I see in - this period the minds of Fuggers and 
Medici fascinated far more by temporal calculation and inven­
tion than religious insights or aesthetic achievement. As 
matter of fact, the more artistically inclined the Medici 
^became, the poorer 'were their returns on the European market.
•- *• The impetus for mercantile and consequently social
.^development shifted from the Mediterranean to the North Sea. 
Antwerp -became the banking center of Europe, and economic 
delations were already so interdependent that a delayed 
figalleon arriving in Lisbon (the receiving port from the East) 
paused, banks to fail in Germany (82). To add to the modern 
flavor of the era, prices began climbing as gold and silver 
reached Spain and Portugal in huge quantities, while wages 
for many remained fixed as relics of feudal agreements.
(Tawney documents this phenomenon along with other problems 
in, his The Agrarian Problem of the 18th Century.) There is 
speculation that inflation was also a work of manipulation 
by the gold-hoarding Spanish government, but the debate is 
unresolved (83)* Meanwhile, technological and navigational 
innovations of the Portuguese brought misery to Arab middle­
men who for years had exacted gigantic taxes and carrying
charges (often over 50$) on the exotic imports from India 
and China.
However, "speetaculax' as were the changes caused 
in the ‘long run by the enlargement of the scope of commerce, 
it must be emphasised that the discovery of America and the 
sea route to the Indies did not all at once revolutionize 
the economic organization of Europe" (84-). This was due to 
the type goods being imported: only the finest and most
expensive luxuries, spices and .jewels, to name the most 
#popular. - Although the upper class clamored for increasing 
bussitities,- for the common 16th century participant in 
ecfaomic relations, changes were slow and indirect. But 
because of the great distance between exorbitant prices and 
fixed wages,"’many of the- bourgeois merchants had the oppor­
tunity to amass wealth, and this capital created the search 
fap'investment possibilities of all types* Hunger for the 
new"and profitable in whatever form was fed by innumerable 
mechanical devices and innovations! techniques, especially 
in.'"money and banking" and related industrial areas® This 
is a prime example of the sociological truism that "both/and 
explains more accurately than "either/or" when considering 
cultural change. "Beth" cultural milieu, social forces, etc 
"and" the presence of independent, untrained and noninstitu­
tionalized innovative talent assured the birth of industrial 
ism during the early 16th century.
The figures concerning industrial growth are stag­
gering. Thanks to Gutenberg, the production of books repre-
sented the first mass production item, and silk, alum mining, 
ship-building in Venice, among others, followed quickly as 
factory-based capitalist ventures (85). Strikes among 
"unionized" journeymen'began almost immediately (86), in 
response to conservative tactics of masters clinging to the 
dying guild idea of limited membership and the correlate, 
high prices for goods. As an example of the maddening rush 
for factory production, Louis XI in 14-66 imported 16 Italian 
silk masters and set them up in Lyons, The city boux'geoisie 
^protested because of preferred treatment given the workers 
and also out of provincial distrust of foreigners. After 
’being moved to Tours four years later, the business began 
to explode, and by 1^00, more than 800 masters and 4-000 
workers produced r. silk for the French nobility in order to 
keep the King’s gold within the borders of France and not 
in Italy as had been the case before (87). By mid-century, 
these numbers doubled. The same magnitude of operations 
obtained in Papal alum mines near Vclterra to name but one 
of the many other European "manu-factories”.
Naturally, with industry of this tr/pe came the 
urban proletariat,1 powerful high-finance tactics, attempted 
monopolies and cartels, and most of the other incursions 
into medievalism which have become "natural” in our day.
But it is wise to cite still more statistics: out of the
70 million European inhabitants in 1500, only 2 or $ million 
labored in capitalist enterprises, and less than a third of 
these -worked in factories, the rest in crafts or home-based
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piece work. What did occur however, in spite of the figures, 
was the birth of a new kind of human, the industrial prole­
tariat, whose life in every-way differed, in major qualita­
tive terms, from the lives of anyone who preceded them. And 
this small, cancerous cell of antimedievalism was the joint 
product of innovating talent in enterprising merchants, 
bankers, visionary lords, and not least of all, those whose 
.genius made mass production possible. There is absolutely 
no evidence to suggest that nebulous social forces or 
* "'-Zeitgeist or Mind coerced or even aided in any way those 
relatively few individuals* from whose hands came the 
1 ^ thousands of technological and organizational changes that 
./%rOuld inexorably finalize the death of medieval social 
structure, and begin the move Maine has described, from 
/ ‘'status to contract. There is no period so crucial to an 
|• Understanding of what followed than this period, the renais­
sance of not only intellectual and antidogmabic fireworks, 
but the small and barely sustained maneuvers of the few to 
make changes in centuries-old traditions, or even more 
difficult, to formulate and institute entirely new procedures
*”X tended to think of history run. by impersonal forces. But 
when you see it in practice you see the differences that the 
personalities make15, could have been the words of a Medici, 
Pugger, Chigi or Welser (bankers), of kings, lords, merchants 
or traders, all of the 16th century; they were spoken by 
Henry Kissinger -in January, 1974*. If one substitutes for 
"personalities'1 the phrase "innovative actions and thoughts 
of specific people", my position is c&psulized. (Time, Feb.
4-, 1 9 7 V  p. 24-*')
aimed at unorthodox ends.
A note contra economic.determinism: all the evidence 
points to the royalty and nobility being the actual decision­
makers of the period, and the existence of a strangely impotent
wealthy class of financial leaders* .Apparently the jump from 
successful businessman to power-wielder was still beyond the 
-conceptual limits of even the most ambitious money-lender.
Jacques Goeur and the Fuggers both collapsed at the hands of
dynastic monarchs, who without their funds could not have 
amassed sufficient power to end their benefactors* enterprises! 
tJBut this situation was soon to change when revised ideas 
Regarding self, the stats, and God began permeating the manip­
ulated bourgeoisie.
'i • As previously stated, the 16th century generally was 
^autime of monumental increase, in population (88), total 
i|4Wealth (89), industry, trade, and size of the known world, 
Emigration within and very soon outside of Europe, and so on. 
And, as ••'traditional history teaches, the reformation was also 
a logical philosophic and religious outgrowth of renaissance 
secularism. Luther is in most estimates considered not only 
a*"great man”:but also an innovator of the first rank. With 
his "discovery1 that salvation need not be earned through the 
application of .sacraments performed by a priest, the self- 
conceptions of the masses altered radically. As the notable, 
still respected Preserved. Smith put it,
Columbus burst the bounds of the world, Copernicus those 
of the universe; Luther only broke his vows. But...the 
repudiation of religious• vows was the hardest to d.o at 
the time, a feat infinitely more impressive to the masses
than either of the former* (90)**. That the Reformation 
strengthened the state was inevitable, for there was no 
practical alternative to putting the final authority 
in spiritual matters, after the pope had been ejected, 
into the hands of civil government. Congregationalism 
was tried and failed as tending to anarchy. (91)
No matter, what motivation is attributed to Luther and 
Calvin in their world-changing activities, the fact remains 
that .^nothing could have pleased the bankers and industrialists 
more than the demoting of the.Papacy and a concurrent boost 
for;individual!sm and the work ethic. (Cf. Nisbet* s Quest 
for Community*) However, the speedy growth of -monarchy and 
^nationalism proved that reformation sentiment was a mixed 
tblessing* The Pone had been much less vigilant about mercan- 
r^ile activities in.the most creative, ruthless, accumulating 
practitioners than the civil governments were to become. It 
■is,,, easy to -picture an early 16th century "liberal” trader in 
i./hls old age blaspheming Luther and the development of states, 
^because of a rise in the sin of sins, the "death of initiative 
and individua1i sm".
Prom this point forward in the history of Western social 
change a subtle blend of individual and collective action is 
noticeable, but not like the Peasant Rebellions two hundred 
years earlier. The difference lies in effectiveness, and with 
the growing secularism destroying Papal Europe, all of the 
same cloth, with the growth of life’s variety, industry, 
urbanisation and numerous other indicators, the value of the 
individual skyrocketed -•formally expressed as humanism, 
coupled with and mutually supportive of capitalism.
The brief period between 1610 and 1660 is--known as 
both the baroque era and the "age of giants”, alleged by more 
than a few historians to be the two most fruitful and excit­
ing generations of European history (92). Whether or not 
this enthusiasm is shared, there is little doubt that 
Spinoza, Hilton, James X, Charles I, Cromwell, Hobbes and 
other of like stature gave a fresh, though often conflicting 
tone to an era which saw the irrevocable climax to the drama 
of vinedievel dissolution, a phenomenon which began several 
centuries before. With the crumbling of all feudal restraint, 
(.the state by 1660 had become sufficiently reified in common 
•"th ought! that discussions of its "possibility", held in earnest 
w x  the beginning of the century, seemed very dated. Although* 
the liberation of intellectual leaders and artistic develop­
ments of the era receive more emphasis by historians than the 
dtiPe'of*the commoners, there is much evidence which illustrate 
„the growing pride of urbanised masses, flaunting ties with the 
church or the nobles, and turning instead to the state for 
authority and reward. The very word "statistics" comes from 
Italy during the 16th century,, when.it became necessary to 
tabulate such data, both for taxation and out of general 
curiosity about population .growth (95)* The -spectacular rise 
of vernacular literature, from popular drama to penny narra­
tives and the Newgate Calendar records, demonstrates the degree 
to which commoners partook of "modem" culture and its many 
outlets,* relative to feudal society, for learning and enter-
-However, Europe at the time was still predominant! 
nonurbanized (9^)* and forces behind changing attitudes and 
behavior originate, of course, in the cities. Only 13 or 14- 
cities had over 100,000 people, the trading centers still 
walled in .from...medieval days, the capitals beginning the 
familiar urban, sprawl. A truly "metropolitan economy", in 
1610 barely noticeable, had by 1660 become recognised as an 
important,, advancing .mode, of financial development* Along 
with other outcomes of this period, the capitals began for 
, the first time to outdistance trading centers in size and 
Importance, a function of the growing significance of central 
ilteiaged political and economic activities (95)•
Patterns which are familiar, today originated in ih 
-time., the .joint-stock companies, trade wax's between nations, 
;#&re-devil expeditions with solely mercantile ends, and most 
rspgportant, the new and apparently permanent bonds between 
Companies and state military organisation were forged. No 
more was one merchant vying with others in the marketplace; 
now the finances, prestige and finally, the military might 
of royalty stood behind the buccaneers. Drake's rape of 
Spanish shipping in the preceding century was the -adventure 
o f a single man. but similar encounters 30 years later a 
wholly new situation: the English government and its rogues
pillaging goods of the Spanish king. In these terms it was 
difficult to avoid the growth of national sentiment in the 
populace since the state proved to be the most exciting, 
honored and fruitful benefactor thus far in European history.
The innovators had t o m  from the -middle ages a social 
structure dependent upon fealty and trust, man to man, and 
with their intellectual advances, merchant ventures and 
industrial inventions, they had perpetrated the formation of 
central governments with developed bureaucracies•
Three countries, each developing vastly differing 
©odes of social organization, dominate histories-of - the 17th 
century •- France, England and Holland.. The rest of Europe 
. was either in eclipse (Spain and Italy) or in more primitive 
v* frtages of coalescing (the East). The study of this period 
^provides for the modern sociologist .an exercise in revalua- 
n ti on. The absolutism of Louis and William both served the 
» interests of their countries superbly Xlouis so much so that 
"VFrance under him ^ became the most powerful nation of Europe, 
gland the first truly modern one); religious sentiments (in no 
il«y attached to economic or other secular incentives) were 
$"&o virulently alive that Germany was devastated during the 
- Thirty Years War and its opponents1 treasuries were emptied 
in the conflict, a war in which modem scrutiny has all the 
leaders "doing the' wrong things", i.e., operating nonration- 
ally; modern science and the discoveries of those luminaries 
who motivated Whitehead to label the period "The Century of 
Genius" (96)* had almost no effect upon everyday life. 
(Newton, the undisputed genius cf them all, was absolutely 
unconcerned about practical applications of his insights, and 
only in the early 18th century were the implications of his 
formulations appreciated widely.) To put it succinctly,
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this-century constitutes the birth of the modern'era. With 
the exception of some obvious technological advances, the 
Europe of 1700 displayed all the elements of society that 
had come to typify the West--two centuries later. But the 
incredible variety of the period, both in terms of cultural 
diversity and intellectual confusion makes problematic any 
.effort at brief characterization. The century- of -Newton 
also saw Pascal, Milton, and Locke (each of differing impact 
upon their contemporaries)% the birth of science and scientism 
sharedv,the period with merciless discrimination against 
herfetics and Dissenters (revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 
etcvi^  and the high point of blind faith in ahsolutistic- 
mohMrchs; radically innovative literature and popular thought 
(whether in Shakespeare or the Levellers) in 1600 had by the 
cl'fifee-. of the century degenerated into highly -formalized-, 
tedi'Ous patronage of the powers that be (Racine, Corneille, 
etc*-); and most astonishing, as late as 1683, c5.vilisati.on in 
the West was threatened by an overwhelming Turkish invasion 
(200,000 strong) attacking-Vienna, the unified response to 
which has been labeled the "first" world war. The transitions 
in every field of human endeavor1 stand out as amplifications 
and logical extensions of those in both later medieval, and 
the 16th century ronaissance-reformation era. Tawney informs 
us that life for the common man changed relatively little
between 1485 and 1640 in England (97) - in spite of the 
enclosure controversy and related dilemmas growing out of an 
agricultural economy changing from subsistence to commercial
scale. But with technological advance (inter alia, the tele­
scope, microscope, thermometer, barometer, pendulum clock, 
air pump (93) ) and the new-born fetish for measurement; 
with such ambivalent personalities as Lord Pra?Lse-G©d' Barebone 
(99) trying to rationalize -Cromwell's Prot e c t or at e over 
Britain, thereby offering into history a unique British 
construct: the loyal opposition; with feudal remnants all 
around and modern genius refusing to allow time to stand still, 
life became so relativized and under-structured for many as 
to make 18th century absolutism a "logical" outcome*
>/ Holland was peculiar insofar as her hardy and unre-
,*p|rrained bourgeoisie lived with the protection of govern- 
u^nially-assured freedom to a degree otherwise unheard of at 
fthis-time. The most limited knowledge of painting in the 
period tells the tale: court portraits and religious motifs
'0X&France and Spain, as opposed to the matchless bourgeois- 
^inspired realism of Rembrandt (1606-1669) and many lesser 
men in Amsterdam. The burghers’ hard-headed acquisitiveness 
continued unabated, which directly or indirectly assured a 
degree of popular freedom and democratic achievement unparalleled 
in Europe,* and not emulated until the founding of this country. 
(The unG-odly behavior of these merchant folk so infuriated 
the more pious Spanish that in 1563, the entire "heretical" 
-population-of the Netherlands was condemned to death by 
Philip II (100).) But, alas, with only 2 million people, 
the tendencies of the Butch did not effect a sea change in 
.governmental- and civil rights practices throughout the continent.
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At this point it becomes necessary to review in brier 
the place of £he innovator in what had become an aver 
plexing”, persistently enriched cultural milieu.* As I stated 
'in the''beginning of this section* innovations! activities 
have met with varying degrees of success in the distinguish­
able epochs-, of -.Western., history, although their unorthodox 
quality has met with'less automatic disapproval here than 
in the East. We remember that the individuals who reshaped 
Europe between 400 and 1000 worked against intolerably poor 
|pdds* and only with the growth of the Church in the 11th 
|p$ntury did -civilisation in Europe find a. stalwart and 
: j^emanent influence regarding its survival. In the 1Jth and 
.j^th ‘centuries,?* apparently no-one stood to have lasting 
Igfcfifluehce. Incessant wars and the Crusades plus the Black 
4pfath and gross insecurity among most societal members, make 
:1$hose- few innovators who did produce--significant-change seem 
uncommonly lucky.
However', as every schoolboy once knew, what made 
renaissance man different from the medieval mold was the 
. astoundingly high* opinion he. held of himself. This courage 
,to institute alterations in all levels of existence - which 
later reached epidemic proportions - boosted Luther and 
fi'iends into revaluating the place of a staid'Church in the 
spiritual (and consequently, secular) lives of men. The 
ideology of the reformation■produced -high levels of literacy 
so: necessary, - to • • later' developments in history, • -along, with
sundry other' monstrously important changes, all of which 
were of course outside Luther’s purview. Subsequent victories 
for the individual were less sweet, for the birth of personal 
rationalism and the scientific.' method came hand, in hand with 
increasingly depersonalised governments, so that as Fromm- —  
(perhaps exaggerating) noted, man in the medieval "felt 
himself secure and safe"(101), and the birth of nation states 
and intense bureaucratization minus feudal.obligations created 
general malaise. Again the individual innovator tread sensi­
tive soil when propounding the new: Galileo was forced to
%xsetract his findings, "Lutherans hounded the pious Kepler, 
'fetlvi.ni.sts exiled Gxotius, "Jews excommunicated Spinoza,■hi"
■iteglicans silenced Hobbes and burned his books, Jesuits got 
• the works of Descartes put on the Index" (102).
Ti§p ; ,t With the beginning of the 18th century, the aberrant 
Creative soul began to find himself once again in workable 
Surroundings, after a tenuous century and. a half of arbitrary 
response from the powerful, religious, and small-minded - in 
many cases one in the same. The history of the democratic 
revolutions and.the results of those mass * movements in the 
1,9th century are. common enough: that I will not enumerate 
details, even to the slight degree I have done so thus far. 
What needs to be mentioned, in reference to developments over 
the following 250 years: are several broad trends, each of 
which affected innovative talent thoroughly.
Our knowledge of the past three centuries is in most 
instances copious, especially when compared to the eras just.
surveyed. The history of invention alone occupies many 
volumes, even excluding the cataract of achievements in 
this century. But as mentioned before, technological inno­
vation came into its own as a prized and laudable activity 
shortly after the "Century'df"'Genius",'"’'add' 'hehcefofth^has 
met with .far more acceptance than earlier innovators would 
have thought possible* Our attention thex*efore shifts (and 
in this we differ somewhat from LaPiere1 s fascination with 
material improvements) to ideological and (especially) organ­
izational innovation.
The. English Puritans and their spiritual allies, the
^Hissenters and related free-thinking religious groups hit 
^Igpon the then shocking conception of life as purposively 
■ improveable, and not necessarily dictated by royalty. When 
liCharles I lost his head in 1649, the first utterly secular
‘ r '........ . . ■ - - v
'^Igbvernment. went into, rocky operation for slightly more than 
Jgsl&ecade, protesting all the while its Godfearing intentions 
But .when Cromwell died and the Restoration came* the newer 
line of monarchy realized, that levels of expectation among
01 ity /
were such that pigheaded absolutism was no longer a healthy 
practice. The line of Georges, famed for their ineptitude 
and lack of tact, were all;.the British needed to begin 
utilising, almost-by chance, the services of a Prime Minister
and cabinet. In France the excesses of Louis XIV had begun 
to wear upon the patience of both the merchants and noble 
butterflies, compelled to spend -lavishly in their court'
the people (for the time being most catered to in the nobil %
existences, so that his death marked the beginning and the 
end of his inimitable style. Changes in values forced the 
ruling powers, whether the King, Parliament, clergy or nobility, 
to continuously offer demonstrable proof to their subjects 
that their authority,was legitimate. This concern with mass 
approval (15consensus formation.”)? if even at first of a 
nominal variety, was something- antithetical to the teaching 
of Louis XIV.and his able ministers, and while England had 
never suffered under such bombastic absolutism, even for 
.Elizabeth, the concept of "accountability" would have been 
repugnant. Whether or not one agrees with. Weber and many 
othfes that ideas are capable of propelling individuals to 
social action, or adheres to the opposing Marxist-Mannheim 
understanding of ideological justifications, this fact is 
clear, without establishing causality: by the beginning of
the!&H;Bth century, the bourgeoisie in all countries (except 
Spain), .the --increasingly literate masses of both the urban 
proletariat and peasant class, and many of the nobles whose 
fortunes languished because of outmoded restraints on their 
activities, all conceived of the monarch and the central 
government in increasingly rational terms. Newton*s formula­
tions, which to him seemed irrelevant to larger issues, had 
begun the usual process of filtering down to mundane levels, 
to such an extent that Voltaire as spokesman of rationality 
enjoyed a readership in the hundreds of thousands, beginning 
in 1733 with his outrageous Letters on the English. The 
people,-not only the idle rich, found time to read and idolise
the author of Candida, and his influence on_ popular issues - 
often religious or political - reached a height unknown to 
any other writert past or present, \*4th the qualified excep­
tion of Mao. He produced 15,000 words per day at times and 
his hyper-rationalism, free of any shred of doubt about the 
possibility of men shaping their existences, has thoroughly 
permeated the ■ .-French-to-this day, not to mention the rest 
of the Western ’'democracies".
History from this point is neatly divided into major 
conflicts, either between nations or between classes or 
‘interests within individual countries (external vs. internal 
ways). The politically dormant but intellectually bright 
period of the first 'half of the 18th century, as we all know, 
finally culminated in the most innovative of all collective 
behavior, the violent overthrow of a government too slow in 
recognizing the liabilities inseparably linked.with feudal 
Vteltanschauungen. She study of the French devolution alone 
tells one a great deal about the dynamics of this style change. 
First, there must be urban centers filled with semi- or non­
literate, manipulable, disenfranchised masses, whose patience 
with piecemeal reform has been exhausted and who have suddenly 
felt the agony of yet another setback to improving-.their lives. 
Secondly, there must exist intellectual leaders and spokesmen 
of the masses, who almost invariably originate in the bour­
geoisie, and whose movement and speech are for whatever reasons 
permitted by the incumbent rulers. Finally, there must obtain 
an incredibly obtuse governmental bureaucracy or oligarchy
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whose skills and resources in both co-optation or oppression 
are unequal to the task of any longer containing the wrath 
the collective, and whose claims to legitimacy have time 
and again been shown to be unfounded. Only 'with these con­
ditions as a minimum can the large-scale (or inclusive) 
political revolution (as opposed to palace coups, etc.) meet 
with success. As is well known, the vast majority of revol­
utions have failed even in an attempt to gain control, to 
say nothing of' their ideologically utopian goals for recti- 
, fying wrongs of the society. No matter whose analytical 
framework one uses in assessing the etiology or lasting effects 
y 'Of revolutions, whether Brinton, Lyfcrd Edwards, Leo Gott- 
1 -s chalk, Davies- Gurr, or Eckstein (103), inter alia, for the'
? typical societal- member, the chances are good that immediate 
f- benefits from upheavals will net be in the offing. Collective 
social change of the revolutionary - sort "devours its own 
children", and in its efforts to fully institutionalise its 
"challenge ideology", no-one is safe from arbitrary repression. 
The enormous literature on revolution attests to at least 
this much.
After Napolean9s demise, Europe9s leaders (particularly 
Castlereagh and Mettemick) were very quick in talcing steps 
to prevent another Bastille (104). - Counter-revolutionary 
tactics of every nature were employed all over Europe between
Waterloo and the general * continental revolutions of 184-8, the 
most wide-spread and glorious of failures in collective action. 
An anomalous situation prevailed : on the one. hand there was
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an almost universal disgust and fear over the -wanton destruc­
tion during the -later stages of the French Revolutions on the 
ether, factions from different strata of the social structure 
and for diverse -reasons were strident in their'support for 
liberalism and-the ".sensibility4' of gradual eradication of 
social ills. Out of this dizziness, bastard ideologies 
grew* romanticism, method!sm, and pietism (105) sill gaining; 
large supportf along - with a generalized reactionary mood in 
favor of royal restoration. But the dialectic of European 
.modernization see-sav/ed with ©mazing speed between extremes, 
..and by 1830 revolutions again shook Europe, for much the 
tetisame .reasons that the late 18th. century American and French 
&: ^ internal wars" had come about. However, because of the 
strength of the. still viable aristocraticolandowners and 
!?'• father reactionary elements (particularly in Britain), these 
i&g^phe&v&ls of the.mid-revolutionary period met with failure. 
§r:(‘0ne histoid.an has claimed that the only difference between 
the 1830 and. 1848 revolutions was this lingering ability of 
the conservative ^ elements to fight back (106).)
By this time the liberal humanitarian doctrine had 
gained such a following (and concurrently, radically-inspired 
bloodshed-of earlier-years was still repugnant) that members 
of the ruling classes began piecemeal reforms which were the 
precursor to the modem art of co-optation, in draining off
from the revolutionary factions both leadership and popular 
support (10?)* At this point and for the next century and a
..quarter, somehow the notion entered the minds of leaders and
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r followers alike that French-style revolution had become a 
no-win genie, or"at best, one of diminishing returns. Political 
organization on the part of rulers grew much tighter and 
their techniques of coercion and repression advanced in 
sophistication geometrically while social improvements for 
the disenfranchised lumbered along the gradtialist route. 
Nevertheless, a new- mode of change became necessary.
a r The enormous growth of urban centers and the expansion 
of5Cormnunication (for example, the repeated attempts to esta- 
* bli^h ill England a radical, working-class newspaper between 
BIO and 1850, rrnaliy culmmatmg m  cneap Sunday papers 
,'flt4>ound 164-0 (108) .), along with the. ever increasing interest 
: socio-economic '.matters among the traditionally dormant 
lt>wei* classes, gave rise ter the social movement (or segmented 
devolution), the tool of the collectivity for social change;.:, 
illfetb ’out own day; The prerequisites for successful social 
^■inovat-ion of this type are several': (1) a high level, of
general, frustration and dissatisfaction, but of such a mature 
that the potential participants recognize the (Mills *) con­
nection between personal problems and: public issues; (2) this 
frustration must become focalized - pure anomic despondency 
has been in evidence throughout history, but social movements 
have not; (3) urban concentration of a literate and politicized 
mass; (4) at least a rudimentary understanding of secondary 
behavior,"-the most essential move from Gemeinschaft- to 
Gese31schaft-thinking-, necessary to an acceptance of complex, 
organization;- (5) rapid and efficient mass communication
Q r\ 
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• (certainly ...one ,of the handicaps, of the earliest attempts at 
such organization was the lack of telecommunications); (6) 
the .capacity to create a separate definition of social, reality 
'and. put of this, .a. hypothetically re arranged, social.: organiz.a-' 
tion; '(7) the early' emergence of strong leadership* The real 
key however, as mentioned before, is also the reluctance of 
the. conservative interests to. utilize brute-repression, (the 
predominance of "foxes"), the use of which would doom any 
, social laovement in its infancy. (This formulation is a.
composite of the findings of Hadley Cantril, Hans Toch, 
forinton and other well-known interpreters of collective 
^political action..)
t Even if the social movement can. formulate an appealing . 
“"challenge ideology’1 - as opposed to the institutionalised
^ideology *(oi? simply, "institution")., of .'the status, quo - it
f
a multitude of organizational problems. The mortality
r.vv' 1
^ate, for movements is extremely high, as it proceeds through 
each- of the four basic stages: social unrest, popular stage, 
stage of formalisation, and institutionalization. Without 
going into detail, a few remarks may be in order regarding 
each of. these stages (again, drawn from prominent theorists). 
Most movements fail -to emerge from the first stage of social 
unrest., since one or more of the prerequisites listed above 
are not in evidence*.
The popular stage is characterized by the focalization 
of general distaste for the status quo, very often through 
the "discovery" •- by the emergent leadership - of a scapegoat.
A martyr at this point is...almost essential in order to gamer 
support -among the uncommitted, but -interested, masses. (The 
powers that be if of any sophistication will naturally do 
everything possible to avoid, creation of martyrs, and will. 
go so far as to disallow the opposition to fabricate one - 
a tactic not ..unknown to enterprising movement leaders. ) The 
infighting will become extremely heated and through something 
Of a P&rwiLnisn selection process, the most adept will I'ise 
’ to“the top-and immediately begin pamphleteering, beginning 
.dissemination of "The Word", usually in'capsulized slogans.
' leaders make certain that the impression is left with 
lithe';.followers of. overwhelming external - popular, support for.. 
Itteir caus'e(s)* Rostering' begins and the "historical imdn- 
; ©ibility" of the movement is proclaimed. Coinciding with 
tsthese aggressive moves, the establishment- is provoked, info 
■^ohfrout ati on. An initial defeat usually ends the future 
'the-movement, either due to leadership loss, or because 
-* (as Bismarck did with such skill) the ideological position 
of the challengers is neatly included in the program of the 
■ dominant interests. If the actual aims cf the movement are 
purely ideological (as the anti-war movement of the 609s 
apparently was), then eradication of the issue dissolves the 
^movement; -but often radicals -in- search of -a-, cause -merely 
gravitate to another of the (many) possible areas which
x*equire rectification.
The movement, during the formalisation- stage has airead 
been more successful than- most, and its'- ideological line
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changes, from ..the inclusive,... .all-encompassing demands, which/ 
typify revolutions, to the. more tractable segmental defini­
tion? change, of one particular social evil or institution*
The choice of this stolid institution is a -delicate one and 
not' always' so simple as one might think, f or if 'the' "institu­
tion is a paper tiger and insufficient moral indignation is 
aroused by. its obtuseness, then the movement • will founder 
for lack of .a detestable enemy* Additional factors come 
under--consideration: for instance, high social mobility or
~ simple geographic mobility are both bad for any movement®
. Captive audiences tied to distasteful statuses and locations
j. —
the best movement personnel - which is one-of .the -reasons 
or the poor -organizational qualities displayed by the student 
activists of the last decade* Also in the minds of the 
ml-eaders is the necessity to reformulate. the movement line 
more absolutistic, personalized and simple terms so that 
j^&omplex problems can be relegated to easy solutions. Large 
r.f and-nonpersonalizable- evils (e.g. population problems) are 
nearly impossible to use as bases for movement activity.
At this point too those intellectuals and others with non- 
standardized...information become disenchanted with the sim­
plistic panaceas offered by the: leaders, and defect. An 
officially prescribed ideology is. formulated, along with a 
- multitude .of.- procedural. ..regulations pertaining to the, move­
ment member's, referred to by. this time ..as the "elect"• Goals 
are made specific and time-tables set.
The leader of the formalized movement rail have about
-Mi
him tv/c types of assistants, the 'philosophers--of the move­
ment and the-'instrumental lieutenants.- Belov; these are the 
regional and cell leaders, who are trained in the art of' 
managing--mass demonstrations. They do this in such a way . 
as to completely avoid the possibility of members conversing, 
seminar style, so they might not discover (to their amaze­
ment! ) that their supposedly shared goals and values are not 
so, homogeneous as the leadership would like them to believe* 
An assumption of tremendous camaraderie is allowed to build 
uptamong the membership, and the meetings of members take on 
carnival, good-time- atmosphere, utterly foreign to the 
fi^ktreme rationality going on in the small leadership •. enclaves 
One of the leaders9 major concerns is of course funds, with 
. which they purchase regalia helpful in creating consensus- 
formation among the. members, plus other obvious expenses, 
JptipkL without which the entire operation collapses.
. jL subtle shift begins within the ranks. Those fiery, 
? effusive types for whom the movement in its infancy was an 
emotional., outlet give way to more bureaucratic souls, railing 
to take orders and whose intellectual-emotional commitment 
to the movement is 4of a more predictable sort. The mainten­
ance of cell conformity across the board is essential, 
otherwise factional strife rail sap the movement of its 
combative strength.. Therefore discipline must be maintained, 
and to do so, some fratricidal techniques are employed.
Finally, the movement will meet with success and 
-gain. the changes as originally conceived, or modified:-'along.
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• the way, thereby, reaching institutionalisation;. or it- will 
meet the established order in. fins:! confrontation and be 
crushed.
In order to appreciate adequately the impossibility 
of another '"classical" social movement taking place in this 
country or in parts of Europe, the-.- individual- -personality- 
of the cell -participant requires examination. Even in the 
days of a relative abundance of social movements, leaders .
(who" typically, are extremely intelligent and capable men,
.1 ‘not ..the.- raving lunatics portrayed popularly) had a devilish 
•titime maintaining internal cohesion within the movement, 
•^specially as.it grew. Those, who. participate in-the cells 
constantly reminded of their-ingroupness, ethnocentrism 
and general rightness in the ways of the world. The member 
;$9ust buy-the national or regional ideology at the. cell level, 
1&©-n&t must become at once highly personalized, but general: 
viiie*,. simple and sloppily applicable. As Cantril put it,
# the cell is the, "microcosmic element of the movement", and 
, the internal discipline and social control - usually through 
peer»px*essure - is rewarded with heavy emotional payoffs as 
to being "in the 'know" and correctly aligned - rath- ultimate s.
In brief, the "true•believer" is as much at home in the cell 
meeting as he would be in prayer meeting*
It is at once obvious that the marginally informed,’ 
or more ably phrased, the "selectively informed" individuals 
who fill the rosters must adhere in. thought and action to 
definitions .of reality (at least -regarding those,-segments.
da six with by the -movement-) anchored - in"- ab s olu t e s. -Social - 
movements do not traffic in moral and intellectual gray 
.areas. The’remarks of the leaders are in keeping'with 
strong value positions on every issue or possible issue 
(something Nixon does naturally) in an effort to avoid 
dealing with the specific and controversial: the mouthing
pf slightly progra:mmatic abstract, sentiments. The point 
of my thesis then is largely concerned with the degree to 
which a leader (who must be simultaneously "one of us" and 
/"above it all") can elicit from his personnel unthinking
solutistic behavior; -and, cornel atively, how much the modern 
;^peiitality-‘will accept -prefabricated,:., highly, subjechivisbic 
•%and empirically-' inaccurate' assessments ’of reality.
The last real social movement in this country was 
:;i$KingVs civil rights movement.'- A man of 'great-intelligence 
Ife,and consummate organizational skills, even he finally failed 
cf £long rbefore his death) to knit together a thoroughly effect­
ive collective mode of social change. To begin with, the 
opposition had, at least at the outset, everything going its 
way: the laws, moral sentiments of the populace, social
* control agencies, ,etc. But even more problematic than -Kingf-s 
enemies were some of his allies, the white intellectual 
spokesmen who worked for.understanding:' on the part of middle 
America. In order to retain their aid (which certainly 
effected change, in the. same, --way Victorian female crusaders 
aided in the-reeducation of patrician England vis a vis the. 
poor) King had to concur, with their intellectual notions of
equality. But in order-to simultaneously retain his black 
followers* zeal and self-sacrifice, he was forced to assume 
the ministerial-posture of simplistic emotionalism* Towards 
the end of his work he faced- more and more the accusation of 
absolutists (on both sides): "two-faced", which of course
he was out of plan and necessity.*
■♦Closely related to these observations about the "last real
• social -movement in the U.S." are current speculations about 
the situation of blacte today and what, if anything, they are 
doing en masse * To answer this, I attended recently a 
'brilliant sermon-lecture by the acknowledged "leader*1 of 
/.blacks today, Jesse- Jackson, whose topic at Amherst College 
'(March 6, 1974) was "Black Capitalism: Myth or Reality".
"-His' hortatory techniques were flawless and extremely reminis­
cent of his mentor and patron, Martin Luther King (whose 
daughter, Yolanda, was in the audience - she attends Smith 
college nearby) but his ideological line was utterly different 
. - w i n  brief; the civil rights movement is completely
dead :since "civil rights are a foregone conclusion". What is 
needed‘now is hard work, thrift, investment, the study of 
economics, control of media through ownership of outlets, 
cessation*- of .*senseless consumerism by exploited blacks, an 
end .to the black.bourgeoisie pseudo-African heritage cult,
-•etscj* ,:*;J,ackson had recognised two facts which • he did not 
reveal directly to the audience: (1) repression by the state 
hdthen&ed. the possibility of violent black revolution, as 
in the assasination of Panthers, to cite the most blatant 
case. (2) The black population is too well educated and 
becoming increasingly attracted to American material exis- 
*. tence to he sincerely attracted to a King-styled quasi­
religious movement. Jacksonfs brilliance as a demogogue 
- took,these-two -severe liabilities vis a vis a social move­
ment and turned them to an advantage, all the while continuing 
his use of movement lingo and the inextinguishable message 
of black pride: "God didn’t send us over here to be the slaves 
of white folk; we were sent over here to save humanity from 
the foolishness and incompetence and greed and emptiness 
of the white man’s practices. Only the black people can save 
the system. We are chosen to be the saviors of humanity and 
we- will not allow the white man to drive the car over the 
cliff with his wife in the front seat, his children in the 
back seat and the black folks locked- in the trunk"•
Increasingly atomistic Weltanschauungen have enveloped 
the most capable blacks in the U«B* and they no longer need 
.or desire pseudo-Gemeinschaft camaraderie within constraining 
movement apparatus. They seek segmented lives as much as 
their class peers who are white* No-one knows this better 
than Jacksona
Speaking from experience* I may add to these reflec­
tions some "data” concerning student political activism of 
the recent past. Many art •intelligent and eager undergraduate 
had severe problems with himself and his peers when he tried 
sincerely to rrgo active” and yet maintain some sense of indi­
vidual intellectual and moral autonomy. SDS meetings and the 
like were exercises in unanimous frustration: on one hand,
everyone cared very much for intellectually vigorous and 
sophisticated political behavior, but on the other, were 
V faced with the necessities for collective action. -The old
sr* organisational route was immediately repellent given the
* <1- - '
i#^ J.;Story of party politics in this and other' countries, but 
serious substitute was discovered, thus the birth of 
politics-by-antics in Rubin et al.
(Moreover, in conversation with a graduate student 
fliat the University of Massachusetts visiting from Free Univer- 
ci ty;- in Berlin, the situation in Europe has taken the next 
logical step. Rather than dissolve the concept of change 
through collective'-’behavior (as I suggest), the German colie- 
, giate. population has renewed its efforts to "unlearn what it 
already knows to be true”, an unenviable and probably impos­
sible task. It seems a renewed dogmatism is being foisted 
upon the student body by radical leftist leaders, and recal­
citrant nonbelievers in the straight Marxist formula for
modern living, paradoxically, flee to the U.S. to find less
regulated intellectual air!)
Thus in the past 600 or so years, social change through
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innovation has come full circle, from the early, damnable 
merchants and bankers of the late medieval and the indepen­
dent renaissance-refoxmation individualists combatting both 
Church and royalty, to the successful collective change 
instituted by Cromwell*s group and subsequent mass movements 
of either the inclusive or segmental variety, and finally 
back to the reappearance of the relatively unattached inno­
vative member of post-modern culture.
I have concentrated upon political change in the last 
pages. To use Raymond Williams * trichotomy, "democratic”
• "industrial” revolutions have both been subject to changes 
itei study of them has continued relevance regarding the limits 
mf social- change• on the -large scale. More difficult to deal 
-■siibh are "cultural'3 revolutions, traditionally involved with 
t3$pdulations in quantity and • quality within the realm of 
l^ linir. As Williams5 own work illustrates (109), the socio­
logist can shape a .methodology suitable to the examination of 
art (serious and pop) within social structure with much profit. 
However, I would*like to expropriate his term and redefine 
•"cultural revolutions to mean not only change within the 
aesthetic institution, but far more broadly, to include change 
in the educational, recreational, kinship and supernatural 
institutions /as shaped by the innovator in ways described 
above* As mentioned earlier, the problems for innovation 
within these major;structural components of post-modern culture 
reside not so much in external pressures for conformity as in
the Individual inertia -socialised into societal participants 
and seldom brought to the level of "critical- consciousness".
It is clear that innovative behavior within kinship relations, 
for example* is relatively free from severe external threat 
which of course did obtain in premodem and early modern 
periods*
However, as Marxists- and the like are quick t© point 
out*, the ability of people to innovate within both these 
institutions and the remaining ones (economic, political- 
* governmental, stratificational) very often hinges upon the 
■f.^ hility to perfect inequities and irrationalities within the 
.JSiStter (e.g»' funds, power, prestige are necessary to some
of .innovation). It is one thing to recombine existing 
cultural...traits.- into*-a revised approach to religion (something 
:J^hich has been done incessantly since man’s beginning), but 
■^ ffejmething else to independently restructure the social control 
i§%£ces -already in the hands of centrally-managed • governments.
This and related arguments in favor of large-scale 
"social change (or its frequent correlate, sabotageiand terror), 
suffer from the illusion of' establishment size and strength 
. typical of left-wing .and right-wing organizational thinking, 
the product of minds bent upon magnifying the evil of their 
opponents through reification in order to enhance their zeal 
or sense of accomplishment (cf• Xdpset and Raab, The Politics 
of Unreason). Complex organisation is both strong and weak, 
and one of the first lessons to be learned by the modem 
innovator when dealing with these three institutions (which
serve as the Marxists1 nemesis) is to locate the many weak­
nesses and quietly begin work in those quarters. While 
emotional satisfaction may be gained by confronting armed 
employees of the established order* those interested in gen­
uine change are found more often (if discovered at all!) 
operating through “approved” .channels* but with personally- 
defined subversive* rational ends. They have discovered 
that life is too short to allow the use of any other technique. 
(The innovative process is of course more complex and difficult 
to characterize than is apparent in the above sentences* but 
-for purposes of broad distinction* it will suffice at this 
fpoint'i)
i%%. As for the “cultural revolution” as defined by scholars 
?d.n the sociology; of art* knowledge and beliefs? the changes 
In the arts over the past 300 years have very closely followed 
anticipated) historical events* as closely that is as 
iapf can emulate social change without becoming state-sponsored 
propaganda. But as popular!sers such as Toffler and scholars 
...like Milton Albrecht* Wylie Sypher and Raymond Williams have 
shown (110)* alterations within the arts have recently sped 
up at an ever increasing rate* so that for instance* the 
novel (first conceived in the early 18th century and only in 
the last 25 years coming.under severe critical attack as 
being anachronistic) lasted 250 years; entire schools of today 
come and go along with their unique definitions of art in one 
or two seasons. The complete works of Balzac or Dickens or 
Trollope run easily over $0 volumes and required maniacl
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dedication to produce; the complete works of our greatest 
current- writers seldom exceed a half-dozen books and are 
usually the product of one "stage” in his life (before he 
went into film* painting or race-car-driving). The guitar 
has replaced the piano and violin as the most popular musical 
instrument in the U.S. A moderately talented soul can perform 
impressively on the guitar within months; violin and piano 
technique come after years* and sometimes not even then.
(3?or examples ad nauseum* see Toffler.)
" But hex*e again* and perhaps more here than in any 
.other institution* individual, innovation consistently pro- 
duiqgb  the fresh, new and imitated. It is intriguing to 
sp#ibulate if. other institutions (those "more critical” to 
the .continuance .of .the social system* to paraphrase Parsons 
(I'il).) were as relatively unstructured and unbureaucratized 
astfthe ;aesthetic* would the paucity of innovative productions 
be* alleviated somewhat.
CHAPTER IV 
PROBLEMS OP CUMURE-WIDE -INNOVATION
There are currently many innovators of the type 
described here operating quietly within post-modern cultures. 
But their numbers are not yet large enough to eclipse in 
importance the great mass of societal members who willingly* 
"unreflectively” buy the 'legitimated ideological and material 
•Jgikckage offered them from earliest socialization. Since this 
tfs the case in even the most enlightened populations* in 
"those sectors of the world still in primitive and neo-modern 
stages* the number of innovators is probably negligible.
• however* -with the growth of education (as opposed to indoc- 
Urination) and the concomitantly sophisticated culture which 
'develops in league with it* there will be more and more in&i- 
•••■viduals* selectively rejecting those prescriptions for thought 
and-behavior which, they find personally objectionable. That 
this should someday become the norm seems entirely reasonable* 
unless technological advance is further shackled by capitalist 
interests, and the continuing fraud of "scarcity” is forced 
ad nauseum upon the consumer. Whether this development is 
only "reasonable” or also “reasonable and good” will now be 
examined from a variety of positions: from that of the
individual trying; to make the transition from societal member 
to social.actor; from that of the "social system”* approached
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necessarily in slightly reified form; and fx*om this writer's 
viewpoint as the product of thinking and reading over some 
time on what has come to be an exciting and perplexing 
•theoretical area.
The distinction I am making between the societal 
member and the social actor is of enormous consequence for 
the persons involved in the actual transition. There are a 
multitude of dichotomies which might be offered, by way of 
illustrating this crucial series of mental and emotional 
changes which precede alterations of actual behavior® Of all 
the possible antipodes, the clearest is the difference between 
life of predictable- and anxietyless regularity versus an 
existence which is constantly under the scrutiny of the 
innovations! mind* a life of experimentation» institutional 
modification and what can become a threatening amount of 
-ambiguity about "selves1 in various settings. Recently when 
I taught a group of undergraduates the rudiments of the theory* 
many of them balked at this point, not understanding now one 
could possibly extricate himself from the "web of beliefs" 
and behaviors which any culture imposes as a matter of course. 
In order to or os s finally this gap in understanding, I used 
the blackboard and drew in enormous letters the word "EGO", 
explaining to them that I intended this to be understood in 
the popular sense, that an individual is "egotistic"• Although 
egocentricity, selfishness and the many related terms are used 
almost exclusively in this culture with pejorative connotations, 
it roust be understood that the prime qualification fox' any
innovator is an unshakable belief in the value of his actions 
and the relative- "dys-value” of alternatives• That this 
behavior, in.no great need of consensual validation, requires 
a resilient and self-reliant ego, is so basic to the theory 
that it may easily be overlooked, undsrstressed and there­
fore not appreciated sufficiently.
Robert S. Xynd in Knowledge for Whet used to much
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advantage. the work of Karen Homey. If I may copy him now, 
it could help clear the necessity for complete understanding 
of this idea, that the innovator is "self’-ish, meant etymo- 
L: logical3.y» According to .Homey, "Human behavior institution- 
ses itself in four paths of attempted escape from anxiety”, 
^either by (1) rationalizing anxiety in the Freudian sense of 
• blaming someone else; (2) denying the existence of anxiety;
, (5) narcoticizi'ag anxiety "by drowning it in hard work, slogan 
r3§3cink..or excitement, or by purchasing a shiny new car"; and
avoiding anxiety. If these subterfuges fail, then we util 
ise four alternatives: (1) "Wo seek reassurance through 
affection; (2) submissively seek the cover of identification 
with some traditional source of authority; (3) have recourse 
*to, power-tactic, s and redoubled aggression; or (A) we may with­
draw within ourselves". Although composed in 1937? that 
description is still quite useful when considering American, 
societal members. It is less useful In the consideration of 
social actors, as I intend the term, All of the above tactics 
in the interest of emotional self-preservation and a shot at 
the American dream of happiness, assume (in the traditional
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3  \  -" i-t-psychiatric mode) that the individual must "adjust" to the 
social environment with some success in order to insure a 
’•healthy” self-image and to gain contentment. I counter this 
conservative bias with the thought that "adaptation" is more 
to the liking of the innovator. In precise terms, the inno­
vator serves no institutions above himself, and, when the 
conditions are amenable, he will reverse the usualy relation­
ship., of power-and prerogative between himself and the sanc­
tioned-social processes. Institutions are ways of getting 
certain ‘necessary jobs done by the supposedly efficient 
*•«<|3?g&nization of behavior. The innovator in almost all cases 
in mind redefinitions of those "ways” to suit his partic- 
|:%lar and (to the degree possible) unique socio-historical 
position' and personality. When an individual steps outside 
Yijffehe .positively -sanctioned mental constructs of his culture, 
r-JPien steps back in long enough to announce the bankruptcy
incorrectness of its major institutions, he i-s implying, 
to put it mildly, that his perception of the inadequacy (as 
a 'function of his knowledge and experience) is better than 
the perceptions of anyone else. "Better" in this case means 
the doing of something with minimum irrationality built into 
the process.
What is being emphasized here is the undeniably high 
regard in which the innovator holds himself, at least when
the process of innovation itself is at stake. There can be 
no subtle disclaimers or qualifications associated with a 
newly proposed life-style, invention or other type innovation
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.(The innovator! s proposed contribution must of course be
susceptible to objective assessment; for his “high regard” for
self is based on a willingness to view himself and his work
in terms of accuracy and feasible applicability. He is more
•than a free-wheeling eccentric*) To- those societal members
of tender sensibilities, the self-assertiveness and downright
brashness for which innovators historically are known, will
largely nullify his effect upon them. This is where the
advocate (in LaPiere1s terms) serves his indispensable purpose,
making .palitable for the unenlightened what in its raw form
very often approaches treason, vulgarity and the acme of
Ilpd-''.taste* The innovator whose target is a distorted struc-
<ture of| social relations, is by definition ”bad taste” per-
‘sonified* (However, at least in some instances, the innovator
ms forced to serve as his own advocate when no-one else is
^available for the unenviable task.) Bo, by extension, if a
Societal member decides however gradually to move into the
position of social actor, the first and most important step
is the development of a powerful ego (which has little to do
•with'egotism)* To quote Saul Alinsky on this point, keeping
in mind however his tangential usefulness as a model of all
innovators since his area is exclusively collective action,
he writes, under "Ego” in Rules for Radicals:
Throughout these desired qualities is interwoven a strong 
ego, one we might describe as monumental in terms of 
solidity. ...Ego is unreserved confidence in one’s ability 
to do what he believes must be done. (112)
Although this has the religious quality one would expect fr
a "crusading" organizer, it nonetheless underscores my point
as^Jea&er a. heavily nonrational component with- which to "stir" 
the masses, etc., which would be diminished or nonexistent
in many other types of innovators*
As in many things, the development of such a durable 
self-image Is much easier discussed than implemented. It is. 
a common tenet in most schools of psychology and psychiatry 
that our personality or its important components are well 
developed at an early age* Some of the transactional theorist 
now speculate that the "Adult" may be firmly ensconced by the 
.age of 10 months (!), while other writers suggest prenatal
P; , s .
1J|*nfluen.ees on; personality (113)* Connected with this belief 
the correlate- that personality is very difficult to change 
* •''"significantly after childhood, the basic capabilities of the 
^individual being somewhat immutable, that later socialisation. 
%W2ll affect only the tip of the iceberg. ,While for the sake 
piltpolemics, I could argue exactly the opposite tack, I will 
-•'instead embrace the "middle way". It would seers that some .of 
our' basic., characteristics go unchanged throughout major 
■ .situational and maturations! variation. But there is still; 
enough' crucial "material" left beyond those relatively minor 
areas to facilitate the development and operation of an 
innovator through resocialization of whatever‘method* (This 
assumes the exclusion of that -very uncommon childhood, one 
in which a wide range and diversity of stimuli were presented 
as "normal" from the earliest point in the development of 
personality, e.g., progeny of artist-intellectuals whose
home(s)- is often filled with obviously innovations! types.) 
This does not so much dodge the issue as give credence to 
both views, the overly psychologistic and the overly socio­
logistic, neither of which alone satisfactorily explain human 
behavior.
But beyond Minherent" limitations end the further 
lacunae created by early socialization, there remains the 
monumental problem of convincing the societal member that 
. much of what he has viewed as given is only as given as he is 
reticent in questioning it, in not viewing it historically 
• in not thinking of its givenness in relativistie terms, 
ffl&en and if the member crosses the conceptual barrier between 
fjpersGxial problems” and "public issues51 (Mills), that moment 
-osn signal the birth of his action-centered existence. With 
•^ ■'highly personal understanding of the fact that men create 
Hfcejir society, the societal member begins the shift from 
3j^s©ive congruence to active incongruence (to modify laPiere), 
and♦ the possibility of his becoming" an apostle of change is 
heightened.
Besides this initial perception of the possibility 
of social change through personal effort, there remain other 
key.necessities to the development of the innovator. He must 
have extended periods of -leisure time in which to work on 
plans, literally or mentally, other time in which to test 
his hypotheses (in many cases a process taking years), and 
to varying degrees, he might require the assistance of 
significant others (often other innovators, a source of
not apply to premodera cultures in which the necessities of 
life still take center stage in the allocation of energy.
The idea of "post-modern" culture holding within it the seeds
for intense creativity stems from this rudimentary fact, that
the hungry,': tired and worried man does not sit idly fox* hours
and reflect or ponder over "problems”, either personal,
aesthetic or social, which only he or a few others consider 
, problematic to begin with* But the fallacious assumption 
that affluence is not only necessary but also sufficient for 
-\<$r?ea£iviby is too often made. Mentioned much earlier was the 
J||pigh incidence of paradox concerning innovators* This is 
'^ pfeother: their richest field of possible endeavor is in
post-ascetic culture, but that same culture has to date 
nptoceed.ed in producing "the lonely (uncreative) crowd” along 
'vip^h much parlor talk about "creativity", as in the case of 
'•HKtpB* missus matching the blue- wall-to-wall with the yellow 
^drapes. A culture of Michelangelos we are not. However, to 
reshape society into more rational and satisfying patterns 
requires a different sort of creativity than reshaping marble 
into the "Pieta% so all is not lost.* With the ever increasi 
complexity of culture, the ideas necessary for far-reaching, 
significant change become proportionately less:.magnificent 
in scope or intensity without losing their effectiveness*
proceed dTaXectically, I do not embrace the "technophobic 
view, e.g. Ellul3s Technological Society, although as the 
poetry of individualistic protest against absurd rationaliza­
tion, such books have uses.
The invention of* the cog was a footnote to the wheel, and 
certainly easier, less grand, less intense an application 
of intelligence. But the effect over time has certainly 
been as great for the "footnote” as for the original state­
ment of genius.
The societal member moving towards an, active life of 
change must temporarily forego the standardized "positive 
reinforcement" dished out by the culture at various levels 
vfor more or less conforming behavior. The aforementioned 
>egOvstrength is indispensable of course, but more than that 
Adhere must be a healthy conception of self which transcends 
.iPas.;.most.basic of socially ..concocted needs: for approval.
'afta'ry Stack Sullivan defined schizophrenia as the holding 
-"of a. world-view which required or made possible fox* its holder 
consensual validation” from one’s peers and associates.
-at -least a brief time, while working in the white-heat 
•*$^>^rati©nslity,s, the innovator will be subject not only to 
„a lack of warmth and companionship (if his innovation is 
genuinely radical) but also to the inverse, dislike and sus­
picion. The social dialectic, between the conformity necessary 
to the maintenance of a social order, and nonconformity every 
bit as necessary for the generation of radical perception 
and action, is the central problem for the innovator. If 
the transactional analysts are even close in their assessment 
of how the personality operates, we see that the prohibitive, 
parent-centered nature of social control practically assures 
the death ox* diminution of child-produced excitement, and
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the correlated adult-controlled innovation, which grows from 
an urdiampered enthusiasm for the new* There has never been 
a culture which championed innovation, any more than there 
has ever been a war fought in the interests of kindness*
But the post-modern scenario unintentionally does make possib3.e 
more innovation at more levels than any previous culture,
IF those who would experiment with the untried can. extricate 
themselves sufficiently from the socially-constructed needs 
■*. which typify the societal member* To further complicate the 
mattex1, there is this issues if the innovator is not direct3_y 
^impeded by his peers, he must remember to allow them the 
•f^ivilege of 'bestowing their approval upon his work* This 
i0>es not actually gratify the innovator very much - his grati­
fication is mostly:self-generated when and if he is successful - 
this kind of behavior does keep open possible lines of 
:jppfjtion to the outside world, something critical for the 
Acceptance of the new formulation*
: * Given the nature of higher education at some of the
best .schools, along with an increasingly relativistic orien­
tation permeating the entire culture, the production of 
innovating minds should reach "record levels" unless the 
post-modern situation suddenly and irrevocably regresses* And 
from all indicators, that is unlikely, even given the temporary 
shortages, real or contrived**- With organized religion, the 
Protestant Ethic, traditional family structure, community, 
the almost monarchical absolutism of central governments 
all on the wane throughout the more sophisticated ranks of
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the culture, it becomes at least more possible for some 
societal membex’s (e.g* a New York male of Jewish background 
whose father is a professor of sociology, mother a social 
worker, who attends Columbia,,etc*) to enter the role of 
actor, that is, when compared with the heroic energy arid 
cunning which had to be utilised by would-be innovators in 
previous times* Frederick Douglass might .serve as an example 
of the latter case* The cry of conservatives, that times are 
too easy and in the old days one really had to work, etc*,
.is the happy announcement to the innovator that his machina­
tions will be allowed, perhaps encouraged, in a period of 
Relaxed absolutes* Affluence it seems has brought more than, 
Edsel or the Baper Bahn of Hamburg* It has given the 
favored areas of civilization something no culture has provided 
-before:: room for thoughts and feelings which differ from
ihhe prevailing modes*
<s$tr v: , What amazes me is how few disenchanted societal
members are aware of this fluidity and how even fewer do 
something creative with it, although the education-marriage- 
children syndrome does succeed in curtailing activities of 
potential innovators (a facet of "traditional existence" 
which historically has served the status quo quite well). 
Hopefully one important role of education in the future will 
be in instructing students that obedience is no longer the
dominant cultural, motif, that increasing rewards, emotional 
and otherwise, make innovation an, appealing activity*
.While there remain other relatively minor hurdles
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before the individual who seeks a life of diversity (relativef 
that is, to the gigantic hindrances just detailed)* I will 
not pursue them at this juncture,
I made; the point above that no society has yet been 
constructed so as to maximise opportunities for individually 
inspired alterations, of its structures, processes and/or. 
values* .Also I stated that the current culture of the advanced 
areas of the world more closely- approaches this optimum 
situation than any to date* Per analytical purposes, let us 
,‘^i imagine; the prospects and dilemmas of a society in which 
viniculture*-wide 'innovation*1 was encouraged. If we begin with 
Conditions much like our own., the immediate problem to surface
- ---would be that involved with enf orced rationalization, especially
economic lines* Hie innovators would set out to rid 
lives cf as much tedium, meaninglessness and regulation 
^ t h e y  could, This would leave most of industry and many 
services employeeless. Thus it i's clear that a genuinely
- post^ascetic environment would call for the emancipation of 
workers from the noxious tasks they now perform, without 
however.destroying an economy capable of producing affluence. 
Automation comes to mind as a probably partial solution.
To those familiar with the production systems now 
employed in post-modern culture, it comes as something cf a 
shock to envision a society full of innovators. Under its 
current organization^ post-modern industrialisation would 
have to institute far-reaching changes, for instance in
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assembly line format £ s$o that all plants would more resemble 
the modern beer factory, in which a handful of skilled mach­
inists and several nonskilled button~pushers. suffice. Unless 
this could be done, the economy would regress severely, so 
much so that the freedoms gained by' participants in the 
culture through individual innovation would.be lost in large 
part due to a general primitiyi.sation of life. *
^ rlA^enTS:el^d?ifT'8r8rit tack is taken by Galbraith in his 
famous series of books on modem economic arrangements. He 
and his followers scoff at the supposed difficulty of liber­
ating people from dead-end jobs. According to his under- 
standing of the problem, we are already creating many make- 
: 'work-° jobs (the more reactionary component of union ideology) 
.ghnd destroying energy and resources hand over fist in a lame 
‘ireffort to resuscitate the work ethic. Naturally, the ruling 
Itf&s&pital ±st* interests and financial leaders work' together 
grin order to insure illusory, fabricated scarcity, but they 
■klhmve very nearly cooked their own goose.-
The problem is no .longer to deconsumerize the culture 
- or-;:automate all the plants, but to junk a terribly expensive 
.ideology of work, in order to preserve the ecology, the supply 
1?of natural resources and as a fortunate byproduct, to procure 
tkhe emancipation of make-work laborers. Total recyclibility 
« technologically feasible, so the necessary conservation of 
materials could become a built-in part of the economic world. 
What would have to change is either an ideology which demands 
constant energy destruction (human .and otherwise), or one 
which retains the work-ethic but skillfully avoids the destruc­
tion of irreplaceables. Thus the growth of service industries.
X have not utilized this view (with which of course X 
have no complaints theoretically or politically) because of 
Galbraithss uncertain standing among many of the mainstream 
American economists and other social scientists. No less an 
"authority” on the nature of work, etc. than Ely Ghinoy 
dismissed this set of assumptions out of hand when I broached 
the topic in a current seminar, "The Working Class”. Also, 
see for example Paul Samuelson* s latest revision (9th, 1973) 
of his classic text, in which he writes "Galbraith; The Icon­
oclastic Vision*1.
Since I claim no -expertise in the area of economics,
X^have adhered (slavishly perhaps) to the generally accepted 
views (what Galbraith calls the "neoclassical model”) rather 
than those of an innovator; a rather strange turn of events!
Bui; more effective over time would be a redefinition 
of goods and services, pushed mere and more in the direction 
of the latter as opposed to the consuming culture now in 
existence* Self or selves would need to be defined not as 
acquisitive, but mere as inquisitive, in search of novel, 
stimulating, educational and entertainting activities.
Three color televisions in one household produce little more 
than programmed monotony, while consuming vital materials 
and manpoitfer in their production. The accumulated trappings 
of .those who aspire towards a prestigeful existence become 
^©omic and grotesque, while the depletion of resources (both 
fgjpier&l and human) continues. In a 'truly innovational culture, 
q^p^ople and not things would become the best toys an adult 
could have* Boundary expansion would be the by-word.
* '$' Two mistaken attempts, at change now being- instituted
i$£Lth some frequency are the communal living situations 
* practiced by those of the counter-culture, and at the other 
extreme, the much touted Hteam~*production" system being used 
in the manufacture of Saabs and other, goods. Both of these 
are:;incorrect in terms, of the innovator1 s future, the former 
because it steps back into preindustrial, times, depriving its 
adherents of liberating technological developments and often 
of stimuli, the other because it suggests that an occupation 
should be of prime significance in one's life as a source of 
interpersonal meaning and self-definition. While a job may 
have strong appeal for the individual, it is fallacious and 
dangerous to suggest- that work for gain should ever be expected
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to fulfill any but the smallest portion of the infinite 
capabilities of men. We arrive then at the prerequisite of 
-liberation: the genuine, not quasi-liberation of laborers
(taken broadly) from routinized tedium.
If the economy were set up correctly, it could be 
operated (to the degree necessary for a deconsumer!zed 
culture) so that it required far less, time from.the workday 
of any. given individual. This is hardly a novel or revolu­
tionary idea^ Marcuse for one has been harping on it for 
decades. But more than just free time is needed in the 
procreation of an innovative society. An entirely recast appro­
priation for what life is or could be is as necessary, and
my thinking, a much more difficult enterprise. The vision 
of "liberated” workers finishing their 20 hour work-week, 
t^only to rush off to their "second51 job seems at this point 
fltin .history almost an inevitability. If I may quote the 
•^ ssse&ia: on a recent newscast from an American Motors plant
% "in*Minnesota, two workers discussed the idea of mandatory 
-vs. optional overtime. The first said "The more I work the 
more useful I .am to my family”. The second, from a slightly 
less noble position, said "It’s mighty hard to turn down 
seven and a half dollars an hour”. Though a small "sample”,
I suggest that their understanding of the relationship 
between work, life and money is consistent with that of most 
laborers, and not a few professionals. About these ideas - 
man as object vs. man. as subject - both Marx and Sartre have 
written persuasively. Liberation begins with more leisure.
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a less constraining definition of self, and the knov/ledge 
and skill necessary to use one's moments to the fullest.
Society would have even more dramatic problems with 
innovators or social actors than those having to do with 
modification of work* On the international scene, if other 
less fortunate nations became pugnacious for whatever reason 
or lack thereof, it would be difficult to arouse a culture 
of relativists into anything approaching nationalistic fervor. 
The. whole idea of nationalism is anathema to the innovator 
; since it carries with it countless feudal obligations and 
^demands, many of which have historically served no-one but 
f-qSopXe like the ICrupps. Nationalism is as dead and unappeal- 
ihfe today as human sacrifice (with which if "bears some resem­
blance), and as ‘anachronistic as the traditional family or 
• the Catholic church. If post-ascetic culture were accosted 
g more primitive nations, it would have to generate- enthu- 
.f or .resistance among its citizens' with purely rational 
' "propaganda”, which would bear no resemblance whatever to the 
tripe usually administered to the masses by the ruling elite. 
More likely however is that old-style international, confron­
tation -will be avoided by the use of the most effective tool 
yet developed in league xclth managerial enterprise and big 
business: co-cptation. Why-waste resources in subduing
aggressive smaller nations when the input of commodities will 
do the same thing. The power of goods and industrialization 
has done in part what the Second World War could not, bring 
relative peace to the world. If big business concerns have
enough money tied up in foreign markets, rest assured they 
will do as much as they can to preserve international equil­
ibrium, as much as they have done traditionally to encourage 
imperialistic wars. The multinational empires can operate 
in no other way.
It will take more than abstract sentiments mouthed 
at election times to gain the cooperation of a populace most 
of whom are capable of informed, rational thought. Although 
this condition is still of the future, the relative disgrace 
the* recent Washington scandals have brought upon the admin­
istration now in office corapared to other equally heinous 
j^ut -less publicised crimes attributed to former administration 
■indicates the increasing sophistication of both the public 
fat-..large and those who shape public opinion. However, as 
^pointed out in the historical documentation, the skills with 
^?hich evil-doers manipulate the laws and their enforcement 
|jiip.,„-suit specific interests increase in complexity and effect­
iveness relative to the advancing skepticism of the public.
But the key point here is that in the past, political leaders 
have had little difficulty in mobilizing public opinion and 
action on the basis of very flimsy propaganda, thereby bring­
ing to the modem world some of its worst scourges in the name 
of national security or whatever. This could not happen 
among the more enlightened groups of post-modern culture today 
and it will become increasingly difficult to gain from the 
traditionally unrefXective masses the degree of cooperation 
elites have come to take for granted. This observation goes
back to the early days of the enlightenment and the birth of 
liberalism, the tracts of which offered "education” as the 
panacea for neo-modern ills®
The only catch to that basically accurate view was 
in not realizing to what degree vested interests determine 
what is and what is not "educational”® The current castra­
tion of HEM•funding, -specifically of most controversial 
sociological research, is a modem example of an age-old 
truth about authority: those with it do not care to have it
•^ .kndwn. how badly they abuse it, and the critics without 5„t 
,*find it very difficult to speak and be heard without the 
permission of their targets and adversaries. But in count- 
ifl.ess subtle ways, including those that are being described 
-,asv ”quasi-legal% damaging information finds itself before 
?htbb public attention. In short, when Nixon says "cynicism”, 
#^ead "politically informed".® As with most features of post- 
•^ imodern. culture, there is absolutely no reason to suppose that 
this brand of awareness should manifest itself less in the 
future® Although some writers, notably Philip Slater (114) 
foresee in American culture the possible development of neo- 
fascist government, with heavy support from the less enlight­
ened and easily threatened lower middle class, I find this 
position difficult to accept. Even within the traditional 
bulwark of conservatism, the southern middle classes, there 
is today surprisingly strong support for some of the catch 
phrases of the sixties, "Do your own-thing”, probably most 
popular of all® The use of these cliches is not an indicator
of a Harrington or Alinsky-styled "radicalization" of the 
middle class* Yet, without knowing it, the people who espouse 
these basically atomistic sentiments are making a profound 
political statement, to the effect that Big Brother a la 
1984 would he the ultimate evil, worse even than hippies, 
communists or college professors. The fact is, praise he 
to the Enlightenment, that education in the form of schools, 
travel, the media or otherwise, does have ameliorative 
effects upon provincial hatreds and prejudice, the stuff out 
of which nationalism and similar political notions are 
-created«
p  We see then that the difficulties' "brought upon the
If"state” through the increasing sophistication and. experimen- 
- tation of its participants have to do with cohesion, Integra- 
I’ion and united action. Eve2? since prefeudal ^ Europe, many 
gjpen of the West have sought after individual liberty to live 
#%h.eir brief spans in the style they chose* The.-.Crusades are 
*best understood as a. mass adventure for othermae unemployed, 
bored men-cf-arms whose usefulness to a rapidly modernising 
social structure had diminished® The explorations of the mid- 
•millenium are also expressions of men seeking room and socio­
political, emotional space, removed from the incestuous fra­
tricide ttfhich had become Europe* Our entire history is one of 
moving to.new ground, and now that all the grounds are known, 
and until space travel is a commonplace for citizens, the 
time has come that external exploitation of existence give 
way to something which has never been allowed to prosper:
1interpersonal exploration* Mere and more of the liberated 
middle and tipper4 classes (meaning those whose material well- 
being is assured) have found their acquisitions lacking for 
life-long fascination, so quite logically they have given up 
the third home in the mountains for the yearly month-long 
fling on alien turf, with the intention of learning the 
folkways of the specific situation, and seeing just how 
successfully they can adapt to the new scenario.
In more ways than one, the popular book of the 1950ss, 
Hatlon ox Sheep, is shewing its age® Social actors are poll- 
taLcally wiser, more sensitive to the value of cosmopolitanism 
sp&IL much less easily shackled by neo-feudal restraints. The 
mitecb. discussed move in this culture from proscriptive to pre- 
-scriptive law will find vehement resistance among the many 
■3Rffiso.se time is too precious to be eaten up by state-designed 
H&Hvia, whether' it be In filling out forms or waiting in 
Sites to fill out forms® Ingenius, quasi-legal methods of 
circumvention or sabotage are and will be developed in the 
avoidance or irrationally constructed regulation of thought 
(e*g® pornography) or action (e.g. marijuana smoking)®*
*Por a thorough exposition of "rationality15 as I am using 
the term, see Martin Jay* s masterful The Dialectical Imagina­
tion, his newly famous history cf the Frankfurt School. Also 
of - use if Trent Schroyer* s Critique of Domination* Of basic 
interest is Horknexmer® s early statement, "Traditional and 
Critical The or;/” (Or it i c al The ory). While I was aware of my 
debt to Marcuse*s conceptions C m  all hie work), until reading 
Jay, the congruence of Horkheimer1 s and Adorno's notions of 
rationality with Marcuse's (and thus, mine) had escaped me.
But for limitations of time, I would rev,rite much of this 
section so as to include the powerful insights of these 
German philosopher-social scientists.
As in the case of the Kansas law prohibiting extended kisses 
in public, there will be great sections of enacted law which 
will not be -enforced due to wide-spread refusal or obstruc­
tion, both on the part of enforcement agencies and their 
constituents* . That this type large-scale "innovation” could 
produce a fascist or totalitarian response in the form of a 
reactionary government seems., only slightly more probable 
than a group of Weathermen successfully taking over the 
White House with carbines® Both views make good romantic 
drama and poor analysis of how people of post-modern culture 
behave (not to-mention ignorance of this country's socio- 
.pGiltical heritage)®
The social system will begin to look much less like 
Parson's version than like Mill's, at least in terms of the 
:ind8LV-.dual <* In the economic realm (which after all served 
•as JHarson’s model), there will be even greater rational!za- 
tio^in&nd centralized planning, but in the interest of using 
as few men for as few hours as possible without jeopardizing 
necessary output® But in all other aspects, especially 
.involving human valu.es and social control, "integration” 
will mean nothing® In the world of a Cooley, value integra­
tion made some sense; the world of Alvin Toffler does not 
expect or permit any type of holistic interpretation of 
reality, for both in social and physical terms, it is much 
too complex to lend itself to such premodem evaluations. 
Like it or not, diversity and change will displace Parson's 
emphasis on continuity and system-maintenance just as surely
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as the auto replaced the carriage* The purpose of the 
system will be to insure sufficient goods and services to 
its members ■ so • that their self-imposed schedule of living 
m i l  be expedited and not interrupted as is now usually the 
case* And that this vision is not construed as the latest 
nonworkable utopia, it should be emphasized that just this 
kind of life-style is already approached, by.. a. great many 
social actors, who in most instances occupy professional 
positions within the upper middle and upper classes. The 
divorce rate, singles' housing, the rate of job-changing and 
i#he decreasing- importance of stability throughout life which 
pmw are beginning to permeate these classes are some of the 
Hotter known indicators® With more time, education, and 
;moneyv the remaining strata will doubtless follow suit.
IMpat. was described in; an earlier time as chronic social 
^jisorgauization or disintegration is more properly charac­
terized today with the phrase, "business as usual"*
As promised, the chapter will now be concluded 
with my personal reservations about culture-wide innovation 
as predicted by this theory.
Depending upon the critic's viewpoint, the theory 
may be said to utilise a conception of man which is.either 
"radically empirical and rational" or "naively positivistic”»
Since the theory has been offered with the implication that 
it is of scientific value5 X will only for the sake of 
argument consider seriously the latter characterization.
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The 20th century has produced a conception of man which 'is 
for some uncomfortably ambiguous: he is calcul&tingly cool
and precise enough to produce unending technological wizardry, 
yet with the same gray matter he has come close to self- 
annihilation In the interests of ill-conceived, ill-defined 
abstract sentiments® Jung and like thinkers have suggested 
repeatedly that we are more subject to the dark, unfathomable 
and treacherous whims of the "unconscious" than to the pull 
of the 18th century's favorite, reason® The existentialists 
have tried to make the case for radically aggressive indivi­
dualism, to the exclusion of an understanding of what 
j^iulture and the individual-*' is all about® However, even 
^bi:most sociologistic rationalists can be awed at least 
'momentarily by the incredible irrationality which apparently 
‘^ fvades post-modern existence at some levels® But this 
*$j?fhselessness stems not of course from anything so indistinct 
l^Sithe unconscious, but from an irrationally constructed 
social order® We are as instinctless as the bees are instinct- 
ridden, thus what we get out of the social order is pretty 
much what goes in as far as rationality is concerned® But, 
so that I.do not seem utterly blind to nonrationalist per­
spectives-, it must be admitted that people tend to behave in 
their own best interests with not quite the frequency and 
predictability Adam Smith supposed they would, and they do 
tend to embrace nonsensical, emotionalistic appraisals of 
reality somewhat more readily than J®- 8® Mill would have 
thought possible® However, since this theory concerns
it is important that a measure of the stupidity evidenced 
by populations historically will henceforth be avoided due 
to the democratization* the general• diffusion of social know­
ledge* Just because the 16 year old girl next door "believes 
in" -astrology does not mean that she won’t "believe in" 
birth control pills rather than relying on magical amulets 
and chants* Try as some might* the modern social actor 
cannot very easily unlearn what he .knows to be true* on 
behalf of romantic attachments to the primitive* Sullivan’s 
insight about the richness of a child®s small* intense vocab- 
'jj$jbary as compared to the watered-down * precise words and 
ifj^ rases of the adult world does not impune the value of 
-^precision and a. modem understanding of causality, Historica 
jp:^mples. of gross irrationality have also been connected, 
if^er since'Kegel, to societal irrationality -at the structural 
Jtevel* Presumably (a basic tenet of Critical Theory),
* increased, rational input into structure would produce, in 
ap unstated dialectical fashion, similarly demystified social 
behavior*
When the modes of perception which grew out of 35® 
years of science, producing relatively exact formulations 
and theories, can be transferred to the masses regarding 
their understanding of not only physical but also social 
phenomena, then the richness and luxuriously/interesting 
imprecision of premodem thought will no longer prevail*
(That 80$ of those polled believe in Nixon’s culpability
. while only 20% approve his removal is typical of the contra­
dictions inherent in a worldview based more on emotion than 
reason, if I maj use a mildly accurate dichotomy*)
Connected with the problem of just how rationally 
men can be expected to behave is an analog: how adventurous
will they be? The innovator would wish that experimentation 
in a variety of .settings could not jeopardize an individual's 
’life,-chances in other nonrelated areas of life, as is now 
the case* Somehow the British politician who enjoys prosti­
tutes ipso facto becomes unqualified for office* 'The point 
•’Hof ..his having been elected, to provice capable government, 
connected only tenuously with his bedchamber behavior, 
rW&P: -time' and again, a minor siindiscretion1’ concerning one 
•.iai-ea of existence becomes nefariously linked to the 1 whole 
^recalling my objections to Gestalt theories), and he
t
^puffers out of all- reasonable porportion* That Byron and 
JirtidhklTi ’-violated” literally thousands of damsels.tsomehow 
* did not diminish their stature as poets; but when the vener­
able Justice Douglas took a young wife to fit h-is young mind 
and body, he won the lasting disapproval of the sturdy 
middle class.. Likewise in the financial world, one major 
blunder spells the end of a burgeoning career, whether the 
disaster was a function of poor business sense or some 
totally unrelated iniquity* In order to make innovation 
the norm, the individual^ protection against negative 
labelling would have to be assured so that he would not have 
to consider his 1 good name”, when taking innovative steps in
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whatever direction. What is needed is a move to a "segmented" 
world, a series of disparate, mutually irrelevant, noncontig­
uous roles-situations, the behavior within any one area not 
threatening the individual's status in another.
It is a common assumption among many writers that 
humans "by their nature" seek the familiar, predictable and 
therefore unthreatening, that undue amounts of fresh stimuli 
can .precipitate near "traumatic" reactions. This again makes 
the mistake of turning historical actuality, the chronicled 
‘^behavior of man, into a non seauitnr. that man is "essentially" 
; fearful of change. My reading of history, especially in this 
|p?denturyf shows just the opposite: men working' feverishly
overstep, widen and modify institutional, structural 
*-constraints upon their lives in the interest of maximizing 
filuncommcn opportunities. What history does show is that men 
Ifehave subjected themselves and each other to the ordeal of 
^uhending monotony, mind-numbing repetition and generally 
, senseless rounds of highlyypredictable, unexciting behaviors. 
•'However, in allowing the conservative position its due, 1 
am ,in something of a quan&ry regarding the limits - defined 
by the nature of the animal, by our neurological and physio­
logical condition - beyond which innovations! energies will 
bring more sorrow than joy. And the reason this question 
escapes answer for the time being is that any good data on 
subject is not to be had. Societies have done such a 
marvelous job of incarc©rating their members into unthinking 
boredom that the data on the effects of tedium is relatively
good: people don’t like it for long. Although there may
well be some naturally defined limitations to radical behavior 
until a culture of innovators becomes a reality, there will 
be no definitive' answer to the problem except for supposition 
based for the most part on the way noninnovating man thinks 
he might react to a hyperfluid life-style. And as many 
"social science prophets'1 have pointed out, thinking about 
tomorrow .,with only. slightly modified mental constructs of 
today is folkish and comforting, but in all likelihood, 
utterly unreliable. (Another possibility of course is to 
rearrange the physiological capabilities of men to suit a 
s|#re demanding existence, but that transcends somewhat the 
scope of this thesis.)
Another*problem is that of resources. This entire 
'^^osition uses as an a priori an, unremitting affluence for 
.stlrre and more people, along with other necessities for 
ifenovatiixg performances. The current misuse of the ecology, 
if continued, as described by the more pessimistic (realistic? 
writers, will not only disallow wide-spread affluence in the 
fixture, but will* also- deplete the earth's supplies of neces­
sary ingredients to the point that subsistence, will be in. 
question. The more scientistic prophets foresee in techno­
logical development a certain cure for the problem. Every­
thing I have read on the subject seems to be overwhelmingly 
in favor of the pessimists, especially when added to the 
ecological difficulties is the spector of phenomenal popula­
tion growth in those areas most dependent for survival on
post-modern donors. As one critic was overheard to say, "My 
vote for the most evil man in the world today goes to the 
Pope**, obviously because of his medieval appreciation of the 
intimately connected problem, population growth. Again,' 
because of the inconclusive data - and its manipulation, 
either by the Club of Home or. Standard Oil - I do not know 
where to stand, except to say that without the creation of 
an anti-eonsumer ethic (as outlined above) growing concomi­
tantly'with scientific advances, the power of this thesis 
to predict change in the future will diminish at the same 
ratfe* that affluence declines. The theory is predicated upon 
.•the^possibilityof tremendous human freedom growing out of 
advanced technology; obviously, without the latter we are 
back:'-to-neo-modem or premodem times, and the days of milk 
•ardpioney are no more (Galbraith notwithstanding).
I mentioned before, were the culture of innovators 
and*is3t>ci&l • - actors to exist (for. more than one generation), 
then provision must be made for the handling of children. 
Their nurturing, according to authorities like Piaget, Sul­
livan and Erikson, is an extremely sensitive "skill” which 
most "mothering ones" develop only partially. That our 
current mode of childbearing is less than might be desired 
requires little debate* We expect a young, often Immature 
and uneducated female with almost no qualifications, either 
formally ox* informally garnered, to act as child psychologist, 
nutritionist, educator, to the degree necessary, sociologist, 
to mention only the most elevated of her responsibilities.
When her relationship with the offspring begins to interfere 
substantially with the antecedent "romantic" involvement 
with the progenitor, the situation for the child becomes 
entirely dysfunctional to its development, Much more inform­
ative and terrifying in its Implications than Spock is 
Sullivan's treatment of the child in the very earliest stages, 
the focus being on the. relationship between its consciousness 
of well-being and not-weil-b eing as a function of the mothering 
zone's behavior, overt or covert. Many writers since Sullivan 
, have found empirical validation for his hunches that tension 
in the child is quickly converted to anxiety of varying 
HUgpees if the mothering one does not.behave in ways which 
jciquld curtail or alleviate somewhat the initial tension,.
Jpalle a certain/amount of physiological tension is normal 
necessary in the young human, the amount sustained by 
infant is very ;>of ten excessive resulting in long-term 
$@jfeotional problems* New developments in transactional 
analysis owe a lot to Sullivan, but in their undisguised 
optimism over the rapidly changeable self-concepts of adults, 
they have closed the b a m  door many years after the horse's 
departure* This is not to say that later resocializatibh 
cannot be of extreme use (cf course, it happens every day 
and is not regarded as noteworthy), but my concern is that 
whatever methods or agencies are devised to handle the early 
socialization of children which the parents wish not to 
bother with, have to be very sound. The reports of Bethel™ 
heim and others on the kibbutz are not encouraging. Apparently,
•placidity and complacence mark the kibbutz "product", and 
there would be no sense whatever in constructing an excitingly 
innovational social structure, only to1 people it with persons 
unable to use it, or unde sir ous" of anything but the ordinary.
I do not want this reservation to be construed as an 
addendum to all sorts of conservative arguments about the 
efficacy of severe, tension-filled upbringing. In more cases 
than not; one who is brought up by excessively parent-centered 
-adults,-generates an I ‘xn-not-OK that distorts and destroys 
; most of what is good in life ad infiniturn. (Our president's 
/public image is such a "person".) But there must be consi- 
'iflqred the other, end of the continuum: just how much tension
J$fl sufficient to produce a rebellious, innovative individual.
if'determined, could this degree of attention and restric- 
i*$§§'on be administered to the millions of progeny which will
to agencies In the wake of the final destruction of the- 
4(6ted±t±onal family. Obviously, the home as now understood 
does a first rate job of almost nothing, but it does a 
•barely sufficient job of a lot. One way or another, -substi- 
tutues must be found so that those social actors who do not 
care for parental shackles may feel personally at ease in 
transferring their children to professionally-run agencies.
Of course, I am not suggesting an enforced abduction of 
children from the parents by the state or any such related 
plan. But apparent in my own generation of college-educated 
innovators is a marked distaste for "doing the family thing" 
as it was done for, to and '(somewhat) by them. Whether they
.are, as their parents hint, egotistic and self-centered to 
the point of being unable to care for children, or if they 
have assessed the problem of childrearing, material and 
emotional, and found the entire 20-year experience not to 
their liking, is beside the point. The fact is that right 
now -many would-be parents won't be, because of an enormously 
complex, demanding, and anxiety-producing package, promulgated 
incessantly by the culture as the ultimate good which they 
■cam imagine to be nothing but trouble* If the role of parent 
could be -redefined towards a looser model - that is being 
parent, and also freedom-seeking adult - the first step of 
liberation - would involve a restructuring of property 
Hf^ds and relationships, then perhaps this generation would 
not religiously eschew parenthood* It is sadly ironic that 
tfefe/generation of students is by far the best informed in so 
ways, childrearing included, and it is the most reluctant 
jm^history to discover whether there is any congruence between 
theory and practice. Moreover it is of small comfort to know 
that/recently the U.S., following- Japan, attained zero-growth 
in population while premodern societies reproduce as if there 
were no tomorrow.
The final question as to the relationship between 
population, affluence and innovation- on a cultural basis 
comes to.thiss just how many bodies can the world sustain in 
a post-modern cultural condition? That becomes a function of 
improved technology, deccnsumerised values and less children* 
But those variables may succumb to the detestable nationalism
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.which still appeals to some of the less modem political 
minds of. the era* Yet it would seem that a finite "n" would 
be determinable and my guess is that world population will 
have to stabilize at a smaller figure than now obtains if 
culture-wide innovational opportunities are to be extended 
to the international realm. That could be done humanely and 
otherwise, and If history is any guide, the latter course 
would almost certainly be followed if an optimum world popula­
tion; were deemed internationally desirable by the controlling 
elites*
‘f*?* Moving now from the macro to the micro-cosmic level,
J|$s§e in the theory the easy possibility of misinterpretation 
.as- "ultimate” human values are concerned* Recently 
Raymond Aron studied Sartre9 s Critique of Dialectical Reason 
extreme care - not of the disciple but of the critic - 
apdqf ound that if Sartre9 s doctrine were adhered to strictly 
■^d^ithout-regard for the. writer's larger intentions (domain 
assumptions), then Stalinist terrorism could be defended by 
it (1 1 5 ). If the spirit of the current theory is misinter­
preted, or assumed to be other than it is, the theory can be 
construed as a defence of hedonistic epicureanism and little 
more. Although a concern for maximum pleasure from life is 
central to the theory, there is as important to it the 
assumption that cultural innovation will provide loosely- 
structured opportunities for learning; that this learning 
should sometimes prove displeasing fox' all concerned is an 
accepted part of the package. What should not be thought
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‘however, is that the theory is so utterly atomistic in 
intention that "significant others" and less important people 
are to he utilized in a. radical instrumentalism by the innova­
tor, and "discarded when empty". Although some of this is 
only wise - and much practiced now - this would not be the 
hallmark of the culture* Rather, Instead of forced, fraudu­
lent "duty" binding people together long ..after they would 
prefer separation, the glue of the culture would be composed 
of mutual interest and affection stemming from a variety of 
*sources, perhaps in the very dissimilarity of backgrounds, 
personalities and aspirations. Put anecdotally, the uneasi- 
..mms professor feels, when in the elevator-with the 
it^ -peeked and destroyed middle-aged janitor, that the white 
-fraternity boy feels when in the forced or unexpected company 
alluring black gird, -and so on, would dissolve into a 
^^eralized and refreshing curiosity* There may be too much 
4§^IkJllyanna in this vision, but given the status. quo vis a 
•vis interpersonal "communication" - if it can be even be 
called that - some positive hyperbole will not harm.
As to the underlying values of the innovator: he
itfould regale in the diversity of culture and the inevitable 
relativism which grows from ouch knowledge; he v/ould, to put 
it very briefly, be adamant and absolutistic in only one 
sense - in his strictest avoidance of narrow and life-diminish­
ing definitions of what is "suitable for consumption" and 
otherwise "fitting and proper" in the social world. Lest 
visions of the Marquis de Bade immediately arise, it is also
assumed that the innovator during socialization would somehow 
come to embrace the standard liberal definition of freedom 
for alls that one's action does not destroy the possibility 
that another may be able to behave in a chosen manner, given 
the limitations of resources. (The ability of societies to 
inculcate into their young "charges" practically anything 
they want is well documented* - Thus the spector of "Clockwork 
Orange15 morality is less than worthy of consideration.)
However the role of judge ideally conceived does not consider 
the^ •possibility of graft, and likewise those who so wish could- 
•e^ j^ Lly bastardize the preferred situation of mutual respect 
Hisd* the kind- usage of -people* Yet the joy of deceit when 
teicen out of Sits typically financial setting would become 
another historically defunct behavior pattern, much less 
relevant/within post-modern culture*
■'%; .• 1 am all too aware that this vagueness lends itself
^misunderstanding, but for me to posit a series of absolute 
"goods", and by implication, their opposites, would be to say 
more about the future than I know. I think the theory can 
explain a gx'eat deal of future social change, but X am aware 
that our current cynosures do not in most instances satisfy 
the qualifications of the innovator* In spite of his enormous 
contribution to sociology, Mannheim has been repeatedly 
attacked because of his use of Alfred Weber* s unfortunate
phrase, "the socially unattached intelligentsia", more often 
expressed as "free-floating elite". His critics attach to 
his thinking the-same fallacies common to all Utopians from
wPlato to Harringtons the belief that some men will scrupu­
lously adhere to the "good” and remain mentally and emotion­
ally incapable of abusing their ruling authority. The conser­
vatives are right in laughing at this position* since histori­
cally, such abuse has been the rule. But in as much as my 
presentation is “beyond Marx% concerning itself with post­
scarcity existence and the. relative paradise which becomes 
possible (when compared to the scenario Marx described), many 
of .the motives for past abuses are no more* Mannheim was in 
•many things ahead of his t inis and perhaj >s his desire to invest 
with tremendous power a select group of intellectuals was more 
^hsn his period could take; but today it is obvious that most 
-|gf the best minds, in the culture rigorously avoid public 
office (Kissinger notwithstanding). They would far rather
.'•-impend vtheir life in personally meaningful activities and leave
/
crass tedium of governing to others. Times have changed*,
the fears of men gone wild with power are as anachronistic 
in some areas of the world as a Nazi flag. As outlined in the 
historical chapter, the opportunity for strong-men and tyranny
*1 'was extremely gratified to find Barrington Moore (in his 
latest work, Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery...) 
supporting several of my "central’contentions connected with 
the realization that “the times have changed1* , and the related 
impact on modes of social change. More elaborate treatment of 
his book (in some ways incompatible with my views) was not 
possible due to practical limitations. However, concerning 
the preeminence of individual vs. collective change in the 
future, see pp. 14-6, 178-9, 189. Regarding the limitations of 
traditional revolution and its likelihood in this country, see 
pp. 168-1 ?4-.
* came at an earlier stage of civilisation, the move from 
feudal to modem social organisation. A Hitler arising in 
the United States or Germany at this time - at least in any­
thing like the method used by the Fuehrer - is-out of the 
question, for the same kinds of reasons that social movements 
no longer work.
My point then is this:, in times when there was much - 
to be gained (j.n terms of personal enrichment of life) from 
- amoral and abusive behavior, of course that type of interac—
. tion prevailed. But the post-modern situation makes explcdb- 
vtation of other people much less profitable and in many 
dilfetances extremely costly, so that the need for a strict 
©iiLe of '"goods” and “bads” is not as necessary to the opera- 
tion of an innovating populace. However, the most basic 
i^mmandments” would still be matters for socialization of 
s$6®trse, not to kill, steal, willfully harm, and so on. But 
nature of situational ethics is so much tied to. particu­
lar sets of circumstances and particular groups of social 
actors that immutable statements about the morals of the 
future make little sense. Any such attempt is another 
example of projecting today®s understanding of social reality 
into a future which will be more unlike the present than like 
it* That there will be personal and social disorganization 
because of overly ambitious or otherwise unrealistic attempts 
at social innovation seems assured, but the damage inflicted 
will not be of the sort traditionally imposed upon people by 
others more powerful than they. It will be the pain of
This leads to my final consideration of the theory 
as problem. I have dispensed with any extended comment about 
the morality of - innovation to this point for reasons already 
stated- But there is in fact a basic a priori which would 
1 think dominate a culture of change, experimentation and
.rationality: that is, a quest for the accurate, for what is
true as far as we can know it® We now know that the Biblical 
explanation of the earth * s development is untrue; we also 
.know that the monogamous relationship is not "natural, good 
true" any more or less than poiyandrous or polygyncus 
%#nship arrangements« We know a great many more things to be 
either in accord with or net in accord with empirically 
■understandable reality, physical and/or social* But to date
of our major institutions remain in their original state, 
“fphat is built around and for the sake of quasi-mythological 
aments of faith which have no more connection, with what 
is*real than did the Biblical explanations of physical 
phenomena. The sloppiness of primitive social organization 
is no longer feasible or sensible in a world too fast and 
complicated for positively sanctioned incompetence to be 
protected. We know that x'acial prejudice and the attendant 
authoritarian personality are based on inaccurate appraisal:s 
of reality, so moves have slowly been made in the direction
of its eradication* The same type of institutional house- 
cleaning is now consistently in evidence throughout the 
culture for a myriad of reasons, all the way from simple
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-sentiment for the traditional to the iron-hand of financial 
interests maintaining an. irrational social order to maximize 
profits* But as subsistence becomes less and less an issue, 
then the innovator is left with considerable resources in 
both time and money, and his targets for institutional change 
will probably focus on those areas of life which can be most 
personally constricting and .irritating:: kinship, the super-
natural, . education, recreation and to some degree the aesthetic., 
Tqe economic, governmental and stratificational systems are 
-the most firmly protected by social control devices and there­
fore least subject to.outright personal modification, although 
ll^ey undergo -' change yearly as more and more people seek alter­
ative positions in relation to these hierarchies* Change as 
chronicled by historical and sociological writers has usually 
depicted as interesting and significant only those manifests- 
^ons. which occurred in the last three mentioned institutions* 
again, while - this was a defensible scholarly position at 
one time, such limited foci are insufficient for an adequate 
understanding of post-modern change* The cultural revolution 
of the 1960*s had and will continue to have long-term effects 
on all institutions although its most dramatic successes came 
in the- educational, kinship and recreational. The Today8s 
Army, campaign, along with other major alterations of the 
status quo, can be interpreted as a product of the liberating 
climate of the 60*s and the adverse effects upon the tradition­
al military. Whether a redi.stribu.tion of goods took place or 
a radical rearxiangement of power relations for the most part
remains to be seen* But to limit to these criteria an 
assessment of the cultural revolution and the part of the 
innovators within it is to miss the point* There was a 
great deal more going throughout that decade of turmoil than 
analysis of the vulgar Marxist variety is capable of analyzing, 
Whether men in society will be able to handle accuracy 
and rationality in their lives, or rather to what degree they 
will be able to include more of it, is a Question,'; I am not 
prepared to answer** But the fact that more realistic and 
volnntaristie attitudes are producing an increasingly rational, 
s pci al oxder means that in the future the joys and sorrows of 
mythology will give way to more calculated innovation*
Values will move in the direction of empirically established 
truth (the rapid change in kinship today reflect increasing 
awareness of the failure of the standard models), and "regu­
larised1 innovation throughout the culture will as much become 
ihe;%iorra then as emotional!stic conformity is today*
♦My doctoral dissertation will deal with that issue*
APPENDIX
’This addition to the text is offered as a response to 
Professor Kemer* s reservations about the thesis* The form 
of an appendix is used for purely technical reasons so that 
typing could be carried on in the main body while these 
answers to Prof. Kemer were formulated* Time was of the 
essence®
The first objection has to do with lines on page 27,
'f
^pec5,fically, "it has begun in some minor ways to correlate
jwith reality", referring to Parsons® system theory and modem
-society*. Dr* Kemer rightly observes that this remark con- 
% ■
■yffcredicts one made earlier to the effect that "the nature of 
!§hange is itself changing", thus leading me into a hypothet­
ically confusing position* The explanation is rather straight- 
forwards the phrase "in some minor ways" refers not to the 
culture broadly, but mors specifically to the inordinate 
growth of complex organization in the West, culminating in 
the production of "organisation and conglomerate men", and 
the well-documented conformity rampant in some of the more 
affluent sectors of the society. Thus in contrast to the 
socio-economic chaos of the thirties, when Parsons began 
dreaming up the system theory under L.J* Henderson, the 
post-war era (even given the putatively disruptive late 609s) 
is better approximated system!cally, again, "in some minor
ways", than earlier eras* As for the relationship with socia 
change, the innovators do not operate pro but rather contra 
the status quo, so that change is changing, but the culture 
in some of its manifestations - like organization - continues 
to churn out the relatively predictable and uninspired societ 
member. Whereas Parsons looked ridiculous in 1969, he's 
beginning to seem less so the more repressive the political 
situation becomes.
Secondly, Prof. Kemer is concerned that my "presen­
tation is overly simplified15 and "a vast array of phenomena 
is.*included in a relatively brief space", which "leads the 
xkea^er to question how logically interrelated the material 
re©|b!y is". This methodological-stylistic problem faced me 
from the.beginning and was never satisfactorily resolved* 
trying to say something "new" about social change - 
a subject which, as I note in the first paragraphs, can be 
practically' equated with sociology - the emphasis must shift 
from tight, logical, puncture-proof arguments, to highly 
generalized formulations which support the thesis. The most 
trying section to compose was the historical chapter. The 
nature of. historiography itself, the very bulk of data 
available, and the limits of time and talent on my part made 
a seemingly haphazard selection inevitable. Before doing
■ i  mu     m i i i *  i m * ' h  i ■ *  **•
the thesis, I studied some major works In the philosophy of
inquiry, and came to the conclusion that my "argument" was 
not destined to be a debater's dream. Everything that went 
into the thesis seemed absolutely necessary to its author and
the many items and paths of thought omitted simply "seemed" 
less crucial!.. Obviously, I have no defense, if one is required, 
for the fact that it is a sprawling effort. It was a sprawling 
subject.
More personally disturbing. Prof. Keraer objects to 
my "categorical casting aside of numerous works with often 
glib comments as opposed to sound logical justifications".
X frankly do not find In the thesis the source of this remark.
X do lambast, for various reasons, Popper, Hirsch, Martindale, 
'JBoskoff (the latter three for negative reviews of LaPiere's 
^jpeok), but I also praise and exploit dozens of other authors 
.$fcforoughout the thesis for 'their learning, sociologically and 
• ^Historically. Also "sound, logical justifications" are not 
^always necessary or sufficient reasons for criticising an 
raurhor. : Some works fall short of serious consideration
before the level of logic: they simply are not well
conceived or executed.
The most important and serious of Prof. 'Kemer’s 
notes is this: "there must be something going on out there
that has been documented in a more empirical manner. Any 
evidence to that effect would only confirm your thesis"* My 
approach to this issue has been two-fold: first, an examina­
tion of journals and books in the hope of finding good infor­
mation about innovation as a process of cultural change, and 
second, a philosophical-methodological inquiry as to the 
likelihood of finding good supporting analyses. As for the 
first, the amount and quality of material is amazingly sparse
and poor® Most innovation studied has to do with moderniza­
tion processes and other economic topics (see, e.g., Fritz 
Redlieh, "Innovation in Business" and "The Bole of Innova­
tion in a Quasi-Static World", both reprinted in Steeped in 
Two .Cultures (Harper Torchbooks, 197"0 and Galbraith, 
Economics and the Public Purpose, pp. 146-54. ), "which though 
interesting, do not usually have much application to the 
thesis. Also, I felt in'some sense justified in not seeking 
out ‘every, possible fragment of data since both LaPiere and 
Barnett surveyed the field with care, and my work depends on 
theirs® As for the logic of the situation, It is completely 
ufspurprising that the processes of innovations! change as I 
psf^ j-ect them have not been studied, first because the study 
of/sIndividual behavior is extraordinarily difficult and 
always post facto in the case of the true innovator, and 
secondly, because this form of post-modern behavior is so 
xapr^ in its current manifestation - that it has had insuffi­
cient time to enter the reluctantly accepting arms of academe.
Prof . Kerner was also bothered by my "weak" economic 
analysis, appropriately I believe. As a partial remedy I 
have studied Galbraith more carefully, and am now’ of the 
belief that the footnote on page 144 of the thesis is more 
accurate as economics than the relatively conservative 
arguments incorporated into the text. But for lack of time, 
an entire rewriting would be performed cn the section®
However, in keeping with my essentially Marxist orientation 
to the problem, I still feel that Galbraith’s plan for
'! >'p
' reform as expressed in his latest writing, is marvelous to 
contemplate and unlikely to be implemented* The relations 
of power and financial strength are such that the individual 
innovator may be able to feather his own nest (see Harry 
Browne on this issue, any of his books), but an essential 
alteration of economic arr atigement s will remain problematic * 
Remember that when a recent president sought to make 
Galbraith a ranking government economic advisor, Wall Street 
erupted in fury and made it plain that his- - "iconoclastic" 
view of economic reality was completely indigestible®
.'4 Connected with this, Prof® Kerner recognizes that
Inhere are all kinds of international economic issues that 
be raised", which I assiduously did not raise due to 
their horrible complexity and also since the thesis was 
■^signed* to explain change in the most advanced sectors of 
itfle wor3„d only.
X hope these responses have clarified somewhat the 
■ muddier sections Prof* Kerner was good enough to elucidate 
for me*
NOOSES
*1. There has existed for nearly two decades within 
the discipline a publicised debate between the remnants of the 
old functionalists versus conflict theorists and the newer 
Mradical caucus” adherents (not to mention the even more 
recent '‘radical functionalists”)* Their basic disagreements 
intern from ma^or methodological differences, resulting of course
fin.-equally major substantive battles* The old problems of
.'Sir
|*bjactivity, social, causation, values and the researcher, etc. 
have come to the fore in books like Yidich and Stein* s Socio- 
'ffipgy on .Trial* Friedrichs* Sociology of Sociology, Reynolds 
ipud Reynolds9 Sociology of Sociology and Myrdal * s Objectivity 
:1S3 Social Research.* among dozens of others* It seems at 
times that American sociologists, perhaps due to pressure from 
Fretich, British and German colleagues, publish as many self-­
conscious, self-critical articles and books as original 
research or theory pieces. While ■ there may be great utility 
in-professional ”soul-searching”, my attention to the debate 
remains small, for another thesis or two on the subject itself 
would be. entirely possible* However, within my scope there 
immediately arise the same problems with which these authors 
concern themselves, well-summarised for example in Norman 
Bimbaum9 s Toward a Critical Sociology* I have taken cogni­
zance of our self-appraising colleagues and wish this to be
1 ? 6
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under stood s 1 write with the knowledge that my methodology 
is anything but airtight vis a vis questions of history and 
sociology, valuation and research, the efficacy of grand 
theory, that is, theory treating great spans of. time and huge 
groupings of variables in "untanglcable plethoras”* But since 
much valuable x*e search of this type has been done in the past,
I write, also with the conviction that protracted theorising, 
if based on a careful reading of history with socioloiogical 
insight,, is not only advisable but indispensable to a disci- 
spline overloaded with unrelated print-outs*
At one point in my research, I compiled a bibliography 
iggnd made notes toward a methodological statement (akin to those 
,Iaa -all of Myrdal • s works) the focus of which centered around 
.f^jjstorical/social causation and its "detection”, value pro- 
•Jesses versus structural manif©stations regarding the phenom- 
.jglsfn of social change, the value-free motif in current research, 
and key epistemological problems growing out of the.Kant-Marx~ 
Mimnheim-Kaberinas tradition and its many offshoots* But 
after toying with the problems of authoritative writing in 
this uncharted field, I.-carefully retreated, not with the 
admission that I was thereby forced to produce less sound 
research, • but simply to get on. with the actual project at 
hand. I began to feel like an airplane at the end of the 
runway, rewing the engines for six hours prepax^ing for a 
ten minute flight! Thus, all the fascinating, sometimes 
momentous, often trivial ramifications of the sociology of
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sociology will have to wait for proper attention. (Bee brief
bibliography of works consulted at the end of this note.)
I have relied on several major theoretical texts in
this study of social and cultural change, those of LaPiere,
Barnett, Toffler and to a less noticeable degree, Brecht and
Etsioni (see general bibliography)* These books were selected
from a large field due to their intensity, originality and
usefulness to rny method* Within social psychology I have
'Used to some advantage Mills and Garth*s classic for like
^reasons* Of even more use however has been the synthetic,
^far-reaching, thought of.-Marion Vanfossen whose probing into
jgjthe future of post-modern culture is as sophisticated and
^original as any being done by so clad scientists at this time.
Partial bibliography of the sociology of sociology:
ilfpixmfeaum, Norman. Toward a Critical Sociology. New York: 
y  Oxford U. Phess” 1971 •
fYBlaekburn, Robin, ed. Ideology in Social Science. New York: 
•Random House, 1^7bT~Vrntage Book*
Branson, Leon* The Political Context of Sociology, Princeton: 
Princeton U* Press, 1961*
Brecht, Arnold* Political Theory: The Poundations of 20th 
Century Political Thought* Princeton paperbacks.
Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1939.
Douglas, Jack* The Relevance of Sociology. N.Y.: Appleton- 
Century-Croft s, 7T970.
Durkheim,- Emile. The Rules of Sociological Method. Translated 
by Sarah A* Solovay and John H. Mueller. Tree Press 
Paperback. N.Y.: Free- Press, 1964.
.Friedrichs, Robert W. A Sociology of Sociology. Free Press 
Paperback. N.YTsTE^eST^ssT
Gouldner, Alvin W. The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology.
Avon Equinox Books* N.Y.: Avon, "iW^.
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Horowitz, Irvin L.-J ed* The New Sociology. Galaxy Books,
N.Y.: Oxford U. Press”, l90f«
Lynd, Robert S .  &iOwled£e for What? Princeton Paperbacks* 
Princeton: Prlhce'tonTu* Press, 1970..
Myrdal, Gunn-ar. Objectivity in Social Research. .N.Y. i Pan­
theon Books, 1^599*
O'Neill, John. Sociology as a Skin Trade: Essays Towards a
Reflexive Sociology. ~N.Y.T Harper and Row,’ T972.
Reynolds, Larry T# and Janice M., eds. The Sociology of 
Sociology. N.Y*: MacKay Co., 1970.
Vidich* Arthur J. and Stein, Maurice, eds. Sociology on Trial, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall7^%?T"
;Weber, Max* On the Methodology of the Social Sciences. Trans- 
^ lated’ by Edward ShiTiand Henry Elnch. Glencoe, 111.:
■ fsfc Free Press, 1949.
2. Gouldner, qjj. cit., p. 29 ff.
3. Blackburn, op. cit., passim.
I' -2P« fitt, pp. ix -48.
i : >  ' 3 *  Ibid., p.  xii.
CJ6. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemie 
(Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1962 J7"3th”edition, revised, 
pp. 3 -48.
?. Richard P. Appelbaum, Thecud.es of Social Change 
(Chicago: Markham Publishing Co.,~ T97dJT^
8. Pitirim A* Sorokin, (N.Y.: Dover Publications, 
1963), originally entitled Social Philosophies of an Age of 
Crisis (1950).
9* New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 196$.
10. Homer G. Barnett, Innovation: The Basis of Cultural 
Change (N.Y*: McGraw-Hill Book,': Co., 1*953)•
11. LaPiere, Social Change. p. vi. (Here aft ex*, SC* )
12. Relying heavily in research of an extended nature 
upon a single major work would seem at best optimistic, at
(Note to page 12) 
worst disastrous, depending of course upon the quality of 
the source and the use made of it® Therefore, it seems 
advisable to defend such a technique.
The study of social change has been intermittently 
popular with professionals for decades, and theories of 
change at both micro and macro levels abound., I have 
examined many of these theories, either directly or through 
comprehensive studies* After having discerned in most of 
them debilitating weaknesses which render them only somewhat 
useful, it was with great delight and relief that LaPiere's 
wo^: came to.my attention* Characterized in social-psycho- 
lcip|eal terms, he seems to be an old wizened liberal whose 
desire for heightened-human, freedom pervades his work, yet 
• through many years of study has found that standard 
ch^ge theories come up short for reasons he makes clear* 
However, in a book of $42 pages, it is not possible to offer 
lengthy refutations of other theoretical positions simply for 
the glorification of one’s own thoughts* It is more important 
to delineate carefully and document as much as possible the 
theory being offered. This LaPiere has done, end this is 
what I shall seek to do in the following.
Out of academic curiosity I studied reviews of 
Social Change in the major journals. Lon Martindale (AJB,?1: 
203-4, Sept. *6$), Walter Hirsc-h (Social Forces, xliv, #1 s 
136-7, Aug. 16$) and Alvin Boskoff (ASR, XXX: 639-40, Aug. 96$) 
all. made slightly differing but equally imperceptive, inade-
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quate and imprecise attacks on the book. It is amazing and 
depressing that particularly Mart indale and Hirsch, two 
important men in the discipline, should so unslo.llfully 
handle LaPiere * s achievement. After reading very carefully 
their reviews, it would be easy to construct a point by 
point contradictory statement, but aside from psychological, 
vindication of LaPiere such an exercise would serve no purpo 
and would consume valuable hour’s. Their attacks, finally, 
for this reader are unworthy of the book.
By way of sample illustration, both Mart indale and 
•SUflpsch extract one line from LaPiere1 s Preface ("The theory 
Sgpjbn,.which the following is based, and which fox' reasons of 
.personal preference is kept mox»e implicit than explicit, 
-c^istitutes a sharp break with the traditional theories 
■^§1.,..) - although both reviewers succeed in misquoting him 
~of--contexting the line beyond recognition - neither 
writer understood the point of the sentence,; LaPiere wanted 
simply to acknowledge his use of Barnett's theory, but was 
not going to footnote every instance. Both reviewers seised 
upon the sentence, claiming for it meanings which were clear 
not intended. It seems neither gave their reading the same 
dedication and care LaPiere gave his writing, which upon 
reflection is not surprising.
Also of interest is LaPiere*s treatment of both 
Martindale and Hirsch in an extended footnote to page $4* of 
Social Change in which he writes: 111) on Mart indale® s Social
i O c
(Note to page 12)
Life and Cultural Change (1962) is only an elaboration of 
certain aspects of Max Weber* s theory of the role of religion 
in the determination of social stability and change*..".
Regarding Hirsch, "Of the hundreds of books that were pub­
lished over the past decade by American sociologists about 
sociological matters, only nine are specifically on social 
change. Of these, two (...Explorations in Social Change,
1964, ea.Br, Walter Hirsch and George Zollschan) are collections 
of discrete essays and articles". Martindale wrote the intro­
duction to Hirsch*s bock so we realize that the negative 
rbpiews were another example of sociology-fratemity black­
balling:*
Hirsch®s reader, Explorations..., in spite of its• iw ia. i mmi*i f m  ■■ n m n . t i» M im . g iii« u —  m k c  •  ■**
8^g;,vpages is predominantly pompous and protracted mediocrity. 
Th»few articles which rise above the trivial or bombastic
M i S ? -
€Q|gpem such old standards as Sorokin's work. Sorokin's 
piece in the book is by far the most readable and sociologi­
cally sensitive. That the antiseptic Purdue "thinkers" would 
eschew LaPiere*s vision of reality does not come as a shock*
Finally., Zollschan wrote an article on Freud's 
"reality principle", and the book in toto Is supposedly 
constructed around that marvelously chic term, "the dialectic". 
Naturally, LaPiere regards Freud as the world's worst socio­
logist, and he frowns on elevating a simple cognitive tool to 
the position of "school"-ishness.
Boskoff's review is only slightly less Inadequate in
(Notes to pages 12 - 28)
this realm of proto-scholarship. He attacks LaPieree s polemics 
as “out of place” i.e. in poor taste, etc*, without discussing 
the possible validity of the author’s arguments* The book 
.for him is a ”disquieting "mixture” of elements, “not text 
nor reference nor tract”. By God, sounds like an innovation!
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